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ABSTRACT
The problems associated with economic stability
and rising income among the nations of the world are
numerous and complex.

These problems consist of short

run and long run difficulties, and pertain to all countries
regardless of the extent of economic development.
This paper presents the relationship between mone
tary, fiscal, and external policies as they ?/ere employed
in some of the Latin American countries during the fiveyear period, 1952-1956.

These policies reveal, in large

measure, changes in income, the price level, and external
practices of these relatively underdeveloped countries.
For the purpose of determining to what extent
monetary, fiscal, and external policies should be applied,
the requirements necessary for a nation to realize a
condition of international equilibrium are given.

This

concept explains that a stated national income may be
maintained at a given exchange rate, provided that changes
in saving and investment are offset by variations in
imports and exports (the current account of the balance
of payments).

If there are differences betv/een the two

accounts, then lending (the capital account of the balance
of payments) would be required to create a balance.
It is suggested that an additional requirement is
viii

necessary before a condition of international equilibrium
may be established.

The requirement is that monetary,

fiscal, and external policies must be so employed that
they may fill the gap between saving and investment and
imports and exports should capital movements fail to do
so.
The concept of international equilibrium is applied
to Mexico and Venezuela in order to determine if these two
countries realized a state of international equilibrium.
Monetary, fiscal, and external policies are then observed
for the purpose of relating their contribution toward
creating such a desirable objective.
It was found that those in charge of carrying out
these policies in the nations considered were unable to
obtain the objective of international equilibrium.

It is

suggested that the desire to develop the countries was
considered to be of greater importance than was that of
acquiring a condition of international equilibrium.

The

effect has been to relegate the aforementioned policies
to some extent in order to stimulate economic development.
These findings suggested a need for various
measures to be undertaken by underdeveloped nations which
may provide for a greater degree of economic progress and
stability.

The measures suggested are (1) the relation

ship between gold and international reserves and the money
ix

supply,

(2) a comparison between the money supply, national

product, and price level, and (3) changes in current
account balances and long-term capital movements.
If utilized, these measures could contribute to a
greater degree of monetary stability; express the rela
tive effectiveness of the internal policies— monetary and
fiscal policies— and, therefore, suggest variations in
their employment;

and provide a basis for estimating the

need and effectiveness of capital movements.
These measures,
nations,

as applied to six Latin American

appeared to justify their use in achieving a

better balanced growth.

x

INTRODUCTION
A sizeable portion of the vast store of economic
literature in recent years has been devoted to studies
on an international level.

Some of the writings have

emphasized the adaptation of older ideas while others
have presented the application of newer theories, some
of which pertain directly to the underdeveloped countries,1
Although the larger portion of this literature is
concerned with the responsibilities of the more highly
industrialized nations and emphasizes the theme of full
employment, steady but rising incomes, and relatively
stable price levels, a growing body of economic writings
is related to the problems of the lesser developed
countries*

A few of the major problems are discussed

under such topics as the pent-up postwar demand for
goods and services, the inadequate supply of many com
modities* the mal-allocation of resource factors, economic
development, a lack of saving and investment, disequilibrium

% o r example, Bertil Ohlin, Interregional and Inter
national Trade (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935
especially pages 29-30, 42, 48-49, and 57-58$ Ragnar Nurske,
"Domestic and International Equilibrium,” in The New
Economics. edited by Seymour Harris, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1948), pp. 264-292; and Joan Robinson, "Beggar My - Neighbor Remedies for Unemployment,” in Readings in
the Theory of International Trade, edited by Howard Ellis
and Lloyd Metzler, (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Company,
1949), pp. 393-407.

),

in the balance of payments, and so on.

The subjects are

of immense importance from both the standpoint of raising
the apparent low plane of living in the underdeveloped
areas and of explaining how these nations may fit into
a pattern of expanding world trade and co-operation.
This paper is to deal with some of the economic
problems of Latin America as a part of the general group
of countries which are referred to as the underdeveloped
areas of the world.^

Specifically, the contention of

this paper is that the problems associated with fluctuat
ing incomes, general high prices and inflation, and
imbalances in the balance of payments could be ameliorated
to a great extent if monetary, fiscal, and external
policies were applied with greater e f f e ctiveness. 3

The

effectiveness allows for the application of these policies
primarily through the present means now available in the
countries.

It further suggests a change in the manner

^The term underdeveloped area is construed to mean
a nation or group of nations with a low per-capita income
but having the basic prerequisites for material improve
ment. For a more authoritative definition of under
development refer to N. S. Buchanan, and H. S. Ellis,
Approaches to Economic Development (New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1955), p. 4; and E. M. Bernstein, and I. G.
Patel, "Inflation In Relation To Economic Development,"
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. Vol. II, No.
3, November, 1952, p. 363.
^There are numerous articles treating these general
problems. For an interesting account of the instability

of their employment only if the policies are inflexible,
or have little or no effect on the functioning of the
economy as they are used.

In addition, it makes little

sense if the policies are employed without proper co
ordination.4
The approach to the solution of the above indicated
problems begins with a logical hypothesis.

It Is assumed

that those in charge of directing the economic growth of
the lesser developed nations hold a condition of Inter
national equilibrium as their major objective.

This

objective may not be attained, or if it becomes a reality,
the nations may not be able to maintain such a condition.
From a more practical viewpoint, it is not so important
as to whether or not a condition of international equi
librium is maintained as long as It remains the chief

of domestic income and employment and the inevitable dis
couragement of investment in the raw material industries
caused by the oscillating of prices in the export industry
see R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar World
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1954), p. 441. Mr.
Adler suggests less emphasis upon agricultural production
to relieve the price problem while Mr. James W. Angell,
et al., explains that in the next fifty years agricultural
prices may become more steady than those of industrial
products. Refer to John Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary
Implementations of Development Programs,11 American Economic
Review. Papers and Proceedings. May, 1952, pp. 588-91; and
James W. Angell, et al., Economic Policy, edited by William
Grampp and Emanuel Weiler, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1956), p. 319.
4Among several good articles on this subject refer

objective of these countries.

Thus, it is realized that

there are factors at work which constantly tend to dis
turb an otherwise balanced pattern of growth.

It is

important, therefore, that these nations attempt to
readjust to the altered conditions.

Monetary, fiscal,

and external policies have a definite role to play in
helping to mitigate the adverse effects of these dis
turbances.
The concept of international equilibrium explains
that a nation could maintain a given national income at
a stated exchange rate provided that realized saving
equated realized investment and imports equated exports
(a current account balance).

Furthermore, that the above

condition could be maintained If the balance between the
internal accounts of saving and Investment are different
from that of the external accounts of Imports and exports,
provided that the movement of international capital is
equal to the difference.^

to John Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary Implementations
of Development Programs,” American Economic Review. Papers
and Proceedings, May, 1952, pp. 584-600; Seymour Harris
fed.), Economic Problems of Latin America (New York;
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1944)", pp. 96-112; and Simon G.
Hanson, Economic Development In Latin America (Washington;
The Inter-American Affairs Press, 1951), especially Chapter
14, ”The Role of the Government: Public Finance, Banking
and Economic Planning,” pp. 456-490.
®The writer drew heavily on the work of Professors

It is further suggested that capital, the balancing
factor, may not be of sufficient magnitude— whether the
balancing result requires an inflow or outflow of capital—
to provide a balance between the internal and external
accounts.

If capital should be exactly sufficient to

close the gap, it still must be directed into channels
which would react on saving and investment and imports
and exports in a balancing fashion, otherwise Income or
the exchange rate, or both, would be subject to change.
On the other hand, the flow of capital is subject
to decisions made by foreign residents, firms, and govern
ments.

Since these foreign groups must give sanction

to capital movements, the lesser developed nations are
not always in a position to influence the directional
flow of capital.
From the reasons stated In the above paragraphs,
it is likely that capital movements are normally unable
to accomplish a condition of international equilibrium
in the open economies of the underdeveloped countries.

Enke and Salera for the explanation of the concept of
International equilibrium. See Stephen Enke and Virgil
Salera, International Economics, second edition (Hew
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), pp. 232-241. This
material is also presented in the third edition bearing
the same title. Refer to Appendix A, pp. 555-565. All
subsequent references pertaining to the above concept
Is taken from the second edition.

A final contention of this paper is, then, that
monetary, fiscal, and external policies must complement
the movement of capital in order to close the gap between
the internal and external accounts of these nations to
achieve, if not maintain, a state of international equi
librium,

A more exhaustive treatment of the concept of

international equilibrium and the role of monetary,
fiscal, and external policies is reserved for the first
part of Chapter I.
To get closer to the more practical implications
in the employment of the three aforementioned policies,
the last part of Chapter I is concerned with some of the
numerous variable factors which influence the implemen
tation of monetary, fiscal, and external policies.

Some

of the factors considered are foreign exchange reserves,
depreciation of the currency, individual and business
savings, the character of the banking systems, taxation,
the role of governmental agencies, exchange systems, and
so on.
No effort is made to separate the variable factors
into a dependent or independent status.

Income is con

sidered to be the only independent variable factor.

All

other elements are dependent on one another and on income
itself.

Furthermore, each factor is introduced and

analyzed individually.

Also, little effort is expended

7
in associating the influence of other factors upon a single
factor under consideration.

This method seems to he justi

fiable since the purpose of our analysis at this stage
is to probe into the nature of these factors as they would
appear to be employed in the lesser developed economies.
To state the matter a little differently, one wants to
know more about what to expect from the influences that
these factors create in the underdeveloped countries.6
Perhaps the variable factors introduced in this survey
produce different effects than the same factors at work
in the more highly developed nations.

In addition, there

may be some factors evident in the underdeveloped nations
that are of minor significance in the more industrialized
countries.

Finally, some of the factors which exist in

the lesser developed nations may not be evident at all
in the advanced countries

.'

After having examined the theory of international
equilibrium and the anticipated influences exerted by
the variable factors, subsequent chapters deal with the
practical application of these forces.

Chapter II is

6A1though important, such elements as cultural
and political factors are not considered within the
realm of this study.
^For instance, an increase in the tax rates appli
cable to individual incomes may tend to stimulate pro
duction in the developed nations, whereas a similar rise

8
devoted to a study of Mexico, while Chapter III is con
cerned with a study of Venezuela.

In this manner, one

is given an opportunity to apply the concepts developed
in Chapter I.
These two nations are chosen on the basis of their
dissimilar characteristics; that is, Mexico is primarily
a domestic economy, and Venezuela is chiefly an export
economy.

Also, the external portion of their economies

functions on a different basis.

Mexico employs a flexible

exchange rate system, and Venezuela utilizes a form of
exchange control.

Recent experience in these two under

developed countries should present one with an opportunity
to test the concept of international equilibrium; to
observe the influences generated by the variable factors;
and to examine the extent to which monetary, fiscal, and
external policies contribute, or fail to contribute,
toward a more balanced economic growth.
With the results produced after examining the two

in tax rates is likely to depress production in the lesser
developed countries. A change in interest rates normally
has the effect of determining the direction of Investment
expenditures In the industrialized nations. Yet, a vari
ation of interest rates in the underdeveloped countries
may provide very little inducement in the employment of
capital.
Also, the latter countries may occasion an
immediate capital flight in response to external pressures
on their exchange rates. These pressures may be evident
only after long intervals in the highly developed nations,
and the probability of anticipated capital flight is likely
to be remote.

above nations, the first part of the last chapter, Chapter
IV, offers several measuring devices which should be use
ful in describing the effectiveness of the above internal
and external policies.

The measuring devices include (l)

the relationship between gold and international reserves
and the money supply, (g) a comparison between the money
supply, national product (income), and the price level,
and (3) changes in current account balances and long-term
capital movements.
These devices are applied to six Latin American
countries, three of which represent domestic economies
in opposition to export economies.
Brazil, and Mexico.

They include Argentina,

The remaining three nations are prima

rily export economies and consist of Chile, Peru, and
Venezuela.
The six nations are taken as representative samples
of the numerous countries referred to as the Latin American
area.

Of course, the list could be expanded.

Yet, the

number of countries chosen should be sufficient for these
purposes, and may serve as a basis for judging whether or
not the nations are directing their policies so as to
achieve a condition of international equilibrium.

In

addition, the measuring devices may yield some information
with respect to the requirement of foreign capital and
the ability of the countries to absorb it.

Finally, they

10
should suggest the need for a change in the use of one or
more

of the internal or external policies, or a shift in

emphasis in applying the policies, to provide a more
continuous pattern of growth.
The second part of Chapter IV is reserved for draw
ing up the general conclusions.
The theoretical portion of this paper is largely
confined to Chapter I Conceptual Relations Among Variable
Factors.

Chapter II Ihe Case of Mexico, Chapter III The

Case of Venezuela, and the first part of Chapter IV Some
Concluding Observations are primarily devoted to observ
ing and describing events as they take place.
Chapters II and III follow a similar sequence of
development.

The earlier sections of these two chapters

are concerned with the concept of international equi
librium and, therefore, deal with the influences exerted
on the national income and price level by the forces of
saving, investment, imports, exports, and lending (capital)
over a five-year period, 1952-1956.

A discussion of the

internal and external influences which give rise to
changes In the above factors is presented on a year-toyear basis.

This approach gives one an opportunity to

check on the application and co-ordination of monetary,
fiscal, and external policies, and to determine their
effectiveness, or lack of effectiveness, in maintaining

11
the national income for the period.
In connection with Venezuela, an attempt is made
to measure the approximate state of international equi
librium by excluding, as far as possible, the impact of
the petroleum industry, and then incorporating the con
tribution of the oil firms into the analysis.

By excluding

this external element in the first instance, it should
give one a chance to estimate the internal growth of the
nation.
This
A. few

paper is subject to perhaps many limitations.

of the moreimportant limiting factors pertain to

the number of countries included in this study and the
time element.

Besides being a monumental task, the

inclusion of a larger number of Latin American countries
would perhaps alter the findings to only a minor extent.
Yet, because they are not included, the above statement
is open to valid criticism.

Nevertheless, some of the

countries are in such an early stage of development that
the type of analysis used in.this paper would yield inef
fective results.

Also, the kind of information which is

required in a study of this nature wrould probably be
1 acking.
With respect to the time
study

is of short duration.

years, 1952-1956.

factor, the period under

It includes only five recent

At best, this short time span allows

one to only touch on the edges of the intermediate period.
Nevertheless, whenever there are definite indications of
the more pronounced long run forces exerting their weight,
they will he brought to the reader’s attention.

CHAPTER I
CONCEPTUAL RELATIONS AMONG VARIABLE FACTORS
Certainly many of our present day economic problems
dealing with nations hinge upon the outcome of the working
of numerous variable forces.

There is still room for more

analytical treatment of these forces, especially as they
apply to nations carrying on trade with one another.
Furthermore, the underdeveloped areas have particular
problems which may be alleviated somewhat through a
better understanding of the interplay of variable factors.
This chapter is to deal with some of the variable
factors as they affect the functioning of an economy.

In

other words, the question posed is: what effects can one
expect from the working of these variable factors?

Of

utmost importance are the possible effects to be realized
in the functioning of an open economy, and particularly
as the factors are applied in underdeveloped nations.
To get underway, it would seem prudent to establish
the conditions which provide for an equilibrium situation
of a nation engaged in trade.

After such a setting is

accomplished, variable factors will be introduced and
analyzed.

The variable factors will be treated under

two general headings:

(1) monetary and fiscal variables

and (2) external variables.

There will be an overlapping
15

14
between these two categories; nonetheless, a general
categorizing is attempted for clarity.
Emphasis is to be placed upon the monetary effects
of the variables rather than their effects upon the flow
of goods.

This distinction is of more importance when

the external factors are treated.
The subject matter in this chapter will pertain
mostly to general short-term problems rather than long
run adjustments, and, therefore, should be considered as
supplemental to the more fundamental long run processes.
I.

THE SETTING

The income approach will be utilized to establish
the necessary requirements for international equilibrium
of a nation engaged in trade.
symbols must be defined.-*-

At the outset, the various

NI is to refer to a given

national income; E is to represent intended exports; M is
to indicate intended imports; S is to represent intended
saving; A is to explain intended investment, that is, the

% o s t of the terminology is taken from Professors
Enke and Salera. See Stephen Enke and Virgil Salera,
International Economics (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1951)7 PP« 233-241. For other references of interest see
Charles Kindleberger, International Economics (Homewood,
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1955), especially Chapter
22, "Cyclical Disturbance to Equilibrium," pp. 414-435;
and Harry Brainard, International Economics and Public
Policy (New York: Henry Holt and Co.7 1954)7 pp. 157-172.

15
net accumulation of real capital by residents; L is to
represent the rate of lending; MB is to refer to monetary
and banking policies; and F is to relate to fiscal policy.
E and A tend to increase income while M and S tend
to reduce income, other things remaining the same.

There

is no assurance, however, that E -f- A equals M ■+* S since
either or both factors on one side of the equation may
rise or fall to an extent greater or less than one or both
of the factors on the opposite side of the equation at
any given point in time.

For example, a rise in intended

exports is not likely to be associated with an exact rise
in intended imports.

And it is further unlikely that the

difference between these two amounts will be exactly offset
by a rise in intended saving and a fall in intended invest
ment to accomplish an equality between the two sides of the
equation.^

The same reasoning may be applied to any other

situation in respect to these factors.

In other words,

in order to establish national equilibrium two balancing
factors must come into play.

They are (1) the intended

rate of lending (L) and (g) monetary and fiscal policies

2As observables, saving and investment are equal.
However, at any given point in time, either factor may
be larger or smaller than the other. In this connection
see Alvin Hansen, Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1949), Appendix B, pp. 219225.

16
(MB and F).5
The center of attention will first be directed
upon lending.

The following conditional requirement for

the establishment of national equilibrium is stated in
the following equation.4
E - M

= L = A-

S

Lending plays the important role of creating a
balance between the two sides of the equation (E - M and
A - S).5

In doing so it connects the national economy,

at a given income level and exchange rate, through the
intended saving and intended investment account, and the
international economy through the external accounts of
intended exports and intended imports.
The result is that the excess of intended saving
over intended investment may be offset by positive lend
ing.

If the' opposite situation existed, negative lend

ing (borrowing) would be instigated in order to balance
the account.
Similar reasoning may be applied to the external
account witnessing an excess of intended exports over

®These two forces are briefly discussed by Professor
Kindleberger. Refer to Kindleberger, op. cit., pp. 438
and 448-450.
4Enke and Salera, op. cit.. p. 233.
^Lending here includes the usual capital account
items.

17
imports or vice versa.

The former would provide a

balance by positive lending, and the latter through
negative lending.

The outcome is explained in a some

what different light by Professors Enke and Salera in
the following statement: ”. . .

When equilibrium has

been attained, intended exports minus intended imports
will equal intended saving minus intended investment
because both differences will be equal to lending.”®
The above discussion may be augmented by pointing
out individual conditions emphasizing the direction of
lending.
If:
E > M , L should be positive, (-) effect
in the balance of payments, or lending,
takes place.
M > E , L should be negative, (+) effect
in the balance of payments, or negative
lending (borrowing), takes place.
S > A, L should be positive, (-) effect
in the balance of payments, or lending,
takes place.
A> S, L should be negative, (♦) effect
in the balance of payments, or negative
lending (borrowing), takes place.
Lending in its balancing role may be either a
cause or effect factor.^

From a causal viewpoint, lending

®Enke and Salera, o&. cit.. p. 234.
^Enke and Salera, o]D. cit., p. 233.

18
would involve contracts for the movement of funds based
upon decisions of individuals, government, and private
or quasi-public institutions.
Lending as a resultant concept may occur when
exporters decide to place their earnings in a bank of
the importing country.

There is a transfer of purchas

ing power as would be occasioned by a movement of short
term funds.
Since lending and borrowing involve two nations,
which means that the flow of funds must be sanctioned by
both sides, except for similar transactions as mentioned
at the end of the above paragraph, lending may fail to
close the necessary gap between the equation factors.
For instance, intended lending may fail to close the gap
registered by an excess of intended exports over intended
imports; or, a surplus of intended investment over intended
saving may not be reduced by the necessary amount required
through intended (negative) lending.
In such a case as given, there would be a tendency
for the national income to change, or the exchange rate
would have to be modified.
The possible failure of lending as a balancing
factor to provide a given national income and rate of
exchange may be compensated for through the interaction
of the second balancing factor (s)— monetary policy (MB)
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and fiscal policy (F).

A second equation may be conceived

and expressed as follows:
E - M = MB and F = A - S
In this equation monetary and fiscal policy replace
lending in the former equation.8

This attempts to explain

that if lending— involving other nations— doe;: ■ t achieve
the necessary balance between the accounts, the money and
banking system and the government could provide enough
flexibility to achieve the desired balance.
Monetary and fiscal policy could play an Important
part in achieving equilibrium.

Some of the measures

available are applied to individual situations below.
If:
E > M , MB should provide for an Increase
In the international exchange reserve
fund to act as a "buffer."
F should allow for an increase of
export taxes or a reduction in subsidies,
if granted.
M > E, MB should utilize the "buffer" of
international exchange reserves.
F should include a rise in import
taxes or a reduction of import subsidies,
if granted.

®The term replacement is employed here only as
an explanation of the new balancing factor(s) (MB and F ) .
Actually, the factor(s) supplement rather than replace
lending.

go

s> A, MB should grant a selective downward
revision of quantitative and qualitative
controls; a reduction of commercial bank
interest rates.
F should produce a decrease in
taxation; an increase of transfer payments;
a rise in government lending to the public.
A } S, MB should incorporate a selective
upward revision of quantitative and
qualitative controls; a rise of commercial
bank interest rates.
F should sanction an increase in
taxation; a reduction of transfer payments;
stepped-up government borrowing from the
public.
The types of measures and the extent of their use
would depend a great deal upon the experience of the nation
involved.

The maintenance of a supply of exchange reserves

as a result of an international sales increase is an
accepted means today of providing for future declines in
export sales or for changes in relative imports.

Inter

national reserves may be used as a first line of defense
to close the gap if negative lending fails to do so.^
Variations in tax levies may not register the
desired effects within a reasonable period of time.

On

the other hand, a highly efficient tax system could
provide the necessary directional change in saving,
exports, and imports, especially if commodity taxes and

^Venezuela has accumulated approximately $350
million of gold and foreign exchange between the years
195S and 1956. See the International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics. any recent issue.
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similar excise taxes constitute an important segment of
income.

Export and import tax levies may be changed in

short-order if the Executive branch of the government
has been granted authority to vary these imposts.^
Governmental borrowing from the domestic sector
could be carried out in connection with tax policy and
other fiscal measures to insure the filling of the gap
not closed through lending.

The decision to use this

measure would hinge upon the desirability of creating a
temporary debt and the extent of prior debt outstanding.
The smaller the gap to be closed between the two sides of
the equation, including lending, the more likely would be
the possibility of employing government borrowing from
the public.
Borrowing from the banking system creates additional
reserves for commercial banks and makes possible larger

^ D e c r e e number 2602 allowed the Acting President
of Columbia to establish import duties for all commodities
in the Tariff Schedule. Refer to United States Department
of Commerce, Business Information Service. World Trade
Series, number 177, February, 1952; laws 1502 and 53 of
1935 and 1939, respectively, gave the President of Paraguay
the power to increase import duties in an amount equal to
revenue losses from changes in the official rate of exchange.
See United States Department of Commerce, Investment in
Paraguay. December, 1954, p. 90; and Presidential decree
number 11 issued on October 18, 1955 exempted certain
industries from paying Nicaraguan import duties on various
products- Refer to United States Department of Commerce,
Foreign Commerce Weekly. December 19, 1955, p. 8.
H-James Maxwell, Fiscal Policy (New York: Henry
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loans.

However, this action by itself may reduce saving

only slightly.

This depends primarily upon psychological

stimulation and anticipation of future economic conditions
by the public in general.
A change in the flow of transfer payments could
be so altered as to contribute somewhat toward closing
the gap between the equation factors.

Perhaps the most

serious obstacle connected with this measure is the time
element.

Generally, a change in the directional flow of

transfer payments takes too long to accomplish desirable
results.
Probably the most flexible measure would be the
altering of quantitative and qualitative controls of the
banking system.

Timing is of immense importance.

In

the case in which intended saving is in excess of
intended accumulation and positive intended lending
does not close the gap, a lowering of the general and
selective monetary controls should reduce the evident
high liquidity.

Lowering bank interest rates would also

contribute something toward the accomplishment of the
same objective, because it would tend to entice idle
funds into investment channels.

A reverse application

Holt and Co., 1955), pp. 115-117. This is a good although
brief discussion of the merits and demerits of spending
and taxation.
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of these monetary measures would serve to close the gap
if intended accumulation were grea-ter than intended saving
and intended lending fell short of absorbing the differ
ence*
In the above discussion monetary and banking
measures were causal factors directly instigated to
create a balance between the equation factors.

One may

inquire as to whether these measures could be effectual
factors, i. e., applied for some other given purpose yet
indirectly aiding in closing the gap.
entirely possible.

This appears

Quantitative and qualitative controls

are tightened when the authorities feel that there is
too much money and credit in circulation or when prices
begin to rise.

This is normally a period when intended

accumulation is in excess of intended saving.

A general

loosening of controls would take place when there is too
little money and credit in circulation or when prices
start to fall.

This is usually the time when intended

saving is in excess of intended accumulation.
The varying of monetary controls in an attempt to
deal effectively with the supply of money and credit in
circulation would tend to produce changes in the direction
required to help offset the excess of intended saving
over intended investment and vice versa.
At present monetary and fiscal policies are
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probably more in the realm of effect factors than they
are cause factors so far as they pertain to the balanc
ing of the equation.

In other words, these policies are

applied mainly to the domestic problems of money, credit,
and prices rather than as measures instigated to fill a
gap in order to achieve a given national income.
So far it has been shown that a nation could
realize a national equilibrium condition through the
alteration of the rate of lending and monetary and fiscal
policies.

International equilibrium could not be achieved,

however, without taking into account the rate of exchange.
There would be only one exchange rate and national income
level that would provide an equilibrium, given the rate
of lending and the sum of the monetary and fiscal
Influencing devices.
The national Income level may rise or fall, but
there is only one exchange rate at each income level that
would provide equilibrium, given the rate of lending and
the influence of monetary and fiscal factors.

Conversely,

there may be different exchange rates, but there is only
one income level at each exchange rate that would assure
equilibrium, given the rate of lending and the Influence

-*-^The recent experience of Brazil and Chile
indicates that monetary and fiscal policies were quite
unsuccessful in relieving the above domestic problems.
Refer to Table III, page 309, and 3.10 of this paper.
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of monetary and fiscal measures.
If there is a tendency for the rate of lending to
he positive, recording a (-) in the balance of payments,
when intended exports exceed intended imports and (S> A),
there will be pressure exerted to raise the exchange rate
unless this tendency is offset by monetary and fiscal
policies.

The opposite reaction would be expected if

there is a tendency for the rate of lending to be negative,
causing a (+) in the balance of payments, when intended
imports exceed intended exports and (A>S).

There will

be pressure exerted to lower.the exchange rate unless
this tendency is offset by monetary and fiscal policies.
The influence of intended saving and intended
investment will affect the exchange rate mainly in an
indirect manner.

The extent of the influence may be

very slight, depending upon the importance of trade in
relation to national income.
If monetary policy is chiefly relied upon to
close the gap when intended accumulation is excessive,
the dampening effect via discouraging loans in order to
accomplish a higher liquidity may actually create a
desire on the part of individuals to spend abroad.
transferring of purchasing power has the effect of

l^Enke and Salera, oja. cit.. p. 254.

The
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turning saving into spending and relieving the downward
pressure upon the exchange rate.-*-4

The reverse effects

would he expected should intended saving be larger than
intended investment.-*-5
This discussion should point out the extreme
difficulty that a nation would encounter in order to
achieve an international equilibrium relying primarily
upon the tedious task of balancing the several factors.
In addition, this short run balance does not include many
factors that actually bear great weight.

The general

level of prices, for example, may change with income,
move in the opposite direction, or remain constant
depending upon the relative elasticities of those two
factors.

It is possible that the income elasticity of

demand may be greater than the price elasticity of demand.
This would mean that a greater than proportionate increase

^ The result of this action depends in great
measure upon the initial group that carried out the
negative lending.
If this group were the government,
the above result is possible. If individuals were the
recipients of borrowing, monetary policy may or may not
accomplish this result.
45This analysis assumes that the multiplier effect
is neutralized; e. g., autonomous exports would bring
forth autonomous imports with the accompanying results
of induced exports and induced imports. In line with the
above reasoning either the exports and imports achieve
exact proportions— which is highly unlikely— or their
effects are offset through the operation of the two
balancing factors. Professor Brainard discusses the

27
in income would be spent upon certain classes of goods.
These products, however, may be occasioned with a rela
tively inelastic demand with respect to price.

Further

purchases may not be forthcoming unless the price falls.
In other words, the incentive to buy which is created by
additional income may be offset by high, rigid prices.
In another case, the price elasticity of demand may be
quite high along with income elasticity of demand.

This

condition may bring about a lower price level since a
given increase in income in certain lines of goods could
stimulate purchases to such an extent that total revenue
accruing to businessmen would be greater at the lower
price, and, hence, cause pressure toward a lower general
price level.

Of course, in both instances above, the

movements would depend upon whether the goods involved
loom heavy in the public’s budget.

The state of employ

ment would also have an Impact on these two forces.
There is a good deal of emphasis placed upon such
a precarious balancing of these factors t o d a y . T h e

operation of the multiplier according to four sources
of income: new gold, use of foreign bank deposits,
foreign loans, and government grants. See Brainard,
o p . cit., pp. 164-166.
■^The income approach would require the utili
zation of the two balancing factors in order to main
tain equilibrium at a given national income.
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camps are divided on this score*

Advocates on the one

side argue that international equilibrium is the primary
responsibility of the individual n a t i o n . E a c h

country

must keep in step or be ostracized by the others.

The

opposing forces feel that international equilibrium is
basically an international co-operative responsibility
rather than an essentially domestic one.^-®

This interest

ing problem is, however, outside the scope of this study.
The remainder, of this chapter is to be concerned
with some of the monetary, fiscal, and exchange variables.
Disequilibrium and imbalance are terms often referred to
in discourse concerning the economic problems of nations.
Special significance is attached to these terms when
discussion is directed toward the underdeveloped areas.
Before discussing the variable factors and dis
equilibrium, the concept of equilibrium should be defined.
According to Professor Kindleberger, international

•^National and International Measures for Full
Employment. Report by a Group of Experts appointed by
the Secretary-General (Lake Success, New York: United
Nations Publications, 1949), pp. 49-50.
l®Delbert Snider, Introduction to International
Economics (Homewood, Illinois: Richard Irwin, Inc.,
1954), pp. 384-385.
Also refer to Brainard, op. cit.,
pp. 189-191; and Jacob Viner, "The Prospects for Foreign
Trade in the Postwar World,” in Readings In The Theory
Of International Trade, edited by Howard Ellis and
Lloyd Metzler, ("Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1949),
p. 526.

equilibrium means: ” . . .

that state of the balance of

payments over the relevant time period which makes it
possible to sustain an open economy without severe unem
ployment on a continuing basis. , . ."19

Equilibrium,

from the rate-of-exchange approach, is explained by
Professor Nurske ". . . as one that maintains a country1s
external accounts in equilibrium without the need for
wholesale unemployment at home. . . ."29

^ synthesis of

these two definitions yields several points as conditions
for international equilibrium.

They are: (1) an equality

in the balance of payments, (2) a relatively high state
of employment at home, and (S) a rate of exchange suit
able to maintain (1) and (2) over a period of time.
II.

SOME VARIABLE FACTORSSl

The above problems of international equilibrium
have not been solved.

No doubt part of the difficulty

. -^Kindleberger, oja. cit.. p. 597.
^Ragnar Nurske, "Conditions of International
Monetary Equilibrium," in Readings In The Theory Of Inter
national Trade (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1949),
pp. 11-12.
^-The variable factors as referred to here mean
those factors which in the short run and intermediate
period would cause a disruption to the otherwise smooth
flow of economic activity unless offset, or at least
mitigated, through monetary, fiscal, or exchange practices.
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lies in the realm of the reaction of variable factors.
Many economists would agree that not enough is known
about these various influences, one way or another, upon
internal and external complexities.
It is hoped that some benefit may be realized from
probing into the nature of their working.

This invest

igation will be undertaken from a conceptual viewpoint.
Subsequently, in later chapters, a pragmatic analysis
will be made of their application and effects in selected
countries.
A.

Monetary and Fiscal Factors

In the discussion of monetary and fiscal policies
it will be anticipated that central banks are more or less
free to carry out monetary policies which appear feasible
to offset the probable adverse results of variable factors.
From a realistic standpoint this is not always the case.^~
To the extent that this condition is not true, monetary

^SA good account of the relationship between
central banks and governments is presented by Miroslav
Kriz, "Central Banks and the State Today," American
Economic Review. September, 1948, pp. 565-580; also see
Roland I. Robinson, "Central Banks and the State: A
Comment," American Economic Review. March, 1949, pp.
494-496; and Robert Triffin, "Central Banking and
Monetary Management," in Economic Problems of Latin
America, edited by Seymour Harris, (New York: McGrawHill Book Co., Inc., 1944), pp. 96-116.
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policy would succumb to the dictates of the federal
government, or the dominance of fiscal policy over mone
tary policy would prevent proper co-ordination between
the two areas of policy determination.2®
1.

Income Changes

The plane of living in a nation is dependent in
part upon the ability of that nation to cope with income
changes primarily through the facility of monetary and
fiscal policy.

Particularly is this true in countries

which are subject to great resiliency in the income
pattern.

The inability of the above policy to deal

adequately with such problems as changes in export income
or the presence of too little saving, prolongs the period
of adjustment for a nation grasping for greater develop
ment.
The remainder of this section will consider some
of the variable factors which tend to give rise to
changes in income and, therefore, produce serious problems
for monetary and fiscal control.

These factors will

consist of export income, personal savings, taxation,
and government borrowing.

result.

2®A study of Venezuela yields evidence of this
See Chapter III of this paper, pp. 260-262.
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a.

Export Income

The preferred position of monetary policy with
respect to changes in export income is usually considered
as passive; that is, banks serve importers by making
exchange available, while they serve exporters by convert
ing foreign exchange earnings into local currency.
As foreign sales rise and exporters receive more
income, their earnings would have a natural, beneficial
effect on the country as a whole.

A portion of the

increased income earned would spur domestic production
and income; a part of the income would be used to import
more goods; and the remainder would be held for near-future
Investment.

If foreign income should fall, these situ

ations would be reversed.

Monetary policy, even in this

instance, would be passive, at least to a certain extent,
with changes In production and the distribution of income
providing the necessary adjustment.
This passive attitude concerning monetary policy
has blended into a more active one in many nations.

The

main reasons for this change are the desire by many
countries to increase post-war production, the emphasis
upon greater industrialization, and the over-all concept
that each nation is to maintain a high rate of employ
ment and income within the nation regardless of so-called
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temporary external maladjustments.®4
The answer to the question of how important is
export income in relation to total income seems to depend
much upon the relative degree of industrialization in
most nations.

The lower the degree of industrial develop

ment, the greater is the importance of export income to
total income, and vice

v e r s a . 25

This source of income constitutes an exceptional
problem for monetary authorities in underdeveloped areas.
Exports are subject to sudden change and, from a monetary
standpoint, banks are subject to rapid deposits and with
drawals.®6

To bring in the other side of the picture,

® Professor Hansen questions this approach in terms
of long run cost or price-level disparities, but supports
it when it is made to refer to a short run cyclical dis
turbance.
See Hansen, Monetary Theory and Fiscal Policy,
pp. 210-211.
According to Professor Nurske, adjustment
should occur through varying the exchange rate. See Bagnar
Nurske, The New Economics, edited by Seymour Harris, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 273. Professors Despres
and Kindleberger state that a guiding principle in post
war equilibrium policy is one which explains that the pur
suit of domestic policies of full employment should not be
hindered through balance of payments difficulties.
See
Emile Despres and Charles Kindleberger, "The Mechanism for
Adjustment in International Payments— Lessons of Post-war
Experience," American Economic Review. Papers and Proceed
ings , May, 1952, p. 332.
®^There are exceptions to the above statement. For
example, Venezuela is further advanced Industrially than
the majority of Latin American countries, yet export income
amounted to approximately 37.9 per cent of national product
(income) between 1952 and 1956. See the International Mone
tary Fund, International Financial Statistics. January, 1957*
2®The Central Banks of Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico,
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there is also a tendency for nations which depend upon
exports for a relatively large share of total income to
possess a relatively large thirst for imports.

Once again

this explains the situation of underdeveloped nations with
respect to their anxiety to industrialize.^

Because of

this situation, it is likely that commercial banks will
tend to hold larger liquid reserves than would otherwise
be the case.

The outcome may be fewer loans and less

investment on the part of banks, or at least a tendency
to

channel funds into more selective areas.
The more cautious attitude of bankers resulting

from the dominance of exports and imports could serve
tosome extent as a means of braking

the inflation.

However, a deleterious effect may be encountered in the
form of loans and investment directed predominantly
toward old well-established firms rather than toward
the growth industries.
Total bank deposits may fail to register a decline
even when imports rise sharply.

The reduction of deposits

Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela utilize foreign exchange
reserves as part of the minimum reserve against note issues
or deposit liabilities, or both. One of the reasons given
to explain the employment of international reserves in this
way is that they tend to create confidence in the currency
no longer backed by gold. See M. H. DeKock, Central Bank
ing (London: Staples Press, Ltd., 1954), pp. 88-89.
S. Buchanan and H. S. Ellis, Approaches To
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund,
1955), pp. 383-385.
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by importers may be matched by an increase of deposits on
pQ
the part of foreign exporters.
Of course, the small
local banks are not likely to handle sizeable deposits
from foreign exporters; nonetheless, the larger com
mercial banks and the central banks may often be in this
position.

There is a strong possibility that the money

supply will not be reduced as importers withdraw funds
according to orthodox banking, and inflation might there
fore be prolonged.
The rise in export income provides additional
income in both the private and public sectors.

In the

private sector of the nation’s economy, expenditures on
consumption and investment would normally be greater.
Spending might rise at a faster rate than the increase
in export income, since bank credit would tend to be
easier to obtain.

The probable result would be a rise

in prices and a fall in real income.
As for the public sector, government revenues
would rise as a result of a prior increase in exports.
This would create an incentive for additional con
sumption and investment expenditures in this area.

The

difficulty here lies in the fact that a temporary

^8F. W. Paish, ’’Banking Policy and the Balance of
International Payments,” in Readings In The Theory Of
International Trade, edited by Howard Ellis and Lloyd
Metzler, (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1949), p. 48.
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increase in income because of a rise in exports may be
comprehended as a permanent improvement in economic
activity.^

The error in judgment would be realized when

export income suddenly declines; but the government may
find that the only way to relieve the situation will be
to increase federal expenditures.
may call for deficit financing.

Sooner or later this

'zn

Since imports are one of the most flexible factors,
it has been proposed that the authorities stabilize
them.^

This kind of policy would pertain only to nations

depending upon exports and imports to a relatively l a r g e .
extent.

By holding imports quite steady, erratic move

ments in export income would be expected to produce less

2^Hefer to Bruno Brovedani, ’’Latin American MediumTerm Import Stabilization Policies and the Adequacy of
Reserves,” International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers.
Washington, D. C., Vol. IV, No. 2, February, 1955, p. 267.
®°The banking system of Uruguay attempts to
mitigate internal disturbances created by the gain or
loss of export income. When exchange reserves accumulate
the banking system reduces its lending.
It does this by
refusing to issue new currency against its larger reserve
balance.
A comparison is made between the annual
expansion in bank loans and the changes in bank reserves
of gold and foreign exchange with the money supply.
If
the percentage rise in bank loans is much greater than
the Increase in reserves in terms of the money supply,
the banking system reduces credit expansion.
Ibid..
pp. 272-273.
51Ibid.. pp. 258-287. The author would consider
this as a proposal for, medium-term policy.

adverse results for monetary policy.

It would be Imown

that a certain amount of export income would be required
to pay for a given amount of imports.

At a time when

export income is larger than that required to pay for the
imports, the excess amount could be set aside for periods
when export income would fail to equate the necessary
payment for imports.

Even if the surplus export earn

ings were not held for future depressing periods, there
would be less disturbance to the present money supply
since only a portion of the total export income would
be channeled into the monetary system.

On the import

side, the stabilization of imports would require that
the greater portion of the limited amount of imports
would consist of necessities.

In other words, import

stabilization would tend to prevent wasteful spending
upon semi-luxury and luxury items which the nation could
not afford.
Serious disadvantages might result from a policy
aimed at stabilizing imports.

The over-all program

would place in the hands of the authorities the decision
as to what would and would not be imported into the
country.

Furthermore, a policy geared to limit imports

would fail to register the changing needs for goods
coming into the nation.

In establishing the basic com

modity import unit, the authorities would have to
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consider the contribution of export income.

Since there

is little internal control over exports, this would be
difficult to do.

The longer the time period considered,

the more likely is the probability of error of judgment
from the standpoint of both exports and imports.

'Zp

The rise or fall of export income not accompanied
by a proportionate change in the same direction of imports
and not offset through opposite changes in investment or
similar changes in saving would cause pressure upon the
price level unless the banking system were able to
provide enough flexibility to counter the price movement,
or unless fiscal policy could provide larger revenue
through taxation, or both. °
Since in many nations structural changes and the
mobility of factors are not free to adjust to the new
situation in a hurry, a resort to deficit financing at
home and abroad serves as a temporary avenue of escape.
It would appear that this latter action only prolongs a
much needed adjustment.
How would other forms of income affect monetary

*2

p

A cursory view of the balance of payments of
the Latin American nations yields little evidence to
support the contention of import stabilization between
1950-1955. Refer to the International Monetary Fund,
Balance of Payments Yearbook. Summary Statements, Vol.
7, March, 1957.
3SThe multiplier would be expected to accentuate
the directional pressure on the price level.
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and fiscal policy in a nation, especially one that is
considered to be underdeveloped?

The answer would depend

in great measure upon the alternative means used to
accumulate capital.

These methods would include personal

savings, taxation, government borrowing from banks, the
public, and foreign countries.3^
b.

Personal Savings

Personal savings would normally constitute the
major source of capital funds.

However, in some nations

the supply of personal savings either does not exist or
the amount is too small to be effective.33

In this

connection, consumption expenditures constitute nearly
all the national income.

To the extent that such is

the case, part of the blame must rest upon the monetary
and banking system.

Individuals who accumulate small

amounts of saving may either hoard the funds or spend a
little more than they otherwise would, in part, because
of the failure of the monetary system to provide people
with saving institutions.3®

*z a

°^This general classification was taken from Professor
Kindleberger. Refer to Kindleberger, op. cit.. pp. 384-387.
33An opposing comment to this popular contention is
offered by Professor Rozenthal.
See Alek Rozenthal,
American Economic Review. Book Reviews Section, March,
1956, pp. 183-184.
3®Some of the countries In Latin America have
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The voluntary aspects of the problem of saving may
be partially explained by the tendency of those who have
relatively large amounts of funds available to place
their money in land or imported luxury items rather than
in productive enterprises.

Again, the failure of bank

development would account for the lack of systematic
personal savings.38
The development of several types of banking insti
tutions within a given area probably contributes to the
disparagement of banking services from the standpoint of
individual savers.

For example, it is pointed out that

the development of banking systems in Latin America
follows no consistent pattern.3®

Foreign branch banking

is common in some of the nations, commercial (unit) bank
ing characterizes other countries, and central banking

alleviated this problem to some extent. For instance,
Mexico had two savings institutions in 1931. By 1951
there were 739 savings institutions including banks and
branches, credit unions and other financial institutions.
Refer to Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Interim
Report, Study of Latin American Countries (Washington:
United States Printing Office), 1954, p. 354.
^ J o h n Adler, "The Fiscal and Monetary Imple
mentations of Development Programs,1' American Economic
Review. Papers and Proceedings. May, 1952, p. 595.
380ther factors are important in this connection,
such as: the moulding of the saving habit and faith in
the government.
3®Triffin, op. cit.. pp. 96-103.
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is important in still o t h e r s . F u r t h e r m o r e ,

the kinds

of controls and their effectiveness may vary a good deal.
Foreign branch banking, for instance, is likely to extend
its services predominantly to traders, or it may encourage
the investment of funds in other countries rather than
for domestic utilization.

Of course, any one type of

banking system may serve a nation better than other forms.
A nation should be free to choose the kind which serves
its purpose best.
In the more industrialized countries an active
stock market serves as an important outlet for money not
spent on consumption.

Failure in the development of

security exchange markets appears to be a characteristic
feature of the lesser developed nations.
The instability of the governments and the lack
of Industrial development in many nations have been lead
ing factors explaining the failure In the development of
security exchange markets.

In addition, the problem of

the technical development of capital markets has prevented
the accumulation of saving for investment.4^-

4(-*The desire for more government control over bank
ing functions may be a partial explanation of the recent
trend in central banking development, especially in Latin
America. Refer to Buchanan and Ellis, op. pit., p. 538.
4^A good discussion of this problem may be found in
Professor HansonTs book. Refer to Simon G. Hanson, Economic

42
It would probably be prudent to first establish a
very narrow market in securities and gradually expand it
as It comes to meet with general acceptance.

In this

connection, the government could be of valuable assistance
in propagandizing the program.

It could also develop a

market for the distribution of its own bonds.
As for the encouragement of personal savings of
the small income earners who are unfamiliar with security
exchange markets, the development of small local indus
tries on a community basis may be utilized for this
purpose.
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Instead of concentrating upon alternative ways to
encourage personal saving, some countries attempt to
acquire funds through forced savings; that is, through
printing additional quantities of paper.

As more money

is printed and spent, inflation arises and this tends to
reduce the real income of wage earners since their wages
fail to keep pace with rising prices.
The selective control over imports has some

Development in Latin America (Washington: The InterAmerican Affairs Press, 1951), pp. 469-471; also see
Triffin, pp. cit., pp. 107-111.
4^Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit.. pp. 304-305.
4SSee R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In Post-war
World (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1954), p. 445;
and Walter Krause, The International Economy (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1955), pp. 290-291.
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influence on the saving function.

Certainly the small

savers would be forced to purchase less.

Those with

larger incomes are likely to spend more of their higher
incomes in buying other domestic products or to increase
their saving accounts abroad.

However, it is difficult

to conceive of a nation deliberately reducing its imports
for the prime purpose of encouraging personal savings.
Deposit insurance in those nations which have no
comparable service would be of special importance to the
people.

Countries with a good record of political sta

bility could provide this service through the government
if no private concern were willing to do so.

Banking

legislation could be modified to provide more flexi
bility with respect to capital requirements for banks
desiring to serve the rural areas.

The government and

private businesses could do something toward familiar
izing the public with the banking institutions by pay
ing workers with checks and encouraging payments by
checks.4*^
c.

Taxation

A good deal of concerted agreement is expressed

^Domestic Financing of Economic Development.
Report by the Department of Economic Affairs (Lake Suecess,
New York: United Nations Publications, 1950), pp. 13-15.
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by writers who feel that much may be accomplished in the
area of taxation as a part of fiscal reform

.^

Taxes imposed upon commodities would normally be
quite regressive for the majority of the people in nations
with relatively low income and saving.

It may be well to

reduce, as far as possible, this type of taxation, at
least for an interim period.

Selectivity may be exer

cised in such a way as to reduce or exclude taxes imposed
upon necessities.

A dual advantage may be realized from

such action; more funds would be made available for
investment, and the banking system would be used more
intensely.^®
Because exports and imports play a substantial
role in various nations, customs duties are of considerable
importance.^

If carried too far, import levies might

deter domestic purchases to a serious extent.

While there

is some justification for preventing the importation of

4®This is one of the most promising spheres of
independent policy action, according to Professor Hanson.
Refer to Hanson, op. cit., pp. 472-473; a similar view
point is expressed by Professor Triffin. See Robert
Triffin, "Exchange Control and Equilibrium," Foreign
Economic Policy for the United States. edited by Seymour
Harris, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), p. 414.
It should be recognized that the saving made
possible by the reduced tax rate may not be shared in its
entirety with consumers.
4^Wendell Gordon, The Economy of Latin America
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 368.
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luxury goods, these duties, at the same time, tend to
reduce the effect of comparative advantage in trade.
Importers may maintain their usual mark-ups, or even
AO

increase them, rather than share in the increased duty.
Imposts applied to exporters may force factors
and suppliers to assume a larger share of the tax.

Yet,

a graduated custom levy on imports starting with items
of necessity and ascending with semi-luxury and luxury
products could have a beneficial effect.

The higher

income groups would be encouraged to invest more of their
idle income at home.

At the same time, the larger number

of lower income earners would be able to purchase a
greater volume of imported goods should home production
fail to satisfy domestic demand.
A tax on exports may produce a sizable share of
total tax revenue.

So long as the tax is not greater

than the cost-price differential, it would not interfere
with sales or hinder international specialization.^

AO

Customs duties constitute a major portion of
total government receipts in nearly all the Central American
countries including Mexico. No doubt these duties are an
important source of revenue in nearly all of the Latin
American nations. See the United States Department of
Commerce, Investment in Central America (Washington: United
States Printing Office, 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 30; and Bank of Mexico,
Annual Reports. 1955 and 1956.
^Buch a n a n and Ellis, op. cit., p. 328.
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This type of tax is easy to administer, and it may con
tribute to stability by raising and lowering the duties
during prosperity and depression.
Government monopolies which are quite common in
some countries may also be made a source of tax income.
The imposition of a tax on such monopolies may create a
desire for efficiency.

Their ability to withstand a tax

may be used as one measure for comparing their efficiency
with that of private producers.

Sometimes they plead

non-tax payments on the basis that they offer commodities
and services at exceedingly low prices.

If this defense

is valid, their tax contributions should be lowered
proportionately.

No doubt there are numerous examples

to show that such is not the case.^°

Though there may

be some justification for their temporary existence, it
would appear to be advantageous not to include govern
ment monopolies in a country’s long run planning.
The progressive income tax so popular in some
nations has not been successful as a major source of
income in many of the lesser developed countries.
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One recent case Is that of Argentina’s monopoly
agency called the I. A. P. I. which purchased farm com
modities at low prices and sold them at the higher world
market price. See Gordon, op. cit., pp. 253-254.
^Individual income taxes provided only 13.9 per
cent of total government revenues of Costa Rica in 1955.
Similarly, taxes on income yielded 7.7 per cent of the
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The chief explanation for this is that the higher income
groups hold a good deal of political p o w e r . T a x
administrators often wink at the flagrant abuses of the
income tax of this group.

And as for the much larger

group, perhaps one of the chief reasons explaining the
lack of popularity with respect to the progressive income
tax has been the inability of the larger masses to earn
enough taxable income, and the expense involved in col
lection.
A tax levied upon real property has been suggested
as a means to be used for recouping revenue lost through
individual income l e v i e s . T h i s may be a commendable
measure if applied to unused property, but it is doubt
ful that it should be used as a substitute for a sound
progressive income tax.

The trend toward a more even

total Salvadoran government revenues in 1955. Honduran
income taxes amounted to 16.9 per cent of total govern
ment revenues in the fiscal years 1954-1955.
Refer to
the United States Department of Commerce, Investment in
Central America. 1956, pp. 78, 181, and 806.
^Gordon, op. cit., pp. 808-810 and 813; for an
explanation of comparative burdens of high income tax
payers refer to Hanson, op. cit.. pp. 466-467; Professors
Buchanan and Ellis point out some of the difficulties of
income tax levies; such as, illiteracy and inadequate
record keeping.
See Buchanan and Ellis, op. cit.« p. 384.
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Gordon, pp. cit.. p. 813. Mr. Adler defends
this type of tax, since the distribution of property is
more uneven in some countries than is the distribution
of income. Refer to Adler, op. cit.. p. 594.
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distribution of land may reduce the incentive toward
developing costly real property tax programs.
A good tax system, particularly in the under
developed nations, should be highly flexible; that is,
as the structure of production changes, new tax sources
may be tapped while others may become of lesser importance.
For example, in a few Latin American countries the sever
ance tax has begun to yield more revenue.^

Perhaps the

sales tax and other types of taxes will take a more
important place as a source of revenue as more productive
facilities are created or existing ones are expanded.
d.

Government Borrowing

The remaining portion of this section is concerned
with government expenditures made possible by borrowing.
The types of borrowing to be considered are borrowing
from banks, the public, and foreign countries.

In

addition, an attempt is made to integrate monetary and
fiscal policies to show how they may contribute toward
a more effective borrowing program.
The well-known Keynesian concept of closing the
investment gap through government spending is probably

^Principally Venezuela and Columbia.
See Wendell
Gordon, The Economy of Latin America (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1950), Table 18 National Government
Revenue, p. 368.
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emphasized more in the monetary and fiscal policies of
underdeveloped nations than elsewhere.

It is supported

on the basis of full employment and economic development.^
The full employment concept is supported on a
somewhat different basis than it is in the more industri
alized nations*

It is generally agreed that nearly full

employment already exists in most underdeveloped countries.
Of course, inefficiencies may be evident because of the
poor factor distribution.

Yet, this may establish a

foundation for the justification of the more effective
use of monetary and fiscal policy.

If this reasoning

can be inculcated, then there is a firm basis established
for more public control in order to bring about a stronger
economy.
Development, or the desire to industrialize,
further supports the more extensive employment of mone
tary and fiscal measures.
slow or rapid rate.

Development may proceed at a

Because of the desire to compete

more successfully with other nations and to raise the
domestic plane of living, the latter is more likely to

5^Full employment is usually considered as an
objective, while economic development is a means-to-end
concept. For a discussion of the meaning of economic
development in this connection see Harold F. Williamson,
Economic Development, edited by H. F. Williamson and John
A. Buttrick, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 6.
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occur with consistency.
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Monetary and fiscal controls should be much easier
to employ in countries in which the people are accustomed
to a good deal of government activity.

The underdeveloped

nations are, as a rule, in this general situation; there
fore, it is likely that monetary and fiscal measures may
be utilized on a larger scale than would be possible in
the more developed nations.
Personal savings as the major source of capital
accumulation may not provide sufficient funds for growth.
Even a change in the tax rates or in the structure of the
tax system may fail to yield a high state of employment
or to support a desirable developmental policy.

The

final area of domestic policy lies within the sphere of
governmental expenditures.
The type and amount of borrowing on the part of
the government may be determined by several factors.
The amount of borrowing may be quite small if the govern
ment were to attempt to balance the budget at the end
of each year.
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On the other hand, a cyclical balancing

^®Gunnar Myrdal, An International Economy (New
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956), p. 206.
57

The yearly budget appears to be giving way in
favor of some type of cyclical budget balancing. Refer
to Charles Prather, Money and Banking. 5th edition,
(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, inc., 1954),

51
of revenues and expenditures would allow more time for
balancing to become a reality according to predetermined
plans.58
It is known that if aggregate expenditure exceeds
the national output at full employment, inflation will
arise; and if national output is larger than aggregate
expenditure, unemployment will come about.

The responsi

bility of the government tends to lie within the limits
of the above concept, the prevention of inflation and
the prevention of serious unemployment.

The current

problem of the underdeveloped nations, however, is
explained primarily in terms of inflation rather than
unemployment as such.59
The experience of the depression of the 1930Ts
has shown that monetary policy is less effective in the
downswing than in prosperity.89

However, even in the

p. 434; also "The Problem of Economic Instability,"
American Economic Review. September, 1950, pp. 521-522.
A committee report under the chairmanship of Donald H.
Wallace.
58Cyclical budget balancing is at least suggested
in the various development programs in Latin America.
For example, Argentina and Guatemala have adopted fiveyear programs. For a survey of the economic development
plan for Guatemala, refer to the Government of Guatemala,
Desarrollo Economico de Guatemala 1955-1960. (Economic
Development of Guatemala), Guatemala, C. A., 1956.
59This is not to say that unemployment (underemploy
ment) is a basic factor partially responsible for inflation.
89George Halm, Economics of Money and Banking
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latter instance, the success of monetary policy was none
too bright because of poor timing, psychological moti
vations, and so on.

Is it possible then that government

borrowing may be successful if monetary policy stands
ready to cope with any adversity affecting the economic
system?

The answer seems to be problematical.
The effect of government borrowing upon the

economy depends upon the way in which it is created.
Borrowing from the banking system allows for the expansion
of commercial bank reserves.

If newly created money is

spent by the government, private expenditures need not
decline since banks are in a position to provide more
funds, and total spending may become favorable to further
output and income.

Yet, the newly created reserves

provide for the likelihood of too much spending and
constitute a threat to the price level.®1
The responsibility of the banking system requires
that it is so organized that it has sufficient funds
available to loan, and it has proper machinery at its
disposal to loosen or tighten the money supply as it sees
fit.

It is entirely possible that this is not the case

(Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956, p. 398.
Ibid.. p. 399. For a brief but good account of
the effect upon the money supply through debt retirement
see Burns, Neal, and Watson, Modern Economics. 2nd edition,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc., 1953), pp. 633-634.
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in an underdeveloped nation.

The banking system may not

be so highly organized, or the government may dominate
fi2
monetary policy.
If this is true, monetary policy
would be quite ineffective as a weapon to ward off
inflation or to prevent deflation.
Government borrowing may come from public saving.
Although this form of borrowing would be expected to be
quite small, it has an effect similar to an increase in
taxation and represents a transfer of existing funds from
the public to the government.

The income effect of such

borrowing depends upon the way in which the government
would utilize the funds obtained.
The operation of government enterprises may take
an active part of a negative monetary policy.

Government

owned firms serve as an important source of revenue in
some nations as well as an item of expenditure.

The

government may borrow from its enterprises at most any
time, and at increasing amounts as the firms become more
vast and numerous.

Moreover, repayment is not such an

important problem.

At the same time, this borrowing

action would restrain or prevent any outward action by

®^Even in an industrialized nation such as the
United States, banking and government policy sometimes
conflict. Evidence of this is found in the Federal
Reserve-Treasury rift.
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the monetary authorities

.^

This clandestine operation

might well be an alternative to the printing or borrowing
of money, since the latter is frowned upon by the
authorities and other (creditor) nations too.
The expenditure of borrowed funds may have different
results depending upon the action taken by the monetary
authorities.

Even in the case in which expenditure of

the funds is carried out by the government, monetary
policy could help assure the most useful application of
those funds by establishing the terms on loans.

Loans

from government funds could be channeled into the most
deserving sectors by the adoption of different loan terms
for each sector.®^

A large portion of the funds would go

where they would be the most productive.

Of course, that

part of the funds which was borrowed and spent directly
by the government would circumvent this action to some

Of course, the functioning of an economy may be
hindered through such action.
fi4.
D In this connection, the policy of the Central
Bank of Mexico accomplishes a similar result. Instead
of channeling funds on the basis of loan terms, the
Central Bank does this by deposit reserves. It requires
the commercial banks to maintain a 100 per cent cash
reserve behind their demand liabilities, but it reduces
the reserve percentage If the commercial banks make
loans in definite sectors on a stipulated long-, inter
mediate-, and short-term basis. See B. H. Beckhart,
editor, Banking Systems (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1954), pp. 585-586.
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extent.
The government has one other borrowing alternative
remaining.

Besides borrowing from the public or banks,

it may have access to foreign capital.
A nation plagued with fundamental problems such
as are usually connected with mal-distribution of
resources, with being a primary producer, or a nation
which is over-emphasizing industrial production may be
faced with a persistent deficit in its current account.
Generally, it is explained that short-term funds
will move out of the country primarily for safe-keeping.
Yet, it is likely that some short-term funds will be
moving into the nation.

This is natural since foreign

importers will place deposits in banks for present or
future purchases from the country in question, and because
there is always the possibility of making a high return
on capital invested for short periods of time.

One may

inquire if it is possible for the nation to receive an

®^I. G. Patel, "Selective Credit Controls in Under
developed Economies," International Monetary Fund, Staff
Papers. Washington, D. C., September, 1954, p. 87; Mr.
Adler points out the importance of diversified investment.
See Adler, op. cit., pp. 588-591; Professor Kindleberger
suggests that price distortion may channel government
funds into areas that cannot be supported after inflation,
i. e., hotels, etc. This is likely unless monetary
measures act quickly enough to dispel the threat. Refer
to Charles Kindleberger, International Economics. p. 386.

56
income benefit from short-term funds when the account may
show a net outward movement of such capital.

That possi

bility depends much upon the monetary policy of the
country.

If banks are operating with a fractional reserve

policy, the additional external deposits placed in the
domestic banks would allow for a multiple expansion of
loans and investment, provided these funds are not
sterilized in the name of the foreign owner.
The funds moving out or 11in flight” may be composed
mainly of accumulated saving rather than the withdrawal of
deposits..

The net effect in the nation concerned would be

an expansion of money and credit through the banking system
to an amount greater than the net outward movement of funds
as indicated in the balance of payments.

In other words,

as long as there is a rather consistent amount of short
term capital in the banks of the country, it could experi
ence a net income gain even though short-term capital is
moving out at a rate faster than it moves toward the
nation.
It would not be common practice, however, to expect
the short-term movement of funds to be employed for the
purpose of attempting to deal successfully with a per
sistent import surplus.

Gold exports, grants or gifts

directed into the country, or capital investment moving
in constitute the major means of solving the current
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account deficit.

The most important of these items would

be the capital movement.

Gold cannot be drained away

over long periods of time, and a nation cannot count upon
other countries* grants or gifts.®®
Both monetary policy and fiscal policy could play
an Important role in connection with capital inflow.

The

monetary role would affect the employment of the funds.
As mentioned earlier (see page 54), the monetary authori
ties could channel the funds into their most productive
uses through the terms on capital.

This would help to

assure repayment by stimulating exports and, at the same
time, providing for the growth of basic industries.
Fiscal policy would be responsible for determining
the necessary amount of capital needed.

This would

involve the co-ordination between the balance of payments
deficit or surplus and the internal need for funds,
including judgment with respect to the probable debt or
surplus encountered.
B.

External Factors

Only a few nations today, if any, can afford to
neglect the impact of external trade upon their national
income, output, and employment.

Even in the case of the

®®Snider, oj). cit. . pp. 134-136
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United States in which exports contribute but a small pro
portion to total national income, it is becoming increas
ingly evident that changes in exports and imports along
with other items making up the balance of payments have
profound international results.®^

A small change in our

decisions to export and import may have tremendous effects
in other nations, primarily in those of the more under
developed areas.
Earlier in this chapter it was stated that lending
(L) could be employed in order to create a balance between
imports (M) and exports (E).

At the same time monetary

and fiscal policy (MB) and (F) could be so applied that
they may bring an equality between saving (S) and invest
ment (A).

By reason of their complementary nature, these

two forces would normally spill over into each other’s
area.

As an example, monetary and fiscal policy might

be concerned to a certain extent with income derived
externally for the purpose of maintaining a given national
income.

On the other hand, lending would tend to affect

saving and investment decisions within the nation.
The working of the above forces as indicated

®^It is explained that though export income repre
sents a small contribution of total income in America,
this may mean the difference between profits and marginal
returns. Refer to Paul V. Horn, International Trade
Principles and Practices (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1951), p." 29.

assumed the existence of a stable exchange rate at a
given national income.

But from a more practical view

point, there will be pressures exerted which will tend
to influence the rate of exchange.

These pressures may

be caused by internal or external factors.

Now our

problem hinges upon the question of what effect an
exchange rate has upon national income.

This calls for

our immediate attention.
1.

The Bate of Exchange

The rate of exchange refers to the price of one
currency in terms of another.

This broad definition

infers that the exchange rate, the national price level,
and national income tend to influence one another.
A monetary disequilibrium could occur because of
an unequal degree of variation in national price levels,
that is, because of changes in the price levels of two
nations, with the exchange rate remaining the samej®®
or whenever a variation in the exchange rate occurs,
national price levels remaining constant or moving less
flQ
proportionately.

68

A shift in foreign demand may raise the price of
one export product and lower that of another leaving the
national income unchanged. Refer to Enke and Salera, o p .
cit. . p. 193.
®®Snider, o£. cit.. p. 167.
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The movement of the exchange rate could lead to a
monetary disequilibrium since it would influence the
national income.

A rise in the exchange rate would

normally increase the national income, that is, a greater
increase in exports relative to impor t s . ^

Conversely,

a drop in the exchange rate would produce a fall in the
national income, for imports would then exceed exports.

71

A fluctuation in national income accompanied by
a given exchange rate could create a monetary disequilibrium
which might call for an adjustment of the exchange rate.
This would be the probable outcome if lending and mone
tary and fiscal policy should fail to be effective.

On

the other hand, the exchange rate might not need to be
tampered with if the national price level should fail to
move along with the national income variation.
The national income and national price level may
not move with the same degree of variation and in the same
direction.

For example, the national price level may move

slowly or not at all until a state of nearly full

70
f Mexico realized an increase in exports in 1955
and 1956 caused, in part, by a rise in the domestic rate
of exchange in 1954. Refer to the Bank of Mexico, Annual
Reports, 1954-1956.
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The final result depends upon the regulators of
demand and supply. For an analysis of these complex
forces see P. T. Ellsworth, The International Economy
(New fork: The Macmillan Co., 1950), pp. 555-572.
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employment is realized.

Also, such factors as wage

rigidity and monopoly may slow down or prevent price
movements from occurring as national income changes.
It is further conceivable that a change in the
national price level, the exchange rate remaining station
ary, could cause a monetary disequilibrium, in as much
as the national income may not respond to the same degree
of change as the price level.

This is most likely to

occur after full employment has been reached, and it
depends to a great extent upon the distribution of income.
So far as adjustment to equilibrium is concerned,
both price and income changes are involved.^

Price

variations are probably least applicable when a good deal
of unemployment Is present and when prices and costs are
inflexible since a change in the money supply and bank

72

The export sector may .suffer less than the
domestic sector because of more favorable terms on loans,
subsidies, an Inelastic demand for major export products,
etc., especially if this sector normally contributes a
large share to total income.
^ T h e income approach tends to relegate price
changes to a secondary position. This is emphasized by
Professor Nurske as follows: ,r. . . in the adjustment
process, price changes work generally In the right
direction for the restoration of equilibrium. But,
insofar as they occur at all they are essentially a by
product of the changes in the volume of employment and
productive activity. These latter changes are there
fore to be regarded as the primary equilibrating factors."
Ragnar Nurske, "Domestic and International Equilibrium,"
in The New Economics. edited by S. E. Harris, p. 269.
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reserves affect the general level of prices only to a
small degree.

However, rising production during a business

slump will tend to raise prices or, at least, keep them
from falling.74
Income variations affect production through changes
in employment.

As production and employment rise, the

increased income tends to maintain a larger supply of
money.

This has the effect of keeping interest rates

down as the demand for money strengthens with a rising
7c
output

.'^

2.

Exchange Control

Income analysis as applied to an open economy
generally requires that cyclical and monetary adjustments
(short-term) should come about through internal changes
rather than by exchange rate variations.

In the long run

period, however, the structural pressures would require
an adjustment in the exchange rate.7®

74Snider, op. cit., p. 234.
75Ibid.
7% r . Bloomfield points out that Keynes, Harrod,
and other followers expressed this attitude. Refer to
Arthur I. Bloomfield, "Foreign Exchange Rate Theory and
Policy," The Hew Economics, edited by S. E. Harris, pp.
300-301, including footnotes on page 300; also see Ragnar
Hurske, "Conditions of International Monetary Equilibrium,"
in Readings In The Theory Of International Trade, p. 34.
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Many of the present problems of the underdeveloped
nations depend upon the application of monetary and fiscal
policies for their solution.

A few of these problems

pertain to investment, development, social security and
union activities, inflation, and price controls.

In

order to solve these types of problems the responsible
authorities may desire to prevent external pressures
77
from upsetting their domestic goals. ' Exchange controls
are often employed in such cases.
The ultimate effect of exchange control is to
allow monetary and fiscal factors to make their full
contribution toward establishing and maintaining full
employment at a high income level while the balance of
rt Q

payments may be held in equilibrium.'0

It Is assumed

that after these adjustments have been made exchange
control would no longer be necessary, and a free or
flexible exchange system would take its place.

The time

required to solve these basic problems may, however,

^ P r o f e s s o r Mikesell criticized the United Nations
reports for overemphasizing planning, controls, etc. which
tend to divert attention away from the relative price
structure, comparative advantage, and so on. Refer to
Raymond F. Mikesell, "Economic Doctrines Implied In
United Nations Reports," .American Economic Review. Papers
and Proceedings. May, 1954, pp. 570-582.
^Professors Buchanan and Ellis stated that the
danger in the use of exchange controls is that they put
no correctives to work.
It Is essential, therefore, that
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extend over many years.
Exchange control may not contribute to the mainte
nance of a high national income, since it would tend to
reduce both imports and exports over a period of time.
The underdeveloped nations would generally be
pressed with inflation since capital facilities cannot
expand as rapidly as the money supply in the first
instance, and the national income would fall because of
later retaliation on the part of the outside world.
A higher domestic price level would tend to stimu
late imports and reduce exports, provided that the price
levels in other trading nations do not rise at the same
time.

If the higher price level were extended to the

open economy, it would tend to lower the nation's exchange
rate.

Imports would tend to rise, for importers would

be willing to give up more units of currency for imported
goods than before.

But the authorities would not allow

the increased imports to upset the balance of payments.
The result is that the imposition of exchange control
will prevent the rate from falling.
Exports would decline if the exchange rate were
lowered, because foreign buyers would have to give up
more units of their currency for their imports.

Since

monetary and fiscal policies are successful. See Buchanan
and Ellis, Approaches to Economic Development, p. 402.
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exchange control prevents the lowering of the exchange
rate, exports would not he expected to show much decline*
The actual effect of exchange control upon the '
balance of payments also depends upon the relative volume
of imports and exports.
Should the inflation not he overcome within a
reasonably short period of time, the nation might stand
to lose much more than it could gain.

The blocking of

external forces also prevents the utilization of com
parative advantage.

It does this by forcing the nation

to use high priced domestic resources and commodities
which could be imported cheaper, and by preventing it
from exporting resources and goods produced cheaper at

home.1
^
The final outcome would depend upon the severity
of the general inflation, the adaptability of monetary
and fiscal policies to this situation, the relative price
inflation in the various domestic sectors which may cause
price control, and the probability of appreciating the
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The rather extensive use of multiple exchange
rates is an outward manifestation of this reasoning.
Rates other than the official rate are employed to attract
certain imports and to assure the sale of selected exports.
At least six countries in Latin America employed multiple
exchange rates in 1952. They were Columbia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. See R. F.
Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Post-war World, p. 315.
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exchange rate in order to bring the nation’s price level
fin
into line with those of other trading nations. u
After about twenty-five years, exchange control
continues to be used for the purpose of rationing imports.
It is usually explained that this is necessary in order
to prevent a decline in the national Income.

Nevertheless,

the reduction in imports would normally lead to a future
decline in exports.
The immediate effect of this phase of exchange
control activity would be a rise in income following the
lowering of imports.
flow into the nation.

Gold and foreign exchange would
But if the period were prolonged,

the gold and foreign exchange reserves of foreign countries
would become seriously reduced or even exhausted.
Under the circumstances Just described, it is
possible that short-term loans could be made to foreign
nations.

The consequent outflow of its capital might be

expected to provide for an equilibrium in the balance of
payments of the import-restricting country.

Yet, for

several reasons, such is not likely to be the result.

88The domestic alternative adjustment would be
deflation. This could lead to unemployment if prices,
wages, etc. are inflexible. The economic and social cost
may be too high. Refer to Snider, ojq. cit.. p. 257.
81This would depend upon the volume of import
reduction and the type of demand for the country’s exports.

67
The exchange control authorities would probably prevent
the outward movement of capital.

Again, capital may be

more profitably employed within the country not neces
sarily because of a higher return but because greater
opportunities now exist.

Furthermore, the restrictions

upon imports may indicate that the general price level
of the nation restricting imports is relatively higher
than those of other trading nations.
The close of the interim period is realized when
exports decline to the extent of the lower import level.
The national income cannot be maintained with a lower
scale of imports and exports unless monetary and fiscal
policy are successfully adapted to that purpose.

The

role of these two policies is next to be traced.
On the basis of the experience of many nations
the following chain of efforts and results would probably
follow under a newly launched system of exchange control.
Since the control is likely to be imposed to reduce
imports, exports would become excessive.

Saving would

then be required to exceed domestic accumulation by an
amount equal to the excess of exports over imports.
This could be realized in part by raising quantitative
and qualitative controls and increasing commercial bank
interest rates.

Additional remedies would include

higher taxes, more emphasis upon government bond sales,
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and smaller transfer payments.
The monetary and fiscal factors at work to main
tain an excess of saving over investment would probably
be moderated, since exports would be constantly reduced
until finally exports equated the lower import level to
create equilibrium,

^his does not appear to be the

correct solution to the problem, however, since now both
exports and imports have d e c l i n e d . I n order to main
tain the original national income at a level which existed
before controls were imposed to reduce imports, both
saving and investment would have to rise to the same
extent at which imports and exports have fallen.®3

DO

This does not take account of the fact that
the domestic price level may be influenced and that
Imports not controlled could amount to a sizable pro
portion of total imports.
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V

E - M = A - s, or
E * A = M t s, then
M > E, and
A > s, exchange controls are imposed to
restrict imports, then
E > M, monetary and fiscal policies are
applied to increase saving, then
exports
are reduced to equate the
A,
lower import level, then
E sr M, monetary and fiscal policies are
employed to reduce saving, then
S s A, but, M and E are at a new low level
which indicates that monetary and
fiscal policies should have allowed
for a rise in both S and A in order
to maintain the original income level.
CD

If:

Symbolically the explanation would be as follows:
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Theorizing can be carried to a point which often
has a humorous side.

On the other hand, one’s sober but

practical application to current problems, without due
regard to sound theory, can be so over-controlled as to
require hourly or "minutely11 decisions looking toward
the solution of the problems.

In this connection, too,

the administration involved in such minute control may
become too costly in terms of accomplishments.

The

chain of developments described above serve to indicate
briefly the vast complexities which would confront the
authorities responsible for carrying out monetary and
fiscal policy in the presence of an exchange control
system.
3.

Flexible Exchange Rates

The flexible exchange rate system represents a
middle-of-the-road condition with respect to external
policy.The

rate of exchange is allowed to fluctuate

according to the dictates of demand and supply, except
that extreme fluctuations are prevented through the
operation of a stabilization fund or some other similar
government a g e n c y . D u r i n g the post-war era, the

^4Snider, o£. cit., p. 159.
® % e x i c o is a good example of a Latin American
country which utilizes a flexible exchange rate system.
The United States supports, in part, the Mexican stabi
lization fund.
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International Monetary Fund has been attempting to modify
extreme exchange rate movements on an international basis.
Since the exchange rate can vary, part of the
shock may be absorbed through this external means rather
than placing full reliance upon domestic changes alone
as would be necessary under exchange control.
The fluctuating rate places great reliance upon
the demand and supply forces at work within nations and
among the trading countries.

The market rate as

determined through trading is responsible for establish
ing an official rate of exchange.
The official rate of exchange is destined to
express an equilibrium condition in the balance of pay
ments of a nation with other trading countries.

This

rate, expressed in terms of prices, tends to link the
average price levels of the periphery.
As the market prices change in accordance with
the forces of the market, the official rate would be
"flexible1' too.

Speculation would be of lesser importance

than under a freely fluctuating system largely because
variations in the official rate are usually carried out
only periodically and in secret.

This result could be

expected as long as the change in market prices are of
moderate intensity.

86Halm, on. cit. , p. 478
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Foreign exchange reserves would flow out if the
average market prices of a nation’s goods rose temporarily
above those of its trading partners.

The official rate

would not need to be altered if the situation corrected
itself within a reasonable period of time.

On the other

hand, the balance of payments could be maintained at
equilibrium should the reverse occur as the nation
accumulates foreign exchange.
If market prices fluctuate to great extremes, the
stabilization fund would be required to buy or sell
foreign exchange until the market straightened itself
out.

The problem is that this may take a long time, and

the Fund may be exhausted.

The other alternatives would

be the inflow of funds or capital, monetary and fiscal
measures, or a change in the official exchange rate.
The most likely to occur is a mixture of all three.
Yet, an important problem would still wait for
solution.

How could internal measures (monetary and

fiscal policy) be combined with external measures
(exchange policy) in order to maintain a price and income
level consistent with such a level in other trading
nations?

Probably no general answer can be given here

since the emphasis in each country would depend upon its
own situation.
It would seem worthwhile to discuss the alternatives
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in terms of the more common problems evident today in the
underdeveloped areas.

These are inflation and disequi

librium in the balance of payments.8^
Since inflation is often so glaringly evident in
the underdeveloped areas, deflation appears to be the
method necessary to solve the internal monetary problem
and, thereby, reduce the pressure exerted upon the
exchange rate.
If there is a redundancy of money and credit which
brought on the inflation in the private sector, either
because of a desire on the part of authorities to induce
the people to consume and invest more or because pro
duction fails to rise proportionately with the larger
supply of funds, a tightening of monetary and fiscal
policy would contribute to the reduction of the excess
of mones^ and credit.

Qfjf

In Latin America eight of the twenty nations
are virtually free of exchange controls. These are:
Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, and Panama. These countries finance
their trade with the rest of the world almost exclusively
in dollars and maintain a high percentage of gold and
dollar reserves behind their currencies. However, for
our purposes the eight-country classification is not
sufficiently exact, for some of the countries exercise
varying degrees of control by means of payments agree
ments and other devices. Refer to R. F. Mikesell,
Foreign Exchange In The Postwar World, pp. 305-306.
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The amount of deflation necessary to stabilize the
economy is of great importance.

As deflation takes hold

and costs and prices begin to fall, prices usually fall
faster than costs.

This tends to lead to unemployment.

But unemployment is directly opposed to the objective of
full employment.

Also, the rigidity of prices and wages

and the possibility of widescale monopoly would not allow
deflation to do its job.
Increased borrowing on the part of the government
to finance various projects may lead to inflation.
Deflation as a means of correction may be turned down
because it would be thought of as an impediment to develop
ment.

In other words, the social cost may be considered

less if inflation prevails primarily for the purpose of
increasing developmental projects.

Whether such action

is justifiable or not, the pendulum may swing in favor
of a short-term expediency (inflation) for a long-term
anticipated gain (a diversified industry and larger pro
duction) .

Furthermore, deflation as an element of policy

in many underdeveloped areas Is likely to be opposed
because of its tendency to reduce imports which may other
wise be too great a cost in terms of development.

8®Underemployment is a more likely situation in
the underdeveloped areas. People usually are not thrown
out of work, but they move to less productive employment.
See Seymour Harris, Chapter I, "Some Major Issues," in
Economic Problems of Latin America, pp. 8-9.

Foreign exchange earnings derived from exports may
not aid a deflationary policy if such earnings ^re allowed
to infiltrate into the monetary system.

This form of

income is subject to wide and unpredictable movements
which could upset a broad deflationary policy.
Prestige may even enter into the explanation of
the failure of deflation.

Underdeveloped nations like to

imitate the more industrialized countries.

This is a

defensive type of situation in which the feeling among
the lesser developed countries is that they must match
the rising income of the industrial countries or at least
to see to it that their income moves in the same direction
that is being taken by that of the more fully developed,
industrial countries, even at the cost of inflation.
Loan funds may be moving toward the underdeveloped
areas, and this movement may explain, in part, the original
equilibrium exchange rate.

Nevertheless, the domestic

economy may feel the inflationary effect of such loans
as they are spent in unproductive endeavors.8^
Inflation may present a problem even when the funds
are being utilized productively.

For example, the govern

ment may use the funds to import capital goods which are

8% o doubt the above is a partial explanation as
to why the World Bank restricts its loans to governments.
Generally, the government or agencies of the governments
in Latin America take a large share of the responsibility
for channeling funds into the more productive sectors.
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sold to domestic firms.

The firms would probably pay for

these goods with savings or borrowed funds.

Income would

rise to the extent of the loan plus the Income velocity
which it generates.
of money.

The result would be a greater supply

Individual purchasers would have to refrain

from spending for other customary non-capital items until
the new savings are equal to the foreign loan.

Since

this deferral of expenditure is unlikely, inflation would
prevail.®^

A deflationary policy, on the other hand, may

reduce the Incentive to expand.
The desire for development which loan funds could
help support, accompanied by the determination to main
tain an equilibrium in the balance of payments, may be
stronger a force than that of deflation.

In such event,

the price level would remain quite high, with Income
varying in accordance with the more dominating factors.9-L
Depreciation of the exchange rate is an alterna
tive means available for coping with inflation.

Its

^ B u c h a n a n and Ellis, op. cit., p. 388.
^ E x p o r t income may rise or fall in comparison
with domestic income, including that derived from Imports;
at one time or another its rise or fall will be affected
by such factors as the distribution of income through
monetary and fiscal policy which could cause income to
rise or fall; the extent and results of price control, if
applied; the stimulative effect of the multiplier which
would also influence the actual income; the psychological
determination on the part of the public via co-operation
in order to alleviate an undesirable condition.
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effect upon the price level and national income may have
mixed results.
If the general market prices of a nation’s com
modities rise, the authorities may he willing to raise
the official rate of exchange to conform with them.

This

will have the effect of reducing imports, in view of the
probability that domestic traders will need to surrender
more of their home currency for a given amount of imports
than they did previously.

An increase in the domestic

rate would also tend to increase the exports of the nation,
for traders of other nations would now give up less units
of their currency for purchases from the depreciating
country.
The average price level in the nation depreciating
its exchange rate would tend to fall or, if rising, to
ascend at a slower rate than those of its trading partner.9^
This being the case, a nation could maintain its price
level and income would rise.

Many perplexities could

arise, however, and lead to a different solution.
If at the outset a deficit balance accrues in the

^ A f t e r the 1954 depreciation of the Mexican peso,
the wholesale price index (1953 = 100) rose to 125 at the
end of 1955. Yet, between January and October of 1956
the price index revealed a three point rise to 128. Using
the same base year, the wholesale index of the United
States showed a five point increase between January and
October of 1956. Refer to International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, January, 1957.
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balance of payments, depreciation could remedy the situ
ation within a short period of time.®^5 Thereafter,
retaliation in kind by other nations is likely to prevent
a continuation of the earlier benefits attaching to
depreciation.
Furthermore, exchange depreciation may actually
foster inflation through its effectiveness in preventing
imports from entering the nation.

The larger supply of

money would probably result in the bidding of prices at
home.

At the same time, rising export income would create

additional funds for domestic expenditures.

This may, in

turn, lead to a policy of further depreciation which could
make the problem nearly unbearable.®4

Speculation and

This assumes that the elasticities of demand and
supply are high enough to bring about greater than pro
portionate changes in imports and exports. For a good
discussion of these effects, refer to Jacob Viner, Inter
national Trade and Economic Development. p. 91-93; also
see James Meade, The Theory of International Economic
Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 195lJ, I, 309-310.
According to Mr. Bloomfield depreciation may not
work rapidly enough in a short period of time, especially
if the country is a primary producer faced with a rela
tively inelastic demand for its exports. Refer to Arthur
Bloomfield, ’’Foreign Exchange Rate Theory and Policy,"
The Hew Economics. p. 309.
qa

° Chile presents a good example of this process.
The wholesale price index rose in the following manner:
1953-100, 1954-157, 1955-277, and August, 1956-485. On
the other hand, the exchange rate changes were as follows
(pesos per dollar): 1953-110.0, 1954-200.0, 1955-300.0,
and August, 1956-497. See the International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics. January, 1957.
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capital outflow would probably occur, and this would again
assert itself upon the balance of payments in the form of
a deficit.
Internally, inflation may.raise the domestic price
level to an extent greater than that in the periphery.
In this case, too, exchange depreciation would fail, since
the price rise may encourage imports.®5
Consideration should also be given to the point
that if inflation is greater in one sector than another,
e. g., the export sector, exports may remain stable or
possibly decline.
Under such circumstances, monetary and fiscal
policy would have a definite place in helping to bring
about a tolerable situation.

Tightening of monetary

controls would be essential as would also the raising of
taxes in the fiscal area.

Intended saving (S) would

become a key factor, for both investment (A) and exports
(E) would have risen while imports (M) would have declined,
except in the case of hyperinflation as was Indicated in
the last two paragraphs

a b o v e . ^6

National income would

probably fall, at least in some sectors, as a result of
the operation of these measures.

®5Snider, op. cit., pp. 257-858.
9®Professor Viner recognized similar measures.
Viner, loc. cit.

See
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Professor Snider suggests an intermediate proposal
of disinflation plus exchange depreciation.^

Inflation

would be reduced through the appropriate monetary and
fiscal measures but would stop short of an actual down
turn of prices.

After prices are stabilized, presumably

under conditions of full employment and high national
income, then exchange depreciation may be instigated in
order to bring costs and prices at home into equilibrium
with those prevailing in the trading nations.

This

appears to be an excellent policy proposal, but the
exactitudes required would be extremely difficult to
ascertain and implement.
SUMMARY
In this chapter an attempt has been made to bring
together some of the internal and external factors whose
functioning with respect-to a nation’s economy may con
tribute to serious fluctuations in income and the general
price level, and may threaten the exchange rate.

Mone

tary and fiscal policy and exchange policy are the
measures suggested to offset their otherwise adverse
effects.
Primary emphasis is placed upon these factors as

^Snider, oj3. cit., pp. S58-S59.
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they relate to the lesser developed countries.

These

nations are quite generally characterized today by inflation
and by disequilibrium in their balance of payments.

At

least a partial explanation of their present-day problems
lies in the realm of factor influences and the inability
of these nations to cope with the reverberations which
originate so largely in those influences.
The approach is primarily in terms of income
analysis, and from a theoretical standpoint.

The temporal

sequence of developments is kept within the realm of short
term problems.

Accordingly, a very considerable emphasis

is given to the monetary aspect of changes and to the
methods employed to deal with such changes as opposed to
the physical or output analysis.
Monetary and fiscal measures are regarded as
desirable and necessary forces for establishing an equi
librium situation.

The addition of these measures to the

general balancing factor of lending is considered
appropriate, because lending, operating alone, may fail
to close the gap in the balance of payments, especially
within the short run period of time.

Monetary and fiscal

policy has an important role to play in helping to reduce
the impact of variable factors, external as well as
domestic.
It appears that much may be accomplished by a

81

nation confronted with short-term shocks which tend to
affect its national income or price level and its balance
of payments through a better co-ordination between
external and internal policy.

Here again, monetary and

fiscal measures have an important part to play.
It was found that changes in the external sector,
such as variations in income, depreciation, etc., have
an impact upon the domestic sector which tends to alter
the national income or price level.

The decision with

respect to the type of external policy which seems most
desirable to produce an equilibrium in the balance of
payments requires a varying degree of monetary and fiscal
implementation.

As an example, the use of exchange

controls, with periodic changes in the exchange rate,
seems to create an unusually important role for monetary
and fiscal policy while, on the other hand, these measures
are of lesser importance if a nation is pursuing a flexi
ble exchange rate policy.

In the latter case, the

external forces are taken into account through the vari
ability of the exchange rate rather than by monetary and
fiscal policy.

Of course, if extreme fluctuations occur

in the external sector, then monetary and fiscal policy
may play a stellar role in moderating the problem.
Deflation or exchange depreciation rely to a very con
siderable extent upon the latter policy.
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As a step toward the more effective co-ordination
between internal and external policy, it was suggested
that -perhaps disinflation along with some exchange
depreciation may be employed to help prevent too great
a burden in either area.

Yet, such sychronization of

policy as may be required might create more problems
than it could solve.
Since there are many varying factors which bring
about change, both monetary and fiscal policy and external
policy should be of a flexible nature in order to suc
cessfully deal with the problems which that change pre
cipitates .
Subsequent chapters will present individual
country analyses in order to find out how some of the
more representative nations are coping with these concepts
through practical application.

An effort will be made

to determine the extent to which that practical appli
cation supports, and is supported by, certain theoretical
expectations and conclusions in this area of inter
national trade study.

CHAPTER II
THE CASE OF MEXICO
Mexico w^s selected for this study because it repre
sents one of the more economically advanced countries of
Latin America.

Its specific position would be subject to

change relative to the other nations In this area depend
ing upon the classification one chooses to employ.

Using

the dual criteria of domestic economic progress and freedom
from external control, Mexico should be classified as one
of the more favorably situated nations of Latin America.
Domestically, the gross national product and
national income have continued to rise in a consistent
manner in recent years.-*-

Wo doubt part of Mexico's ability

to cope creditably with domestic problems is because the
people have an opportunity to observe and to employ many
policies successfully used in the United.States.

On the

other hand, Mexico is an underdeveloped country faced with

^•The gross national product has risen from 58,300
millions of pesos in 1952 to 92,400 millions of pesos in
1956. The devaluation of the peso by about 30.8 per cent
in 1954 is responsible, in part, for the rise in the gross
national product figures from 1954 to 1956. See the Banco
de Mexico, S. A., Trigesimatercera Asamblea General
Ordinaria de Accionistas CThirty-third Annual Report of
the Bank of Mexico), 1955, p. 149j also the International
Monetary Fund, International Financial News Survey.
November 16, 1956, p. 162.
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inflation and numerous other domestic problems found in a
typical developing nation. ^
It is contended that Mexico has no balance of pay
ments problem as such.®

^hls explains why the country

does not practice exchange control.

Nevertheless, there

is a tendency for Mexico to import more than it exports.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze some of
the theoretical concepts developed in Chapter I from a
more practical viewpoint.

The topics to be presented for

observation will be the international equilibrium of
Mexico and the internal and external policies of the
country during the last five years, 1952-1956.

Variable

factors which present numerous problems will be treated
as they Influence monetary,■fiscal, and external policies*
As mentioned earlier, attention Is to center around recent
experiences of the nation and, therefore, covers a rela
tively short period of time.

^A recent report of the National Bank of Mexico
states that Mexico1s economic position is comparable to
that of the United States in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Refer to Banco Nacional de Mexico,
S. A., Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico. July,
1955, pp. 5-4.
3R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar
World (New York: Twentieth Century Fund), 1954, p. 506.
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I.

INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: SOME FACTS

The concept of international equilibrium assumes
that the necessary factors of saving, investment, imports,
exports, and lending are so adjusted that equality among
these factors is a probability, and that they will main
tain such a relationship over a more or less prolonged
period of time.

From a more practical viewpoint, it is

unlikely that such a situation would occur in an under
developed nation, or if it did exist, it would not last
for an extended period of time.
The latter explanation seems reasonable because
international equilibrium is subject to human discretion.
For example, an international equilibrium balance could
be disturbed whenever groups of importers decide to alter
the quantity of goods imported, while the decisions on
the part of savers, investors, exporters, or lenders do
not change accordingly to offset the prior dictates of
the importers.
Furthermore, a nation which would realize a state
of international equilibrium would be constantly on the
defense to maintain its favorable position because many
of its trading partners probably would have not achieved
such a desirable goal.
A majority of the lesser developed nations are
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subject to the economic diversities of foreign industrial
countries with which they trade.

Such may be the case

even if their foreign trade represents a minor portion of
total income.

The reason for this is that they must

import certain basic foodstuffs not available within the
country or not produced in sufficient quantities, and
their urgent need to acquire capital goods produced by
other nations.

The import of foodstuffs is essential to

maintain their plane of living while the inflow of capital
goods provides for future growth.
Mexico is no exception to this kind of reliance
upon other countries.

The major part of its foreign trade

is with the United States.^

Although its foreign trade

accounts for about 15 per cent of its total trade, the
types of goods imported are crucially important for the
maintenance of the nation1s plane of living and for
economic growth.
On the other hand, the extensive participation on
the part of the government may serve to check large devi
ations away from an equilibrium position.

Again, Mexico

% n 1954, 83.6 per cent of MexicoTs import trade
and 79.7 per cent of its export trade was carried on with
North America, principally the United States. The import
and export trade was 83.1 per cent and 80.2 per cent,
respectively, for the year 1955. See the Banco Nacional
de Comercio Exterior, S. A., Comercio Exterior de Mexico
1955 (The National Bank of Foreign Commerce, Foreign
Commerce of Mexico 1955). March, 1956, p. 217.
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is an example of an underdeveloped nation in which the
government takes an active role in economic development.
The following section on saving and investment
emphasizes the relative contribution of the private and
government sectors to the total product of the nation.
Unless specifically stated, the terms national product
and national income will be used interchangeably.

The

national product figures are to be used in describing
relationships.

This seems to be the best way of making

comparisons since both the private and public sectors are
being considered.

Furthermore, the national product is

equal to national income if it is recognized that the
former takes account of depreciation, indirect business
taxes, and subsidies.

Unfortunately, existing infor

mation with respect to these factors is lacking in the
case of Mexico.

The national product data are given,

therefore, in gross figures.
A.

Saving and Investment

Table I, page 88, presents the saving and invest
ment picture of Mexico from 1952 to 1956.

The national

product for the years 1953 and 1955 show exceptional
directional changes.5

in addition, the 1953 national

N a t i o n a l product figures for the years 1952-1954
were taken from the Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1955,

TABLE I
SAVING AND INVESTMENT OF MEXICO
(in millions of pesos)
National As a S aving
Producta
of
Total
(2)
(1)

%

1952
58,300 100.0

5,222c

1953
56,300 100.0
1954
66,478 100.0

As a Private As a Public As a Invest As a Private As a Public As a
of ment3
of Invest
of Saving^
S aving
of
of Invest
ment^
ment
(4)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(5 )
(5 ) ' (7)
(1)
(&)
(1)
(6)

% of

%

%

%

%

%

9.0

3,394 65.0

l,828d 35.0

8,166 14.0

4,732 57.9

3,434 42.1

6,573

11.7

4,000 61.0

2,573

39.0

7,540 13.4

4,600 61.0

2,940 39.0

8,056

12.1

4,815 59.8

3,241

40.2

9,428 14.2

5,400 57.3

4,028 42.7

1955
84,000 100.0 10,742

12.8

6,505 60.6

4,237

39.4

11,611 13.8

7,600 65.5

4,011 34.5

1956e
92,400 100.0 11,817

12.8

7,156 60.6

4,661

39.4

12,774 13.8

8,360 65.4

4,414 34.6

Source: Bank of Mexico, S. A., Annual Report, 1955; Nacional Financlera, S. A.,
Informe Anual (Annual Report), 1956; and United States Department of Commerce, Investment
In Mexico, 1955.
®Gross figures.
^Public sector includes decentralized government organizations, state owned
businesses, government of the Federal District, and states and municipalities.
cPartially estimated.
j

00

Estimated at 35% of total saving.
eAll figures are estimated on the basis of a ten per cent increase.

00
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income fell by 1,800 millions of pesos from the preceding
year, while the national income in 1955 rose by 15,420
millions of pesos over 1954.6
The decline in the gross national product for 1953
was 3.4- per cent.

Several reasons can be offered to

explain, in part, this decline in the national product.
Inflation had been a problem for several years, and the
Korean War further aggravated the situation.

Credit

expanded by nearly 20 per cent between 1952 and 1953.?
On the other hand, prices actually declined in 1953.®
The fall of less than three percentage points was not
unusual when compared to the prior yearts price rise.
In 1952 the price level rose by about 35 per cent;
furthermore, in the following year, 1954, the price level
ascended by approximately 37 percentage points.

p. 149. The figure for 1955 was obtained from the Nacional
Financiera, S. A., Annual Report. 1956, p. 37, and the
figure for 1956 was acquired from the International Mone
tary Fund, International Financial News Survey. November
16, 1956, p. 162.
^National income figures for the years under study
were as follows: 1952, 52,000 millions of pesos; 1953,
50,200; 1954, 59,180; 1955, 74,600; and 1956, 82,060.
The sources of national income data are the same as those
used for the national product figures (see footnote 5,
p. 87), except for 1956. National income for 1956 was
estimated at ten per cent greater than 1955.
7
Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1954, p. 58. This
figure excludes inter-bank accounts.
Q
Ibid., p. 123. The wholesale price index was
392.5 at the end of 1953 (base 1939
100).

-
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Positive action, primarily by the governmental
sector, halted the rise in output and income for the year.
Realized public investment fell by 494 millions of pesos
(14.4 per cent) -while private investment expenditures
dropped by 132 millions of pesos (3.0 per cent).

Over-all

total realized investment expenditures declined by 7.7
per cent at the end of 1953.

In contrast,the national

product dropped 3.4 per cent.
Table I further reveals that total saving rose
25.9 per cent during the year.

Realized private saving

increased 17.1 per cent; thus

it accountedfor approxi

mately 45 per cent of the total rise.
To sum up the internal factors, the decline in
government investment expenditures and the rise of public
savings played a vital role in explaining the economic
situation at the year's end.

Saving rose by a much

greater extent than investment fell; however, the effect
upon the fall in the national product was not very pro
nounced.

Two major reasons explain this condition.

are the abundance of credit and the time element.

They
The

extent of available credit has already been stated, but
some attention should be given to the latter factor.
During the first half of 1953 the government carried out
various conservative measures to deal effectively with
the inflation.

The conservative attitude, expressed mainly
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through a brisk reduction of investment spending, spread
to the general public.

The result was larger saving.

The government was forced to change its policy in the
middle of 1953 because national income was expected to
fall rapidly.

Government investment spending then rose;

nevertheless, the desired expansion on the part of the
general public failed to mature.

The final end-of-the-

year result was an actual decline in the national product
and income*
These events were expressed by an authoritative
report:
. . . Two distinct phases were apparent during
1953.
In the first half of the year, official
policy was aimed at balancing the fiscal budget
and containing the threat of inflation, which also
coincided with a deterioration in the balance of
payments. The measures for financial austerity
mainly led to a slackening of public investment.
. . , Nevertheless, the private sector enjoyed
credit which was more readily available and more
abundant, loaned with the objective of encouraging
private investment and of thus reconciling the
need for financial and monetary equilibrium with
the desire to avoid restricting economic develop
ment.
The consequent tendency towards depression led
during the second half of the year to a change in
fiscal policy, while public investment was raised.
But the influence of the initial contraction,
which was partly psychological, could not be
neutralized. . . .9

% n i t e d Nations, department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America 1954 (New York:
United Nations Publications, 1955), p. 174.
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The high liquidity on the part of the general
public had become too firm to be pried loose.

The general

price level followed pretty much the course of events.
The wholesale price level in December, 1952 was 392.7.
By February, 1953 it had declined to 383.9 while it stood
at 387.4 at the end of April.

Finally, the year ended

with the December, 1953 price index at 395.6.-^
On the international scene, the normal trend of
import surpluses was realized again in 1953.^

This fact

plus the fear of the public’s inclination to save for
later spending upon imports brought about the decision by
the government to devaluate the currency in 1954.
Foreign exchange reserves declined from 2,163
millions of pesos in 1952 to 1,886 millions of pesos at
the close of 1953.

From the commodity viewpoint, the

reason for the smaller exchange balance was not because
of a rise in imports, the latter actually declined, but
because of the pronounced fall in exports earnings as is
demonstrated by the balance of payments schedule.
Mexico’s short-term obligations with American

^National Bank of Mexico, S. A«, Review of the
Economic Situation of Mexico. See the following issues:
February, April, and June, 1954.
-^See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix
A, p. 174.
-^Devaluation took place in April, 1954.
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banks, principally loans and acceptances and draft
indebtedness, rose by 34.6 millions of pesos (4 millions
of dollars) while American Banks’ obligations to Mexico,
mainly deposits and United States Government bonds matur
ing within one year, fell by 380.6 millions of pesos (44
million dollars)*^®
The second of the two years of exceptional
directional change in the national product was 1955.

The

sharp rise in the national product was brought about in
several different ways.

Perhaps the most significant

event was the devaluation of the peso in mid-1954.
Export income swelled by about 1,937 millions of pesos
(154.9 millions of dollars).^4
Total investment for 1955 was 23.1 per cent larger
than in 1954.

Government investment did not increase,

but actually fell.

This result came about after a large

injection of government investment in 1954.

The official

attitude was to place the burden of rising investment on
the shoulders of the private sector.

The result was a

fortunate turn of events; private investment was greater
by approximately 41 per cent over 1954, as Table I

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin. December, 1956, pp. 1374 and 1376.
^C a l c u l a t e d at the new rate of exchange of 12.51
pesos to the dollar.
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Indicates.
Another factor of utmost importance was the official
concern of higher costs and prices attributed in part to
the 1954 devaluation.

This problem led once again to a

more conservative policy with respect to government spend
ing.
The policy of the Bank of Mexico was to encourage
private investment.

Although this policy will be dis

cussed under the internal and external policy heading, it
should be pointed out that commercial banks were enticed
into channeling loans to those various sectors of the
economy in which economic development would yield the
greatest returns.
Private saving expansion during 1955 represented
a 56 per cent increase over the preceding 12 months.

The

share of private saving to total saving maintained a rate
of approximately 60 per cent; the remainder consisted of
public saving.
The physical output was larger by some 26 per cent
at the end of 1955; that is, a rise from 66,478 millions
of pesos in 1954 to 84,000 millions of pesos in 1955,
calculated In terms of gross figures.
Table I shows that the figures for 1956 were esti
mated.

The national product and income represented a 10

95
per cent increase over 1955.

15

The figures for investment

and saving have also been increased by 10 per cent.

No

doubt these are conservative estimates, but they seem to
be indicative of the general conservative viewpoint
expressed during the first part of the year.
On the basis of information made available during
the first half of the year, it would seem reasonable to
expect the balance of payments of Mexico to continue its
favorable condition.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to

predict just how and to what extent the devaluation will
affect Mexico*s international relations.
It is quite clear that the volume of saving has
failed to maintain a volume of investment capable of
supporting a high level of production and employment.
Table I indicates, however, that the saving gap has
narrowed over the past five years.
Table II, page 96, takes account of the monetary
influences by attaching prices to a base year.

The general

commodity index of 210 commodities was employed as a guide
for measurement.

The index based upon 1939 was rebased

for 1950 in order to obtain a more current trend in price
changes.^6

1R

International Monetary Fund, International
Financial News Survey. November 16, 1956, p. 162.
^-%ee the Index of Wholesale Prices in Mexico City,
Appendix B, p. 176.
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TABLE II
REAL SAVING AND INVESTMENT OF MEXICO
(in millions of pesos)
Year
1958
1953
1954
1955
1956

National
Product
46,014
44,647
48,207
58,239
55,797
Source:

Saving
4,122
5,213
5,842
6,618
7,135

Investment
6,445
5,979
6,837
7,221
7,714

Pricesa
(1950 = 100)
126.7
126.1
137.9
160.8
165.6b

Table I, p. 88.

aPrices are computed from data issued by the Bank
of Mexico, S. A., Annual Reports. and the National Bank of
Foreign Commerce, Foreign Commerce of Mexico. December, 1956.
^The price index for 1956 consists of the average
price of consumer and producer goods for the first ten
months of the year.
Table II shows that inflation has been something
more than of passing importance.

The national product

rose In terms of 1950 prices by 81.3 per cent, or it aver
aged a little more than 5 per cent per year.

In contrast,

investment expenditures increased by 19.7 per cent or
approximately 3.95 per cent for each of the five years.
The data also shows that investment expenditures for the
period as a whole failed to maintain the given level of
national income.

Nevertheless, the last two years, 1955

and 1956, indicated that investment expenditures rose by
6.6 per cent per year while the national product increased
by 7.6 per cent per year.

In other words, investment has
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Improved its position with respect to the national income.
Saving has risen at a rapid rate, although It still
falls short of investment expenditures.

The rate of

increase in 1955 and 1956 was about 11 per cent for each
year based upon 1950 prices.

The rise in saving paints

a somewhat optimistic picture; nevertheless, there are
several reasons that help to explain why saving con
sistently falls short of investment.

It is said that

only a small proportion of the population have funds avail
able out of their income for saving.

Although statistical

proof is lacking, Mr. Antonio Flores, Director of the
National Financiera (National Industrial Financing
Corporation) states that:
. . . the distribution of income results in a
situation which has a marked influence on the
structure of the capital market. There is on the
one hand a small population group whose high income
gives it a wide margin of saving, and on the other
millions who can hardly satisfy their most pressing
needs.
It Is recognized too that hoarding is a continuous
problem in Mexico; however, there is no way to determine
to what extent hoarding could contribute to greater invest
ment.

There is good indication that hoarding is not so

United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs,
Domestic Financing of Economic Development (New York:
United Nations Publications, 1950), p. 160. A report by
a committee of experts.
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serious a problem today as it was in the past.

Banking

institutions have spread to nearly all parts of the
country.

In 1951 there were 759 depositories of cash

including banks and branches, credit unions, and other
financial organizations.

This figure is in contrast to

the two savings institutions which existed in 1951.

18

The

growth In the number of all types of financial institutions
follows the phenomenal rate of the savings banks.
The rise in the national product and income during
recent years has surely contributed to a larger number of
people realizing some savings.

On the other hand, the

rise in income is not nearly so impressive when expressed
in real terms as shown in Table II.

Nevertheless, invest

ment expenditures have made it possible for more people to
save a portion of their income.
The degree of government Influence into the working
of the economic system Is of particular interest.

Table I,

page 88, shows that government investment varied between
54.5 to 42.7 per cent of total investment for the years
under study while public saving ranged within similar
percentage points.

In other words, government partici

pation accounts for a large portion of total income and

18

Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Interim
Report, Study of Latin American Countries (Washington:
United States Printing Office), 1954, p. 554.
A report
of the Capehart Commission In Latin America.
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employment*

Also, it accounts for a sizable portion of

total saving.

Public works and public enterprises are

evidently the foundation for economic development.

The

basic industries and external economies are primarily a
governmental responsibility.
The saving public does have access to two stock
exchanges in Mexico.

Although individual participation

on these exchanges is greater at present than ever before,
there is still a good deal of apathy on the part of the
general public.
Inflation has been a leading factor in holding
back further utilization of the exchanges.

Inflation is,

nevertheless, a partial explanation for the recent upsurge
in stock exchange activity.

Private holders of bonds

have suffered through their investment in this type of
fixed return paper; therefore, many people have changed
1Q
their portfolios to the purchase of stocks.
The public is being further stimulated in putting
its saving to work through the efforts of the invest
ment bankers.

In addition, the National Financiera sells

securities to individuals.

Evidently the general public

is becoming more accustomed to the purchases of the latter
institutions securities since it is now offering its

19

National Bank of Mexico, S. A., Review of the
Economic Situation of Mexico. December, 1955, pp. 3-4.
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paper without the usual repurchase guarantee.

This

guarantee has been used in the past in order to encourage
individuals to buy more, securities.

Nevertheless,

a

recent issue was offered by the National Financiera with
out this additional prop.

In other words, the officials

of financial institutions must feel that the general
public is so conditioned with respect to the purchase of
securities that it will take them off the market without
an additional incentive.^0
Table I reveals the rapid rise in saving during the
five-year period.

Total realized saving increased approxi

mately 126 per cent, but public saving over-shadowed
private saving.

The percentage figures were 155 per cent

for the former and 111 per cent for the latter.
No doubt part of the public saving consisted of
forced saving of the private sector.

On the other hand,

another unverified portion of public saving represented
the inflationary influence.

Nonetheless, aggregate saving

has risen at a rapid rate even though it did fall short
of investment expenditures.
The question may be posed: why is it that investment
spending was larger than saving?

A partial explanation is

that the creation of money allowed for greater investment

pQ

& International Monetary Fund, International
Financial News Survey. January 27, 1956, p. 236.
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expansion.

The expansion was of a dual nature.

Credit

itself made it possible for private investment to rise.
The second feature is that the government provided vast
investment expenditures.

Furthermore, rising export

income and the tightening of import restrictions both
stimulated domestic investment.

In reference to Table I,

total actual investment increased 56.4 per cent during
the five years under consideration.

Private Investment

expenditures rose 76.7 per cent while the public sector
accounted for a S8.5 per cent increase.

Perhaps of

greater significance is the fact that public Investment
has averaged 38.6 per cent of total investment for the
period.

Both private and public investment expenditures

have advanced rapidly in the last few years; however, the
inflationary impact must be kept in mind.

Certainly It

should modify such optimistic overtones.
Traditionally, a low propensity to save creates a
PT
large multiplier effect.
The result should stimulate
consumption and, in turn, induce further investment.

In

Mexico part of the multiplying effect is reduced because
the Improvement In consumption is confined to a very
narrow base; that is, only a small portion of the

^ T a b l e I indicates that the maximum autonomous
multiplier effect, notwithstanding import leakages, would
average about 7.
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population share in the returns from investment via higher
incomes sufficient to accumulate savings for investment*
Some part of the funds that would he available for further
investment are directed into conspicuous consumption, the
acquisition of more land, increased imports, or it goes
abroad as flight capital.
Reference to Table I again shows that saving, as
one leakage factor, would reduce the multiplier somewhat.
The marginal propensity to save in Mexico is approximately
0.14.

However, the inclusion of the marginal propensity

to import estimated at about 0.20 reduces the multiplier
to a great extent.22

At the minimum, the two leakage

factors amount to 0.34.

This means that 34 centavos (100

centavos per peso) out of every additional peso of income
would be saved and spent for imports.
Only a rough estimate is possible in determining
the influence of capital outflow.

The balance of payments

indicates that capital outflows were especially prominent
in 1952, 1954, and 1955.25
Import restrictions have been tightened in each of

CO

The estimate of the import leakage is taken from
Mr. Flores. Refer to United Nations, Department of Economic
Affairs, Domestic Financing of Economic Development, pp.
175-176.
23
A,

p.

See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix

174.
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several recent years.

In 1954 the government took action

to reduce the inflow of luxury and non-essential goods.2^
An effort was made in 1956 to regulate import licenses of
some commodities in accordance with the value of the
oc
surpluses of major export products.
A new Mexican
import tariff schedule went into effect in the latter
year.2®

The new schedule involves a complete revision of

the tariff classification for imported goods.
A further treatment of saving and investment will
be presented under the subsequent heading of monetary,
fiscal and external policies.

At this stage it is quite

clear that realized saving and Investment decisions have
not provided for an equality between these two factors in
any of the years under studyj investment expenditure has
been larger than saving in every year.

Table III below

gives the amounts of excess investment over saving.
TABLE III
THE EXCESS OF REALIZED INVESTMENT OVER SAVING
(in millions of pesos)
1952
1953

2,944
967

^ U n i t e d Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America
1954. p. 176.
25International Monetary Fund, International
Financial News Survey. September 21, 1956, p. 95.
pg

United States Department of Commerce, Foreign
Commerce Weekly, February 20, 1956, p. 6.
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TABLE III

(continued)

1954
1955
1956

1,372
869
957

Source: Table I, p. 88.
B.

Imports, Exports, and Lending2*'’

Chapter I explained that if an international equi
librium condition were to be obtained whenever Investment
expenditures exceeded saving, as is the case in Mexico,
imports should be larger than exports by an amount equal
to the investment surplus.

If this balance were not

realized, then lending would be the factor responsible
for creating the balance.^9

This section will inquire

Into Mexico1s import and export relations to find out
whether or not an International equilibrium exists, and
if it does not, to see if lending fills the gap.
The current account section of the balance of pay
ments explains whether a nation is balancing its current
transactions (receipts and expenditures) in its trade
with other nations.

If an imbalance is present, the

difference must be reconciled through the capital account,

27

Imports include all the current account minus
Items while exports represent the sum of all the current
account plus items. Lending constitutes the (net)
capital account balance.
28
Refer to Chapter I, pp. 15-17.
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unilateral account, or the gold account.
Some interesting relationships may be drawn from
Table IV.

Mexico has realized an import surplus in its

commodity trade for every year included in this survey.
Nevertheless, the import surplus has declined in every
year with the exception of 1953.

Among the more important

factors which have contributed to the narrowing of the
import gap were the success of import controls as mentioned
on pages 102 and 103, the devaluation in 1954, the stimu
lation of exports, and good harvest years.
TABLE IV
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MEXICO*
(in millions of dollars)
Item

1952

1953

1954

1955

Exports, f.o.b.
Imports, c.i.f.
Nonmonetary gold
Foreign travel
Foreign travel
Investment income
Other (net)
Balance

619.6
-830.9
2.0
275.1
-113.3
-123.5
28.7
-142.3

589.2
-807.6
14,0
302.3
-140.1
- 93.6
28.6
-107.2

655.3
-788.7
11.7
336.8
-173.2
- 85.7
23.3
- 20.5

810.2
-883.7
14.2
364.8
-164.6
- 93.3
20.8
68.4

1956a
454.9
-518.3
2.4
223.6
-104.1
- 57.9
9.1
9.7

Source: Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix
A,

p.

174.

*Minus items denote debits or a reduction In
purchasing power.
aIncludes the first six months of 1956 only.
The receipts of foreign travel expenditures are
of particular importance to Mexico's current account
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balance.

The major components of this item consist of

dollar earnings brought into Mexico by seasonal workers
(braeeros) in the United States and foreign tourist
expenditures in the country.

Table IV reveals that the

foreign travel Item amounted to between one-third and
one-half the value of exports.
The investment income account was characteristic
of a nation in a debtor stage of economic progress; that
Is, Income earned abroad consistently falls short of
income earned in Mexico by foreign individuals, firms,
and governments.
Mexico had an over-all debit balance on current
account In the first three years of the five-year period.
Yet, the amount of the debit balance was lowered in each
of the successive years.
35 millions of dollars.

The decline in 1955 was about
Although total commodity trade

fell, imports declined to a greater extent than exports
and nonmonetary gold tak:en together.

No doubt the con

servative measures carried out by the government in the
first half of the year contributed to the fall in Imports
(see pages 90 and 91).

The "wait-and-see" attitude of the

general public, the possibility of devaluation, and the
general business decline in the United States were sig
nificant factors accounting for the reduction in exports.
The foreign travel Items offset one another between
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1952 and 1955 while the miscellaneous account declined by
only 100,000 dollars.

The principal factor explaining the

reduced deficit balance in 1953 was the investment income
item, which although still unfavorable, fell by some 29.9
millions of dollars.
The deficit on current account in 1954 was 20.5
millions of dollars.

The devaluation of the peso in

April, 1954 was perhaps the chief reason for the small
unfavorable balance.

Table IY shows the effects of

devaluation with a large spurt in export sales and a
reduction in imports.
In 1955 the current account turned favorable.
Exports rose by 154.9 millions of dollars.

This large

increase of exports is indicative of the results to be
expected during the first full year after devaluation.
On the other hand, imports surged upward by the amount of
95 millions of dollars.

Perhaps the main reasons for the

rise in imports were the accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves and the rapid rise of the domestic price level
(see Table II, page 96).

Both were Influenced in the

first instance by the devaluation of the previous year.
Another important factor which helped to produce
a favorable current account balance in 1955 was the large
increase of foreign travel receipts in Mexico accompanied
by a decline of Mexican foreign travel expenditures.
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Since the data for 1956 included only the first six
months, it is difficult to predict the changes which may
have occurred in the last half of the year.

Nevertheless,

it is normal for exports to rise markedly in the last part
of the year when a large portion of the crops are harvested
for shipment.
By way of summation, the current account has shown
a deficit balance for the years 1952, 1953, and 1954.
The only complete year which yielded a favorable current
account balance was 1955, while the information for 1956
presents an incomplete picture,
A survey of the capital account should throw some
light upon the directional flow of lending (positive or
negative).

Table V shows the capital account items and
TABLE V
CAPITAL ACCOUNT OF MEXICO
(in millions of dollars)

Item

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956a

64.3
Long term
Private
42.S
Official
21.5
Short term
-51.2
Private
- 2.4
Official
-48.8
Balance 13.1

21.7
21.3
.4
65.5
20.1
45.4
87.2

115.9
98.0
17.9
- 95.6
- 20.2
- 68.4
20.3

179.0
139.5
39.5
-121.9
29.0
-150.9
57.1

84.5
69.8
14.7
48.2
13.5
34.7
132.7

Source: Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix
A, p. 174.
aIncludes the first half of 1956 only.
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their directional movements.

It is inferred that all the

positive items represent inward movements of capital or
negative lending (borrowing), or returns on loans made
and, consequently, the minus items indicate outward flows
of capital or positive lending, or the repayment of
previous borrowings.
Long-term movements of capital into Mexico showed
a constant rise except for the year 1953.

The reasons

for the fall of capital imports were two-fold.

First of

all, the government of Mexico was deeply concerned with
the presence of inflation.

As mentioned earlier, measures

were taken in that year to prevent further loss of
purchasing power.

Furthermore, the adverse psychology as

expressed by the private sector contributed to the smaller
amount of long-term capital inflow.
The 400,000 dollars of official capital import were
evidence that foreign governments and other official
bodies were inclined to reserve their decisions to make
funds available to Mexico.
Private long-term capital inflow accounted for the
greater portion of Mexico*s total long-term foreign capital
resources; nevertheless, some caution should be read into
these figures.

A large portion of the private direct

investments consisted of the reinvestment of the profits
of foreign owned firms in Mexico rather than new investments
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by a larger number of foreign residents.
The amount of official capital flows represents
capital actually consumed, not authorized.

In addition,

the figures include repayments made each year.

The

constancy of repayments along with the favorable balance
of payments in the past few years has provided Mexico
with a high international credit rating.

OQ

Total short-term capital movements have been quite
erratic during the period covered by this survey.

Table V

indicates a debit balance existed for three out of the
five years.

On the whole, official short-term capital

movements have been

larger in amount than the private

short-term capital movements.

The private short-term

capital account consists of the changes in national and
private banks*

assets which include gold holdings of these

banks, but it excludes the foreign assets of the Central
Bank.30
The short-term account totals represent net balance
31
figures.
A minus means that either non-residents

2% a t i o n a l Bank of Mexico, S. A., Review of the
Economic Situation of Mexico. February, 1956, pp. 3-5.
30

The Bank of Mexico's foreign assets are included
with "other foreign assets" of the "official short-term"
capital account item. Private transactions also fall
within the classification of the latter account item.
See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix A, p. 174.
31

The lone exception is the "use or repayment of
International Monetary Fund resources" item.

Ill

have— on balance— drawn down their bank deposits in
Mexican banks; or the banks have acquired stocks, bonds,
or other assets of foreign countries, including foreign
currency, bank deposits, and brokerage balances; or the
banks have received gold on balance.
The minus balance of the short-term capital account
in 1952 seems logical because internally the economy was
characterized by inflation.

Externally the situation gave

rise to foreign skepticism which resulted in a decline of
American banks * short-term claims on Mexico and a rise in
United States banks1 short-term liabilities to Mexico.
In other words, American short-term balances were being
withdrawn while Mexican nationals were increasing their
deposits in American banks and purchasing United States
securities.

32

The favorable capital account balance was

possible in 1952 because of the inflow of long-term
capital.
At the end of 1953 the short-term capital balance
turned positive.

This suggests that a high state of

liquidity was desired on the part of both the private
and official sectors.

ssUnited States short-term claims fell by two
millions of dollars while United States short-term
liabilities increased by 73 millions of dollars.
See
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin. March, 1955, pp. 334 and 336.
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The debit balance on short-term capital account was
re-established in 1954 and continued through 1955.
Devaluation played a star role in bringing about the minus
balance.
A more thorough investigation of the balance of
payments accounts will be undertaken in the subsequent
section dealing with monetary, fiscal, and external
policies.
It is now possible to bring together the internal
factors of saving and investment and the external factors
of imports, exports, and lending in order to arrive at an
approximate international equilibrium of Mexico.
Table VI combines the above factors to show their
TABLE VI
THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM OF MEXICO
(in millions of pesos)*
Year

National
Product

Saving(S)Investment (A)
Balance

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

58,300
56,300
66,478
84,000
92,400

A>
A>
A>
A>
A>

S 2,944
S
967
S 1,372
S
869
S
957

Lending
Balance
(4-inflow)
44-

113
754
254
714
4r- l,660a

Import(M)Export(E)
Balance
M > E 1,231
M> E
927
M> E
257
E>M
856
E>M
121a

Source: Table I, page 88; Table III, pages 103-104;
Table IV, page 105; Table V, page 108; and the Balance of
Payments of Mexico, Appendix A, p. 174.
^Monetary conversions were made at the following
rates of exchange: 8.65 pesos per dollar, 1952-1955; 12*51
pesos per dollar, 1954-1956.
aIncludes data for the first half of 1956 only.
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balancing relationships.

An over-all appraisal of the

table yields some important facts.
excess of saving for each year.

Investment was in

In the first instance,

this relationship presents a gratifying situation.

Never

theless, it is possible that productivity has not risen
so much as the figures indicate.

An increase in the

supply of money and credit could constitute a part of this
seemingly tremendous increase in investment and output.
According to theory, an excess of investment over
saving should be offset through negative lending if inter
national equilibrium is to be realized, i. e., there
should be an inflow of capital in an amount equal to the
investment surplus.

Table VI reveals the above condition.

Lending was negative on balance;
place in every year.

an inflow of capital took

This fact Indicates that some portion

of the rise in investment and national product was caused
by inflation.

The year 1953 would seem to bear this out,

because income and output fell while investment was still
much greater than saving.
Table VI further indicates that external policy
was of prime importance since the lending balance was
i

moving in the desired direction for the first three of
the five years surveyed.

In other words, lending should

be negative whenever imports exceed exports.

In addition,

a major correction was made through external policy via
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devaluation in 1954*

Within the general framework of events, each year
presents its own unique set of factor relationships.

The

remainder of this section will be devoted to observing
the influences exerted by the various factors during the
five-year period under consideration.
I
In 1958 investment (A) exceeded saving (S) by some
2,944 millions of pesos.

This would indicate that lend

ing (the capital account of the balance of payments)
should show an inflow of capital by this amount.

Accord

ingly, negative lending took place to the extent of 113
millions of pesos.

Therefore, the lending function

contributed to a decline in the imbalance in a theoreti
cal sense, which when deducted from investment totaled
2,831 millions of pesos.
Since investment was in excess of saving, the
surplus must have been generated through an increase of
money and credit and government spending.

The supply of

money in circulation and demand deposits increased by 278
millions of pesos while credit extended by the banking
institutions was greater by some 770 millions of pesos

^ S e e Table VI,

column 4, p. 112*

115
rzA

during 1952.

Money and credit accounted for 1,048

millions of pesos out of the total investment balance of
2,831 millions of pesos, including the lending factor.
Although data were not available, the remainder must have
been financed through the government by use of various
direct and indirect methods.
Negative lending failed to close the gap between
imports and exports.

The year 1952 ended with an import

balance on current account to the extent of 1,231 millions
of pesos.

Although negative lending took place, there

remained a gap of 1,118 millions of pesos.

35

This gap

was covered through the unilateral, gold, and errors and
omissions accounts of the balance of payments and the
change in international reserves.

To sum up: Mexico

received donations amounting to 27 millions of pesos,
lost gold to the extent of 551 millions of pesos, increased
its foreign exchange reserves by 519 millions of pesos,
and assigned 21 millions of pesos as a credit to the errors
and omissions item.

These figures total 1,118 millions of

pesos, and this sum is equal to the original gap between
the import surplus and the capital or lending balance.

36

34Refer to Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C,
p.

177.

Refer to Table VI, columns 4 and 5, p. 112.
36

The figures for the donations and gold items—
converted into pesos— are taken from the Balance of
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The national product realized an increase of 6,500
millions of pesos at current prices.

This amounted to a

12.5 per cent rise in national product (income).

How

ever, in constant pesos the rise was only 1,127 millions
of pesos, or 2.5 per cent.

In either case the rise in

output appeared satisfactory.

It would seem logical that

productivity could rise hy a larger amount since the
establishment of a new firm, for example, would convert
the operators of, say, shoe-shining booths into steel
handlers or auto assembly workers.

In other words, the

'immediate effect of even a small capital investment in a
country in which productivity is exceptionally low would
make possible a large percentage rise in production.
On the other hand, the constant creation of money
and credit may be too great even though a rise in national
product is evident.

This year seemed to be the end of a

culmination period; that is, inflation was getting too far
out of hand.

Since 1950 the total money supply has risen

18*2 per cent or from 5,989 to 7,078 millions of pesos.
Furthermore, at the end of 1952 the banking system had
<zrf

extended 7,639 millions of pesos worth of credit.

These

figures reveal the fact that the national product probably

Payments, Appendix A, p. 1?4. The foreign exchange figure
was obtained from the International Monetary Fund, Inter
national Financial Statistics. January, 1957, p. 156, line 12.
S^Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C, p.

177.
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could not have been maintained at its existing level with
out even more extreme penalties imposed on the economic
system.
Externally, the top-heavy import balance consist
ing mainly of capital goods failed to reap immediate bene
fits while the gold-foreign exchange balance indicated a
reverse directional movement, that is, a net loss of gold
amounting to 32 millions of pesos.
II
The next year, 1953, ended with an actual decline
in national product (income).

This was the only year in

this survey in which the national product fell.

Yet,

in referring back to Table VI, page 112, one finds a
pattern in the trend of saving and investment, lending,
and imports and exports similar to that of the preceding
year, except that the figures were smaller in amount.
Investment exceeded saving by 967 millions of
pesos in 1953.

This figure would indicate that lending

should have been negative by the amount of the investment
balance in order to establish an equilibrium at the new,
lower national product figure.

Thus, borrowing took place

as lending revealed an inward flow to the extent of 754
millions of pesos.

Internally, then, there was an invest

ment accumulation of 123 millions of pesos after consider
ing the effect of the lending inflow.

Even though saving rose by an amount greater than
investment fell, investment was still in excess of saving.
Money and credit in circulation increased in 1955 by a
large amount.

Money in circulation was 575 millions of

pesos greater than at the end of 1952.

In addition, the

banking system allowed credit to rise by 1,514 millions
of pesos.38

This total of 2,089 millions of pesos was

much larger than the investment excess.

Accordingly, this

fact would seem, at first, to indicate a large rise in the
price level.

However, the price level did not rise, but

fell slightly.

The events explaining these results were

given earlier; however, it would seem expedient to mention
39
them once again.
The government decided to reduce the
apparent inflation at the beginning of the year.

Invest

ment spending was curtailed and credit controls were made
more stringent.

By mid-year it was observed that the

national income was headed toward a sharp decline; there
fore, governmental policy was reversed.

Government spend

ing began to rise while money and credit were made more
plentiful.

Yet, the private sector failed to be stimu

lated through governmental and banking policy.

The result

was that the price level fell during the first four or

38Ibid.
39
Refer to pp. 91-92
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five months of the year under the government’s "austerity"
policy, but as credit rose during the last half of the
year, the price level increased too, and finally settled
on a plane nearly equal to that at the beginning of the
year. 40
u
On the international scene, imports were larger
than exports by 927 millions of pesos.

Negative lending

once again was in the right direction to close the import
gap.

Nevertheless, the amount of capital inflow was 175

millions of pesos short of covering the import excess.
Other balance of payments accounts provided the desired
flows to create a balance.

Gold inflow totaled 119

millions of pesos while donations amounted to 37 millions
of pesos.

Foreign exchange reserves declined, however,

by 389 millions of pesos.

Finally, the errors and

omissions absorbed the remaining 644 millions of pesos
in the form of a credit balance.
Economic development suffered a blow in the year
1953 as output declined 3 per cent in real terms.

It

appears that the authorities were rudely awakened to the
fact that saving and investment were not strong enough to
support the previous high level of income and output.
Furthermore, the abundance of money and credit could not

40

See Table II, column 5, p. 96.
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be relied upon to sufficiently stimulate the private
sector.
Evidently the authorities gave serious consider
ation to the probability of an inappropriate exchange
rate, which is the predominate factor influencing the
national product (income) in the external sector.

Upon

reviewing the gold and foreign exchange items for the
first two years of this study, it is evident that a net
loss occurred.

In 1952 there was a net gold loss of 32

millions of pesos while at the end of 1953 foreign
exchange drained away to the extent of 270 millions of
pesos.

Taking both years into consideration, the total

net loss of these two items was approximately 302
millions of pesos.

Ill
The problem to be faced squarely at the beginning
of 1954 seemed to be one with two alternative solutions.
The first was to moderate economic development primarily
through stringent monetary and fiscal measures; the
second, to maintain an abundance of money and credit
internally and to take drastic measures in the external
portion of the economy.

The decision to be rendered at

this time was further influenced, no doubt, by the possi
ble reaction of the private sector to either proposal.
Although the decision was not as clear-cut as the two
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above alternative solutions indicate, the second of the
two choices dominated.
What was the result?

Investment rose to about

1,372 millions of pesos over saving, and the lending
balance resulted in an inflow of capital, which failed
to close the saving-investment gap.

Investment less the

lending balance totaled 1,118 millions of pesos.41

It

is of special interest to note that although private sav
ing and investment figures were larger in 1954, they rose
by nearly the same amount— 800 millions of pesos.

Govern

ment investment spending increased by 1,088 millions of
pesos while saving rose less in 1954 than it did in 1953.42
The result was that the excess of investment over saving
was attributed to larger government spending.
The abundance of money and credit appeared to make
it rather easy for the governmental sector to increase
investment expenditures.

The money supply was made larger

during the year by some 1,071 millions of pesos, and bank
credit increased In an amount of 3,670 millions of pesos
according to assembled data.455
Lending almost fulfilled its theoretical purpose

41Refer to Table VI, columns 3 and 4, p. 112.
42See Table II, p. 96.
43
p. 177.

Refer to Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C,
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in the international sector, i. e., the inward movement
of capital nearly equaled the import surplus.

As shown

in Table VI, page 112, the import surplus was 257 millions
of pesos while (negative) lending amounted to 254 millions
of pesos.

The difference of 5 millions of pesos was

accounted for in the following manner: foreign exchange
reserve-holdings rose 976 millions of pesos and (net)
donations flowed inward to the extent of 71 millions of
pesos.

The outward movement of gold totaled 1,206

millions of pesos.

The summation of these figures (2,253

millions of pesos) was offset by a debit balance in the
errors and omissions account amounting to 2,250 millions
of pesos.

The difference of 3 millions of pesos was

equal to the imbalance between the import-lending items.
The result of these forces made possible, in part,
a rise in national product amounting to 10,176 millions
of pesos.

44

At current prices, this figure represented

an 18.1 per cent increase over 1953.

However, at 1950

prices the percentage rise amounted to 8.0 per cent.
The rise in money and credit during 1952, and the
last half of 1953, and for a portion of 1954 brought about
the creation and modification of several monetary, fiscal,
and exchange measures during this and the following year.

See Table I, column 2, p. 88
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Some of these factors included a new tariff, a new income
tax law, and restrictions upon the granting of credit.

A

discussion of these measures will be forthcoming in the
subsequent section dealing with monetary, fiscal, and
external policy.
The outstanding change during 1954 was the devalu
ation in April.

The peso rate was lowered from 8.65 to

the dollar to 12.51 to the dollar, a decline of 45 per
cent in terms of dollars.

The devaluation surely con

tributed to the higher price level.

One source of infor

mation states that: ’’The monetary devaluation provoked a
rapid upturn in prices, the level of wholesale prices
rising by 15 per cent during the period March to December
1954. . . .h -®

Another result of devaluation was the

rise of exports and the fall of imports.

Nevertheless,

because the new, lower exchange rate was in effect for
only about seven months in 1954, the real impact of
devaluation was more clearly recognized in 1955.
One other factor should not be overlooked, as
observed from the experience during the year.
was government Investment.

This factor

It was earlier stated that the

investment-saving excess was financed almost entirely by

^ U n i t e d Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America 1954, p. 178.
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the government.

The productivity of government investment

in general is indirect and quite slow in realizing a
greater output.

This type of capital addition may make

possible a larger future output, but the immediate effect
would be quite moderate.

In evidence of this result, the

real national product was only about 2 millions of pesos
larger than that of 1952.^®
IV
Two main events took place in 1955.

The first was

that government investment declined, and the second
related to the influence on the external sector brought
about by the devaluation of 1954.

On the domestic scene,

investment exceeded saving for the fourth year in a row.
This year's excess was 869 millions of pesos.

The lend

ing factor could have contributed to an equilibrium situ
ation if capital would have moved inward to the extent
of the investment surplus.

However, this inflow was not

sufficient to equate saving and investment.

As Table

VI, page 112, shows, capital flowed inward on balance to
the extent of 714 millions of pesos.

Furthermore, money

and credit in circulation rose by approximately 2,975
millions of pesos.

Yet, it was not the government sector

which increased its investment spending.

46
See Table II, p. 96.

Investment
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expenditures in this sector actually declined by 17
millions of pesos.

It was, therefore, the private sector's

additional spending which led to an investment surplus.
Even though total investment was larger than total saving,
the latter increased by more than the former.
It would seem that from this experience an opti
mistic trend was developing via increased private and
decreased government spending while saving in both areas
continued to rise.

Nevertheless, the distribution of

Income was probably on a very narrow basis.

It was the

export sector that seemed to gain the most.

Importers

were in a favorable situation, too, since the domestic
47
price level shot upward again this year.
The International sector contributed a good deal
to the rise in national product amounting to 17,522
millions of pesos at current prices.

This is the first

year of the survey In which exports were larger than
Imports.

Devaluation did its job from this standpoint.

However, this is not to say that devaluation produced
only favorable results.

The export excess called for the

outward movement of capital to the extent of this surplus
If equilibrium were to be accomplished in the external
sector.

But as stated above the capital flow was inward

47

Refer to Table II, p. 96.
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instead.

The result was a gap amounting to 1,570 millions

of pesos, if the export surplus and the lending balance
are taken into account.

The gap was closed by the inflow

of 1,000 millions of pesos of gold, a (net) outward move
ment in the donations account of 55 millions of pesos,
and a rise of foreign exchange reserves amounting to 1,652
millions of pesos.

The remaining balance was absorbed

by a debit of some 2,167 millions of pesos in the errors
and omissions account.
Gold and foreign exchange reserves produced a net
gain for the first time in the last four years.

The

receipt of these two factors totaled 2,652 millions of
pesos; hence, there is a strong indication of the large
increase of money in circulation.

Referring to Appendix

C, Money and Credit of Mexico, page 177, it is observed
that of the total additions to money and credit in 1955,
money in circulation accounted for 2,049 millions of
pesos of the total 2,975 millions of pesos created by
both money and credit.
The financing of the excess Investment of 869
millions of pesos, the surplus of exports amounting to
856 millions of pesos, and the accumulation of gold and
foreign exchange reserves noted above, all of which con
tributed to an increase of the national product of some
17,522 millions of pesos, would seem to have exerted some
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influence upon the general level of prices.

Table II on

page 96 supports the above statement by showing that the
price level rose 22.9 points at the close of 1955.

The

result was that the national product rose 8.4 per cent
at 1950 prices.

This rise is considered highly favorable

if compared to the experience of industrialized nations,
but it was much lower than the current figures indicated.
V

The estimated rise of 10 per cent in saving and
investment for the year 1956 provided an investment sur
plus of 957 millions of pesos.

According to mid-year

figures, capital inflow amounted to 1,660 millions of
pesos.

Information during the year gave no indication

that one could expect a reverse flow of capital at the
yearTs end; nevertheless, it would be expected that the
mid-year figure was much larger than that anticipated at
the close of the period.

Taking the first half-year

figure as representative for the period, capital inflow
more than provided for the excess of investment over saving.
On the other hand, total money and credit in circu
lation declined for the first time in the last five years.
Credit was reduced by 1,265 millions of pesos and money
in circulation fell some 514 millions of pesos.

This

result was brought about by new banking requirements which
included higher reserves behind demand and savings deposits
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and the refusal on the part of the Bank of Mexico to grant
rediscounts as freely as in the past.

48

Exports exceeded imports by 121 millions of pesos*
The export surplus added to the inflow of capital, which
amounted to 1,660 millions of pesos, indicated that the
export-import gap would not be closed through lending.
At mid-year the gold-foreign exchange items together
showed a net gain of about 126 millions of pesos. ^
Should there be no adversities during the remainder of
the year, the balance of payments will be favorable once
ag ain.
Perhaps the outstanding event of this year was the
determination on the part of the authorities to maintain
a tight money and credit policy.

The real national product

rose by approximately 7 per cent.

Although estimates were

employed in determining saving and investment for this
year, a recent report stateb that at the end of July the
real national product rose 10 per cent above that of the
previous y e a r . ^

Furthermore, the conservative monetary

48

International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Hews Survey. May 11, 1956, p. 355*
^ F o r e i g n exchange figures w'ere obtained from
the International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics. January, 1957, p. 157.
50
International Monetary Fund, International
Financial News Survey. September 21, 1956, p. 94.
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policy was applied with a good deal of success as compared
with prior years.

The general price level rise was held

to less than five points.
Before passing on to the final sections of this
chapter, a few general statements seem to be in order.
The national product (income) rose during four out of the
five years included in this survey.

Nevertheless, the

rise in prices was greater than that of the national
product.

This rise indicates that the majority of people

with low incomes must have suffered to a great extent.
Lending as a balancing factor did not serve its
purpose of closing the gaps between saving and invest
ment and imports and exports.

For this reason, it would

be natural to expect variations in the national income.
Mexico realized an inflow of capital in every year under
consideration.

Since realized investment was larger than

realized saving throughout the period, it was stated that
capital should have moved inward in order to provide a
balance between the factors.

The effect of a capital

inflow would be to raise saving.

Saving did rise accord

ing to the experience of Mexico.

It is true, nevertheless,

that investment was two or three steps ahead of saving,
but the principle was at work.

In other words, with a

more vigorous application of monetary and fiscal measures,
the gaps between saving and investment probably could have
been closed.
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The relationship between lending and the external
sector produced a rather consistent pattern at least for
the first three of the five years under investigation.
The inward capital flows, though insufficient, contributed
toward the closing of the import surplus gap.

It appears

that external policy— particularly that of a fiscal nature—
was not applied with enough force.

During the last two

years of this survey, Mexico encountered export surpluses.
Devaluation made this possible, but, at the same time,
the lower exchange rate which helped to produce a larger
national product also raised prices and influenced the
distribution of income.

It would seem that the necessary

corrections would have been possible through the combined
efforts of monetary, fiscal, and exchange policies.

The

review of the year 1956 revealed that some measures were
Instigated in order to reduce the two-pronged effects of
the investment and export balances.
The foregoing analysis has shown that many changes
have occurred in Mexico even though a relatively short
period of time was considered.

Although some attention

has been given to various measures adopted to cope with
these changes, a more systematic treatment of these devices
will be undertaken in order to visualize more clearly how
this nation handled such problems.

The following dis

cussion will center around internal and external policies.
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II.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MONETARY, FISCAL,
AND EXTERNAL POLICIES

Banking operations in Mexico are carried out
through a central hanking system.

The Bank of Mexico is

the central bank which is endowed with all the traditional
functions of a central bank.

51

Although the methods

employed to control the supply of money and credit in
circulation are described as being similar to that of our
Federal Reserve System, the association between the Bank
of Mexico and the government is much different than that
of the Federal Reserve System and the United States
government.

The Mexican government owns 51 per cent of

the stock of the Bank of Mexico, and it enjoys the right
52
to appoint five of the Bankts nine directors.
The types of controls consist of open market oper
ations, rediscounting, and reserve requirements.

The

first two kinds of controls have not been very effective.
With reference to open market operations Professor Myers
states that:

51

The Bank of Mexico was organized in 1925, but
it was not given the sole right of note issue until 1958.
Refer to Margaret G. Myers, ”16x100,” in Banking Systems,
edited by Benjamin H. Beckhart, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1954), p. 580.
5gIbid.
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Open-market operations, which are often used
in order to force banks to rediscount and thus
make the rate effective, are of little avail in
a country like Mexico where the securities market
is rudimentary. . .
The rediscounting process has likewise been quite
ineffective in most recent years.

It seems that many

banks have access to sources of funds other than the
Central Bank.

The favorable balance of payments occasioned

in the last few years Indicates that deposits received
from external trade are.one of the most important sources
of funds.
Reserve requirements include both demand and savings
deposits.

These requirements differ according to the three

types of banking institutions.

For example, the flexible

reserve requirements in 1949 consisted of a 50 per cent
reserve against deposits for banks located in Mexico City;
a 45 per cent reserve for all branch banks; and a 40 per
cent reserve against deposits for all non-branch city
banks.

Modifications wrere made at various times as to

the use of government securities and private reserves.
The latter were not used until 1948, when the banks in
the Federal District were given permission to include
government-approved securities and private issues up to
54
limited amounts of their total reserves.
The idea was

55Ibid.. p. 581.
54Ibid.. pp. 584-585.
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to increase the amount of loans to productive enterprises.
Finally, in September, 1949, a more drastic action
was taken because of the threat of continued inflation.
The Bank of Mexico subjected all increases in demand lia
bilities of the deposit banks to a 100 per cent reserve.
However, an exception allowed deficits in reserves up to
70 per cent without penalty, provided that the deficit
sums were invested in equipment loans of a short-term
character, securities of two years’ maturity, or capital
loans up to five years’ duration.

In addition, the total

long-term loans for any bank were limited to an amount
equal to 20 per cent of its demand liabilities.

The

effect of the latter was to limit the banks’ ability to
take advantage of the escape clause in the new reserve
requirement and to make banks invest up to 20 per cent of
their deposits in long-term loans, with the remaining
increases in deposits placed with the Bank of M e x i c o . ^
Bankers were critical of the elaborate reserve
program; so a revision was made in 1950.

The 20 per cent

of total deposits in long loans was maintained, but
increases in deposits had to be offset in the following
manner:

55

I b i d . . p. 585.
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30 per cent by an Increase in deposits at the
Bank of Mexico;
20 per cent by investment in productive activities,
at medium-term and long-term;
20 per cent by investment in securities, private
or government;
30 per cent (the remainder) unrestricted. b
The above requirements were established for the
banks in Mexico City; however, similar requirements were
imposed on branch and non-branch banks.

The former were

allowred 35 per cent of the increase in cash deposits as
unrestricted while the non-branch banks were given the
right to employ 40 per cent of their increases in deposits
as they wished.
The concluding requirement of this complex reserve
procedure took effect in 1951.

Because the expansion of

bank credit became so large, all banks whose deposits
exceeded an amount equal to 10 times their capital and
reserves were required to deposit the total amount of
such new cash deposits with the Bank of Mexico.^
Other restrictions were placed upon special bank
ing institutions including the agricultural and invest
ment banks.
There is a distinction between national and private
banks.

However, from a practical standpoint, their

56Ibid., p. 586.
57Ibid.
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operations and regulations are similar.

For example, all

private commercial banks are associated with the Bank of
Mexico.

They must subscribe to the stock of the Central

Bank, and their reserve requirements are almost identical
with those of the national banks, as stated above.
This short review of the complex banking operations
reveals the sincere effort of the monetary authorities to
reduce money and credit in circulation on the one hand,
and to stimulate economic development on the other.

None

theless, the latter effort seemed to predominate over the
former because, even with the imposition of the stringent
monetary measures as applied in 1951, total money and
credit rose from 13,669 millions of pesos at the end of
1951 to 14,717 millions of pesos at the close of 1952.
In addition, the Central Bank held 1,614 millions of
pesos worth of government securities.5®

This figure

represents a large portion of the Federal Government1s
debt.

The significant point to be stressed is that the

Bank of Mexico was being forced to help finance the program
of industrialization carried out by the government.
The following discussion relating to monetary,
fiscal, and external policies will be presented on a
year-to-year basis in a manner similar to that employed

58
Refer to the Balance Sheet of the Bank of Mexico,
Appendix D, p.
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in the preceding portion of this chapter.
I
Total government expenditures were greater than
total income in 1952.^®

The deficit of 231.6 millions of

pesos included public debt retirement, which accounted
for 16.9 per cent of total expenditures.

Although the

data are incomplete as given by function, the difference
between the sum of the items shown (3,381.0 millions of
pesos) and the total expenditures of 5,657.7 millions of
pesos consisted of transfer expenditures.

A Department of

Commerce report which listed expenditures by type under the
heading of current, capital, and transfer expenditures for
the year presented a breakdown of these expenditures in
the following manner, all in millions of pesos.
Price and other subsidies
To public institutions
To private institutions
Social security payments
Acquisition of real property
Acquisition of securities
including investments
Other transfers
Total transfers

60

688.7
678.7
10.0
123.9
6.4
1,500.0
50.6
2,349.6

The total transfers figure less social security
payments accounted for 2,225.7 millions of pesos.

This

59

See the Federal Government Accounts of Mexico,
Appendix E, p. 180.
uJnited States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign Commerce, Investment in Mexico (Washington: United
States Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 88.
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figure added to the actual expenditures computed by
function totaled 5,606.7 millions of pesos.

Thus, if

transfer expenditures are taken into consideration, it is
possible to account for nearly all of the expenditures
for 195S, even though the use of different sources and the
ever-present possibility of overlapping are taken into
account.
The transfer expenditure item yielded some important
information with respect to the governments participation
in economic activity.

Subsidy payments were as large as

expenditures for public education and culture, and greater
than expenditures encountered for agricultural develop
ment.

Furthermore, nearly all of the subsidies granted

were directed into publicly owned facilities.
Government purchases of securities had a substantial
effect upon the amount of money in circulation and the
extension of government ownership.

The portion of corpo

rate and public enterprise securities purchased by the
government expanded its ownership and control over the
economy, and perhaps the larger portion of the purchase
of securities resulted in a greater supply of money in the
possession of business firms and other holders.
Total government income consisted in large measure
61
of direct taxes levied upon income or profit.

61

National income taxes are divided into five
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Approximately 43.3 per cent of total federal revenue was
obtained by means of direct taxation.

fiP

The usual criti

cism of the underdeveloped nations1 failure to employ
direct tax levies does not apply in the case of Mexico.
However, this statement is not meant to be construed as
indicating the attainment of maximum satisfaction in
connection with taxation procedures.
There is probably some doubt as to the rather small
deficit encountered by the Federal Government.

Yet, one

must keep in mind the fact that the public sector includes
much more than just the Federal Government.

Unfortunately,

income and expenditure figures realized by these other
groups were unavailable.

A United States Department of

Commerce report makes the following statement in referring
to the public sector:

. . The principal deficits in

schedules as shown below. See the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, Interim Report, Study of Latin
American Countries, p. 394.
Schedule I includes individuals or corporations
engaged in commerce, industry, or agriculture for a
profit.
.Schedule II applies to income received from
interest, dividends, leases, patents, royalties, and
so on, from foreign enterprises.
Schedule III represents income from subsoil
operations or government concessions.
Schedule IV includes salary, wages, bonuses,
pensions, and annuities.
Schedule V covers professions, arts, and sports.

62

Direct taxes specifically included those levied
upon income, excess profits, exports, and mineral pro
duction.
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recent years have been incurred by the autonomous public
agencies."6^

At any rate, one may conclude at this stage

that both the banking system and the government failed to
prevent inflation during 1952.
The next area of interest is that of the external
sector.

In this connection, an important question may be

asked: were there any factors in this area which influ
enced the national product and contributed to the apparent
inflation?

One article reviewing the money supply of

Mexico contains a statement which reads: ” . . .

During

periods when our imports predominate, for instance, there
is a contractionist tendency in the offer of money whereas
the opposite phenomenon manifests itself when the country's
exports exceed imports."64

Construed literally, this

statement means that banks will witness a withdrawal of
deposits and, therefore, loans and investments will con
tract during those periods in which imports are excessive.
Although imports were excessive in 1952, the tendency
toward contraction did not materialize.

The rather small

net loss of gold and foreign exchange, amounting to about
32 millions of pesos, was more than offset through the

®^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau
Foreign Commerce, Investment in Mexico, p. 87.
‘National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic
Situation of Mexico. September, 1954, p. 6.
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operation of monetary and fiscal policy.
The only serious problem created in the external
sphere was that of a sizeable long-term capital inflow
which could cause an exceptional burden in subsequent
years if not properly utilized.
The terms of trade remained favorable at the end
of 1952.65

However, the figure .483 for 1951 revealed

more favorable terms of trade than in 1952 (.654).

Accord

ing to the latter figure, for each unit of imports received
.65 units of exports were given in return.

In terms of

the volume of imports and exports, a less satisfactory
relationship prevailed.

In 1951 the volume of exports,

in tons, declined by 2 percentage points from the base
year of 1950.®®

“n evertheless, the volume in 1952 rose to

3 points above the base year; it was larger than that in
1951 by 5 points.

Since the Korean War was partially

responsible for both the increases in price and volume,
the administrative authorities probably felt that this
favorable export condition would not last.

The volume of

imports, measured In tons, stood at 37 points above the

®5The general index of the price of Imports rose
19 points (base 1950 = 100) while the price of exports
increased 29 points. The computation is: £± (M) -J* A (E)
= 19 -v- 29 2 .654. Refer to the National Bank of Foreign
Commerce, Foreign Commerce of Mexico 1955. pp. 55-56.
66Ibid.. p. 59.
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■base year.

This index number was 1 point lower than in

1951, but it revealed the effects of the higher income and
prices of the domestic economy; that is, a larger portion
of the national income was being spent for imports in 1952
than in 1951.

The result of price and volume changes in

1952 showed that what Mexico lost in terms of volume it
gained through price changes.

II
At the outset of 1955 the government decided to
reduce the inflationary pressure.

As already stated, it

did curtail some of its own spending.

However, it was

felt that the private sector should maintain or, better
still, increase its expenditures.

In February, 1955, the

Bank of Mexico felt it necessary to Introduce some reforms
for the purpose of stimulating private spending and
encouraging productive loans.

67

It encouraged agri

cultural banks to rediscount their paper by allowing them
to present an amount up to 20 per cent of their paid-in
capital and surplus for rediscounting purposes.

In order

to stimulate other loans, commercial banks were given the
privilege of Increasing their demand deposits up to 12.5
times their capital and surplus.

Furthermore, banks In

the Federal District were permitted to invest up to 10

67
17-18.

See the Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1954.
---

p p

.

per cent of their cash reserves in government and other
securities.®8

The Bank of Mexico nearly doubled its loans

and discounts during the year.®9

It was evident too that

the Central Bank increased its holdings of Federal Govern
ment securities.

Total holdings amounted to 1,717.5

millions of pesos as shown by the balance sheet of this
Bank.
The less stringent banking requirements facilitated
the purchase of government securities by most of the banks
consequently, the expansion of loans took place on a large
scale.

Although demand deposits constitute about 50 per

cent, on the average, of the total money supply, the pro
portionate rise of demand deposits was larger in 1953.
Money in circulation rose 215 millions of pesos while
70
demand deposits increased 360 millions of pesos.
On the other hand, Federal Government expenditures
in 1953 were lower than those in 1952 by approximately
1,000 millions of pesos.

Slightly lower too was the

government's budget deficit of 161 millions of pesos.
Expenditures, by function, totaled 3,474.9 millions of
pesos, as shown in Appendix E, page 180.

Because some of

6aIbld.
gq

Refer to the Balance1'Sheet of the Bank of Mexico,
Appendix D, p. 178.
70
177.

See Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C, p.
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the data were unavailable, this figure was 1,045.2
millions of pesos less than the total expenditures by the
government for the year.

However, the difference between

the two above figures is narrowed if one considers the
transfer expenditures which, fortunately, were available
for 1953.

They were utilized as follows (in millions of

pesos)
Subsidies
To public institutions
To private institutions
To individuals
Social security payments
Acquisition of real property
Acquisition of securities
including investments
Other transfers
Total transfers

420.2
----391.1
29.1
93.2
3.6
965.0
50.1
1,512.1

The deduction of the social security payments
already accounted for would give a total transfer figure
of 1,418.9 millions of pesos.

Since a portion of the

transfer payments was probably included in the expenditure-by-function figures,.a discrepancy occurred between
the sum of the actual total expenditures by function
amounting to 3,479.9 millions of pesos, plus the transfer
payments of 1,418.9 millions of pesos.

The total expendi

tures of the Federal Government amounted to 4,518.1
millions of pesos.
Total subsidy payments in 1953 were slightly less

^ T h e Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1955, p. 161
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than one-half those of 1952.

Furthermore, the authori

tative figures indicated that government owned enterprises
received none of this aid.

Finally, the government helped

to reduce the amount of money in circulation somewhat hy
purchasing less corporate and public enterprise securities
and hy making fewer investments with transfer funds.
An analysis of the Federal Government expenditure
accounts for 1953 reveals no extreme shifts in expendi
tures,

An additional 243.1 millions of pesos were spent

for communication and transportation, while the agri
cultural sector received an increase of about 100 millions
of pesos for development.

However, the banking system and

perhaps some of the autonomous government enterprises made
available a large amount of money and credit for expansion.
Although total tax revenue was less this year than
in 1952, direct taxes represented approximately 42.6 per
cent of the total revenue.

The chief reason for the

smaller total of tax collections was the general business
recession which took place rather than changes in tax laws.
The reduction of income from taxes further reflected the
more conservative attitude on the part of the government,
especially during the first six months of the year.
The Federal Government decided that it had to do
something in the latter portion of the year with respect
to stimulating the economy since its anti-inflationary

policy during the first half spilled over into the private
sector.

Firms and individuals adopted the same attitude

as the government with respect to spending, and the
national product (income) was falling.

The government

could have imposed a higher income tax in order to combat
the private sector*s apparent demand for higher liquidity.
But such action probably would have discouraged the
private sector.

It was also possible to increase expendi

tures via public works and other developmental projects
already planned through foreign financing.
tive was not employed either.

This alterna

A major reason for not

accepting this choice was because the time necessary to
reap physical benefits from such projects would be too
extended, and foreign capital required the acceptance of
other nations.

Perhaps Mexico could have obtained

additional funds from official sources to carry out these
projects.

However, the authorities did not attempt to

seek a solution to its problem in this manner.

The

balance of payments of Mexico reveals that in 1953 the
repayment of official loans (31.2 millions of dollars)
was nearly as large as official loans obtained during the
year (31.6 millions of dollars).
A third recourse involved government deficit spend
ing along with import restrictions.

Although such a

policy would tend to place a good deal of pressure on the
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external sector unless applied rigidly, this was the
alternative chosen hy the authorities to solve their state
72
of depression.
Nevertheless, the second part of the
program— imposing import duties— was not made effective
in 1952.

Imports did decline somewhat, as the balance of

payments of Mexico reveals, principally because of the
reduced business activity.

Yet, the difference between

imports and exports was greater in 1953 than in 1952,
imports being larger in both years.
The terms of trade turned unfavorable this year.
The index of import prices remained the same as in 1952,
that is, 19 points higher than in the base year, 1950.
However, the export price index was 16 points lower than
the previous year, but it was still 13 percentage points
higher than in 1950.

Measured from the base year, the

terms of trade was unfavorable at 1.1.

A given unit of

imports was exchanged for every 1.1 unit of exports.

On

the other hand, the volume of exports rose 15 points over
the base year in 1953 while the index volume of imports
was 49 percentage points larger than in 1950.

To summa

rize on the basis of these figures: the increase in the
volume of exports was slightly larger than the rise in

uJnited Nations, Economic Survey of Latin M e r i c a
1954, pp. 174-175.
^^National Bank of Foreign Commerce, loc. cit.
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price of exports; the relative increase in import prices
was much less than the relative volume of increase in
imports; and once again a portion of the national income
leaked away through the purchase of imports.
Foreign exchange reserves were reduced by about
389 millions of pesos.

However, the inward flow of gold

helped offset the loss of foreign exchange in part,
leaving a net loss figure of approximately 270 millions
of pesos.
The resolute determination on the part of the
authorities was quite clear at the end of this year.
Economic development was to be stimulated even though it
created more inflation.

Moreover, the authorities were

willing to allow a disequilibrium and subsequent depreci
ation of the monetary unit in order to protect the
domestic economy.

However, depreciation occurred in the

following year, 1954.

Attention will now be focused upon

some of the internal and external policies put into
effect during this latter.year.

Ill
There were no new banking reforms enacted in 1954;
nevertheless, there was great emphasis placed upon the
channeling of funds into the various sectors of the
economy.

Agricultural loans were encouraged during the

major portion of the year by continuing the policy of

148
allowing agricultural banks to rediscount paper up to 20
per cent of their paid-in capital and surplus, and by
establishing a limit upon such banks loans of 10 per cent
rfA

of their paid-in capital and surplus.'
Of the total credit made available during the year,
approximately 58 per cent was directed into industry,
about 25 per cent was channeled into agriculture, and the
remainder was shared between commerce and m i n i n g . ^
Industrial and agricultural credit together amounted to
85 per cent of the total credit expended.

In the preced

ing year, total credit for these two sectors amounted to
75 per cent.

The effect was to reduce the amount of

commercial credit this year for the purpose of stimulat
ing, as far as possible, the production of commodities.
Furthermore, commercial credits have had a poor repayment
record.

According to a banking source, "Approximately

35 to 38 per cent of commercial paper presented for pay
ments is returned uncollectable. . . ,n^
It is apparent from the above discussion that the

^^Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1955, p. 34.
^^United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America
1954, p. 176.
76

National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic
Situation of Mexico. December, 1954, p. 5.
77

Ibid., issue of June, 1954, p. 7.
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banking system tried to channel funds into production as
opposed to commercial credit and speculation.

The latter

was evidently a serious problem in the first three or four
months of the year because of the high liquidity prefer
ence attaching to such uses of funds.

The Bank of Mexico

introduced several measures to deal with speculation.

In

April new banking institutions were required to place a
50 per cent down-payment on speculative security purchases.
However, the margin requirement was lowered to 25 per cent
in June.

The Bank also refused to provide funds for

speculation in stocks of private enterprises.

Furthermore,

the Central Bank suspended the authorization of long-term
bonds by public enterprises in order to prevent the satu78
ration of the market for such issues.
Loans and discounts granted by the Bank of Mexico
Increased at such a rapid rate that by the end of the year
79
they had nearly doubled.
In addition, the balance sheet
reveals that loans to the Federal Government rose sharply
while loans and discounts to national banks Increased 170
per cent.
Government spending was at a high level in the
early months of 1954.

In fact, it was anticipated that

^®Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1955, p. 35.
79
See the Balance Sheet of the Bank of Mexico,
Appendix D, p. 178.
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should spending be maintained at such a level, the govern
ment would witness a budget deficit of about 1,000 millions
of pesos at the end of the year.80

It was realized by

April of this year that a firm policy requiring serious
adjustments was necessary.

The problems of utmost

importance in addition to abundant government spending
were: a large supply of money and credit in circulation
causing prices to turn upward, a liquidity which is
attractive to the general public with the probability of
huge capital outflows, and the continuance of a strong
demand for imports while exports were moving downward
accompanied by an unfavorable terms-of-trade situation
which had appeared at the close of 1953.
The attempts to make adjustments which these
problems called for were of a mixed nature.

From the

discussion of banking activity during the year, it was
found that conservative measures were not forthcoming.
Nevertheless, a major adjustment took place in the external
sector via depreciation.

Internally, fiscal policy was

the primary device employed to bring about a healthier
economic situation.

In other words, it was the govern

ment which attempted to relieve the ensuing problems,
with little or no reliance upon a co-ordination of banking

80

United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America
1954. p. 175.
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(monetary) and fiscal policy.
In December, the import duties which were in effect
in 1955 were selectively raised while a 15 per cent ad
valorem tax on exports was removed.

A new ad valorem

duty of 25 per cent was put into effect for the dual
purpose of reducing exportersT profits and increasing the
income of the Treasury.

Obviously, these measures were

instigated because of the depreciation.
These levies on exports and imports resulted in
increased income for the Federal Government.

Together

they contributed 1,611.3 millions of pesos, which was
201.2 millions of pesos more than similar levies yielded
the preceding year.®-*There was no marked change in the income tax law,
although a few modifications were made primarily for the
purpose of creating a greater incentive toward production.
The most important modification concerned Schedules I and
III which allowed greater reinvestment of profits and
larger depreciation reserves.®^

Income tax revenue was

nearly 200 millions of pesos greater this year than in
1953.

A larger number of persons were subject to income

Ol
OJ-See the Federal Government Accounts of Mexico,
Appendix E, p. 180.
®^United Nations, Economic Survey of Latin America
1954. p. 176. The various tax schedules applicable in
Mexico are given on pp. 137-138, footnote 61 of this paper.

taxes this year, and, at the same time, administrative
efficiency reduced collection costs.
In order to stimulate consumption, federal employees
Q»2

were given a 10 per cent wage increase.

Most industries

followed suit; in fact, the general industrial wage
increase averaged slightly higher than that given to
'federal employees.

The problem of wage Increases in Mexico

is that the general purchasing power fails to rise because
the larger number of potential consumers are employed in
agriculture.

These individuals do not share in enhanced

wage benefits; therefore, consumption is augmented to
only a small degree, if at all.

Furthermore, wage

increases have lagged far behind the increased living
costs.

Statistics indieatec n. . . that from 1939 to

June 1954, the cost of living index rose 379.4$ whereas
during this same period wages lagged behind registered a
rise of only 280$. . .
Federal Government expenditures exceeded those of
1953 by approximately 300 millions of pesos.

By observing

the Federal Government Accounts in Appendix E, page 180,

S^National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic
Situation of Mexico. June, 1954, p. 3. In July, 1954 the
minimum wage law raised wages in the Federal District to
9.50 pesos ($.76) and 7.50 pesos ($.60) outside the
district. See the August, 1954 Issue, p. 3.
84

Ibid., issue of August, 1954.
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one finds larger spending figures for every functional
item with the exception of the public debt.

This year

the payment on the debt was reduced by about 300 millions
of pesos.

Nevertheless, this was the first year in which

the Federal Government realized a surplus in its accounts.
The immediate causes leading to the depreciation
in April were explained in the following terms: ” . . .

the

activities of speculators buying dollars during March and
April of this year, and falling exports gave rise to fears
that our reserves would soon become exhausted.

. . .

QC

In January the foreign exchange reserves held by the Bank
of Mexico were reported as 243 millions of dollars
(approximately 2,102 millions of pesos).

At the end of

April the reserves amounted to 157 millions of dollars
(about 1,358 millions of pesos).®®

One of the most

rational guides for determining the effects of the loss
of foreign exchange is a comparison of the reserves with
the amount of money in circulation.

Such a comparison

for the two months mentioned above reveals that foreign
exchange reserves represented nearly 27 per cent of the
money in circulation in January while the reserves fell

Ibid.. issue of May, 1954, p. 4.
Ibid., issue of November, 1955, p. 7.
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to 17.5 per cent in A p r i l . T h e

authorities felt that

the fall in exchange reserves was sufficient reason to
depreciate the currency.

Furthermore, the depreciation

was sanctioned by the officials of the International
Monetary Fund.
Exports were on the decline and imports were steady
in the first quarter of 1954, but depreciation was expected
to reverse this tendency.

The result at the end of the

year was that the general price index of exports, in pesos,
rose to 145 above the base year.

At the same time, the

price index of imports increased to 153.

Therefore, the

terms-of-trade was 1.8 which meant that a given unit of
imports exchanged for every 1.8 units of exports.

In

terms of volume, exports rose to 117 points above the
base year.

The result was that the higher peso price

(lower foreign currency price) of exports did not create
a corresponding increase in the volume of sales.

With

respect to Imports, the higher peso price maintained an
index volume at 148 points above the base year.

A com

parison of the higher index price of imports, as given
above, revealed that the volume of imports was nearly as
large as the rise in the price index.

87

The general

Ibid., issues of March and July, 1954, pp. 9 and
14, respectively. Money in circulation In January was
7,859 millions of pesos while In April it was 7,760
millions of pesos.
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conclusion, then, is that at the end of the year depreci
ation had provided only a small improvement in commodity
movements.
Compared with 1953, the price index of exports
rose 32 points, from 113 to 145, while the volume index
of exports increased from 115 to 117, or by only 2 points.
On the other hand, the price index of imports at the end
of 1953 was 119, and it rose to 153 at the end of the
following year.

The rise amounted to 34 points.

However,

the volume index of imports fell by 1 point during the
same period; from 149 in 1953 to 148 in 1954.88

The tax

levies on both imports and exports were imposed to make
possible a more even distribution of income, and to
supply the government with additional revenue.

Ho doubt

the tax levies helped to achieve both results.
In summary, the rise in internal prices was immedi
ate and direct.

Government investment spending alone

increased during the year by 1,068 millions of pesos
while money and credit in circulation was greater by some
89
4,741 millions of pesos.
It appears that the basic
error In the adjustment technique was the failure to apply
a more stringent monetary policy in conjunction with

88

National Bank of Foreign Commerce, Foreign
Commerce of Mexico 1955. pp. 55-59.
®^See page 121.

fiscal policy.

The result was that internal prices rose

11.8 points.^0

This rise of the price level was larger

than the 10 per cent increase in wages which was granted
during the year.

Moreover, the largest consumer group,

the farmers, did not participate in higher wage benefits.
Internal expansion was not as responsive as the authori
ties evidently hoped it would be.

It should have been

realized that depreciation puts no corrective to work,
and in Mexico the co-ordination and flexibility of mone
tary and fiscal measures are of special importance in
order to deal effectively with the results of adjustment
factors such as depreciation.
IV
One of the first measures undertaken in 1955 was a
banking reform.

Its purpose was to check the excessive

expansion of the circulating media.

Circular 1279 of

January 10, 1955 affected all deposit banks.

The decree

stated that increases in demand deposits in national money
must be deposited with the Bank of Mexico or applied in
91
the following manner:
30
20
15
10

per
per
per
per

Banks in the Federal District
cent in cash in the Bank of Mexico
cent in government bonds
cent in financiers bonds
cent in securities approved by the Ministry

^ R e f e r to Table II, p. 96.
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Bank of Mexico, Annual Report. 1956, p. 48.
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of Finance
10 per cent in equipment bonds
15 per cent (remainder) unrestricted
A further condition stipulated that out of the
total loans extended by the above banks 70 per cent must
be channeled into production and the remaining SO per cent
may be directed into commercial production.
Banks outside the Federal District
20 per cent in cash in the Bank of Mexico
30 per cent in securities approved by the Ministry
of Finance
35 per cent in equipment bonds
15 per cent (remainder) unrestricted
The quantitative and qualitative aspects of govern
ment regulation are revealed once again in the new banking
decree.

From the quantitative viewpoint, it is clear that

the authorities now intend to restrict the circulation of
money to a greater extent than was evident in the older
law.

Perhaps even greater emphasis is placed upon the

qualitative provisions.

The amounts and direction of loans

and investments are quite specific.
The financiera bonds are explained as securities
issued primarily by the Nacional Financiera, the largest
government investment bank, and they consist of issues for
an industrial enterprise.

The backing consists of a

mortgage on the assets of the firm plus a general guaranty
Qp

of the Financiera institution.0'0

These bonds were to be

^^National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic
Situation of Mexico. August, 1955, p. 9, footnote 1.
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purchased from the Bank of Mexico.

By handling the

securities in this manner, the effect was an automatic
93
open market sale by the Central Bank.
Equipment bonds
mentioned above, " . . .

are credits granted for a par

ticular business purpose and secured on the equipment
and/or product. . . .”94
The disposition of deposits held in foreign
currency were included in Circular 1279.

It was stated

that increases in deposits of foreign money would be
handled as follows:95
25 per cent in cash with the Bank of Mexico
75 per cent invested in bonds of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and in
securities of the Kacional Financiera
In August, Circular 1287 was issued, affecting
deposits in savings banks and savings departments of com
mercial banks.

It explained that 100 per cent of the

increase in savings deposits must be deposited in full
with the Bank of Mexico.

However, an escape clause

relieved the banks from penalty payments of up to 90 per
cent of such deposits provided the funds were invested
accordingly:^6
Q

*Z

Ibid.. p. 9.
94
Ibid., footnote 2.
95
Bank of Mexico, loc. cit.
96Ibid.. pp. 48-49.
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10

per cent in national and foreign currency in
short-term loans
5
per cent in plant expansion and equipment loans
37.5 per cent in intermediate loans approved by the
Department of Interior and Public Credit
37.5 per cent in government securities
In addition, when total loans and investments of

these institutions were equal to SO per cent of their
deposits in national and foreign coins, new deposits were
to be treated as given below:97
10
5

per cent in cash in the Bank of Mexico
per cent in short-term plant expansion and
equipment loans
10 per cent in short-term industrial securities
10 per cent in government securities
65 per cent (remainder) unrestricted
It is apparent that safety of deposits was the

chief factor in the strict allocation of savings deposits.
Liquidity and safety are excellent criteria for such
deposits, but it would seem that the administrative
expenses and particularly inspection costs would be exceed
ingly high.
At least two other banking changes which occurred
during the year should be mentioned.

The Bank of Mexico

liquidated its holdings in the Nacional Financiera and
reduced its ownership In the National Bank of Foreign
98
Commerce.
The securities were sold to private banks

97Ibid.. p. 49.
98Ibid., p. 50.
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and Individuals.

Total credit of the Bank was reduced

because of the liquidation.99

Furthermore, a more general

distribution of these securities was expected to encourage
a greater interest in stock market activity as well as a
withdrawal of hoarded funds from their hiding places.
The Central Bank curtailed its rediscounting privi
lege for the National Agricultural Banks and Ejidal Insti
tutions.^9

The latter provided funds for farmers with

small landholdings.
An important monetary reform was passed by Congress
on September 15, 1955.

It was, In effect, a coinage act.

New silver coins were Issued In various denominations, with
their intrinsic and market values equal.
100 per cent representative coins.

Hence, they were

Some older coins were

demonetized at the current value of their silver content
while others were to circulate but would be no longer
minted.

In addition, the new coins possessed limited

legal tender qualities while the older issues were to
become subsidiary coins.
The purpose of this reform was to present the public

99Refer to Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C,
p. 177.
^99Bank of Mexico, op. cit.. p. 50.
^^National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic
Situation of Mexico. October, 1955, pp. 5-4.
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with coins of constant value and, therefore, to encourage
savings.

If the public were to accept the new coins on

this basis, the reform could represent an important
deterrent to inflation.

Yet, the past experience of coin

circulation in Mexico casts a shadow of doubt as to the
accomplishment of the above objective.
These rather lengthy changes in banking and mone
tary operations emphasized the determination on the part
of the authorities to employ a more co-ordinated attack
upon the problems associated with inflation.

Nevertheless,

the inelastic nature of such reforms could not cope with
the excessive demand for funds, particularly the demand
of the private sector.

Furthermore, the banking system

was unable to restrict or demonetize the receipt of foreign
exchange reserves which began to flow inward in large
amounts.
The government was evidently aware of the probable
inflationary consequences which often follow depreciation,
for public investment declined.

Total government spend

ing did increase somewhat this year, however, as the
Federal Government Accounts of Mexico, Appendix E, page
181, reveal.

Total revenue rose to slightly more than

7,000 millions of pesos.

This rise in income was large

enough to create a surplus in the government accounts
for the second consecutive year.

The amount of the surplus
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in the current year was 486.1 millions of pesos.
Again this year, every revenue item showed a gain.
Significant increases were noticeable in income, export,
and taxes on trade.

On the expenditure side of the ledger,

communication and transportation accounted for 26.3 per
cent of total government spending.

This percentage repre

sents the largest relative and absolute amounts for this
particular item to date.

The remaining items received

their normal share of government expenditures.
Even though the Federal Government showed a surplus
in its activities, other government owned enterprises were
not usually so fortunate.

A report at the beginning of

the year indicated the need for economy in the functioning
of these firms by stating that the prospect for economic
growth in 1955 will brighten a good deal if the deficits of
some of the government owned entities could be reduced.
There were no new fiscal policy measures instigated
this year except for the reduction of government invest
ment expenditures, and an additional 300 millions of pesos
expended on the public debt.
As was mentioned earlier, money and credit in cir
culation rose by some 2,975 millions of pesos (see page
124).

Demand deposits rose by approximately 1,500 millions

Ibid.. issue of January, 1955, p. 5.
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of pesos.

This was the first year of this survey that

demand deposits represented more then 50 per cent of the
money supply.

This is a healthy trend which indicates

that the private sector is making greater use of the bank
ing system*

The exceptionally large increase in private

investment this year revealed that the business slump and
high state of liquidity during 1953 had ended.

Also a

portion of the rise in demand deposits could be attributed
to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves.
Credit rose by slightly more than 1,000 millions of
pesos.

The private banking institutions increased their

loans by a much larger amount than the national insti
tutions while the Bank of Mexico actually reduced its lending during the year.

1 O'2!

In the external sector, the price of exports rose
to 164 (fell in terms of foreign currency) of the base year
while the volume index ascended to 141.

In other words,

the peso price rise was larger than the increase in volume
exported.

However, in order to visualize the influence of

depreciation, a comparison with last yearTs figures is
essential.

This comparison reveals that the price index

of exports in 1955 was 19 points higher than 1954.

On the

other hand, the volume index of exports stood at 24 points

103
Money and Credit of Mexico, Appendix C, p. 177.
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higher in 1955.

This yearly comparison meant that export

income should have increased by a large amount in the
latter year.10^

The Balance of Payments of Mexico in

Appendix A, page 174 , does verify this trend.
Imports also rose in 1955.

However, the increase

of the price index was larger than the volume index
expansion.

The trend is in the same direction whether

compared to the base year or during the last year.

The

price index of imports was at 168 compared with 1950, and
it was 15 points greater than the index at the end of 1954.
The volume index change recorded 155 above the base year
while it was 7 points greater than last year.

105

The

result has been a larger rise in price than volume change.
Nevertheless, the total expenditures for imports were less
than the income received from exports, including the taxes
In both categories.10®
Since money and credit in circulation increased
during the year and the current account of the balance of
payments registered its first surplus balance since 1950,
one would expect that foreign exchange reserves had

104National Bank of Foreign Commerce, 0 £. cit., pp.
55 and 59.
105
Ibid., pp. 56 and 59.

106
A, p. 174.

See the Balance of Payments of Mexico, Appendix
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accumulated during the year.

It was found earlier in this

paper (page 126) that the rise of foreign exchange hold
ings amounted to 1,652 millions of pesos.

Adding the gold

inflow (1,000 millions of pesos) to these foreign exchange
reserves gives a total of 2,652 millions of pesos.

This

accumulation would normally lead to monetary expansion
within the country unless monetary policy were flexible
enough to cope with this new inflationary pressure.
How successful was the monetary policy of Mexico
in dealing with this problem?
cessful.

Fortunately, quite suc

On page 126 of this paper it was pointed out

that, of the total additions to money and credit of some
2,975 millions of pesos, 2,049 millions of pesos repre
sented an increase in the money supply.

Since the rise

in gold and foreign exchange was less than that of the
money supply, it would appear that the rise in prices
could hardly be explained in terms of an increase in the
exchange factor.

A better explanation of the rise in

prices would be one that relates to Internal pressures
such as higher wages, more social benefits, taxation, and
the increased costs of imported goods.

Such pressures

were created in 1954 and continued throughout 1955.
V

In reviewing the final year of this study, 1956,
various estimates were employed.

At the present writing,
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figures representing external activity are available only
through the first half of the year.

Nonetheless,

a

general appraisal with respect to the application of mone
tary, fiscal, and external policy can be presented.
Although no new monetary reforms were evident in
1956, the extensive modifications in banking requirements
undertaken last year began to produce more favorable
results.

By referring to the Money and Credit of Mexico

in Appendix C, page 177, it will be observed that the
money in circulation declined by 514 millions of pesos,
and credit was reduced by 1,265 millions of pesos.

In

addition, figures indicated that saving had been rising
in a consistent fashion.

In order to further stimulate

savings in national money, the Treasury Department
increased the interest rate from 4 to 4.5 per cent in
107
February.
The Bank of Mexico continued its policy of refusing
to grant rediscounts to banks except when they showed a
severe decline in their deposits.
Gold and foreign exchange holdings through August
Increased by only 225 millions of pesos.

This factor,

which usually is a source of monetary instability, posed
no problem for the authorities.
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Council for Inter-American Cooperation, Inc.,
Noticias. March 27, 1956, p. 4.

A major change in fiscal policy took place this
year.

The Mexican income tax law was modified in several

respects.

One of the major provisions raised the tax

rates on earnings of: ”. . .

income from commerce and

industry (tax schedules I and II) will he subject to pro
portional and progressive tax rates as high as 59 per
cent in place of the former top rate of 33 per cent.
. .”108

.

Also, the excess profits tax was reduced for the

purpose of stimulating development.

The old law provided:

. . . that part of net taxable excess profits
amounting to a sum greater than 15 per cent of
invested capital was subject to excess profits tax
ation at rates of up to 25 per cent.. Under the new
amendments, . . . the excess profits tax may not,
under any circumstances, exceed 10 per cent of thein
amount of net taxable excess profits income. . •
In addition, foreign branches or agencies of foreign
business organizations were required to pay a higher excess
profits tax.

Other changes were incorporated into the new

law which, In general, raised tax levies as applied under
schedules I through V.
The effect of the tax changes were beginning to be
felt at the end of the year.

Income tax revenue was

approximately 40 millions of pesos larger than in 1955.
However, the force of the tax modifications should be

108United States Department of Commerce, Foreign
Commerce Weekly. March 12, 1956, p. 7.
109Ibid.
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even greater in 1957 than in 1956,
Other forms of tax revenue declined somewhat in
1956,

Smaller export tax income was attributed to a

selectivity which was accomplished by adjusting rates in
such a way as to encourage shipments of those goods which
had been moving slowly in trade.

Import tax levies also

brought in less revenue this year because tariffs had
restricted the inflow of commodities to capital goods and
certain basic foodstuffs.

However, this is the first

year under study in which export tax income exceeded that
of import revenue.
It was anticipated that the Federal Accounts would
be in balance at the end of the year.

Available infor

mation on this matter is scanty, but it does indicate that
over one-half the total expenditures were divided among
three items.

These were Communications and Transportation,

Agriculture, and Public Education and Cultural Services.
The year 1956 was, no doubt, the most prosperous
one of the five years covered in this study.

Internally,

money and credit in circulation declined; the Federal
Government budget was heading toward a balance, if not a
surplus; real production and Income rose along with saving;
and the price level rose only 5.S points.

Externally,

foreign exchange reserves were rising as of August but not
enough to disturb the money in circulation, and the current
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account tended toward a surplus.

Finally, relative

economic stability in foreign countries, particularly in
the United States, helped to contribute toward a most
economically successful year.
SUMMARY
International equilibrium in Mexico was not realized
during the five years included in this study.

Neverthe

less, one could hardly conceive the possibility of an
international equilibrium situation occurring within a
nation that is characterized with underdevelopment.

Lend

ing as a balancing factor does not seem to possess enough
flexibility to help offset internal and external fluctu
ations.

At least this study reveals that such was the

case with respect to Mexico.

Capital tended to move into

the country, but in none of the years surveyed did capital
move outward on balance.

Historically, capital would flow

to the lesser developed areas.

On the other hand, invest

ment spending via inflation ultimately leads only to a
more serious adjustment problem.

Furthermore, should

exports exceed Imports, as they did in the final two years
of this study, capital would tend to move out of the
country, especially If the lending function were to create
International equilibrium.

Once again, there is a con

flict between the historical movement of capital and
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international equilibrium created through the lending
function.

In any event, lending was unable to create a

condition of international equilibrium.
It was a contention in Chapter I that, if lending
were to fail to bring about a condition of international
equilibrium, monetary, fiscal, and external policy could
help bring about that desirable situation.

Although those

policies were applied, in varying degrees, they did not
establish international equilibrium during the rather
short period covered in this survey.
By briefly reviewing the five years, one finds that
monetary and fiscal policy were applied with little suc
cess in 1952.

Inflation was rampant during the year.

Fiscal policy was the dominant force put into effect dur
ing the first half of 1953.

At the same time, some mone

tary encouragement was forthcoming in order to maintain
private expenditures.

But private expenditures declined

too, and this forced the government to increase its spend
ing in the last half of the year.

The Bank of Mexico was

forced to contribute to the expansion through the purchase
of government securities.
The most important policy change in 1954 occurred
in the external sector.
is still doubtful.

The justification of depreciation

One should consider, however, that

economic development is the basis for almost all policy
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procedures.

Since there was a good prospect that foreign

exchange reserves would he drained away, action was taken
to preserve the country’s holdings.

Fiscal policy was

intermixed with external policy; monetary policy was, how
ever, neglected.
A change toward a more effective monetary policy
characterized 1955.

Fiscal and exchange policy found

negligible expression, except for taxes levied upon imports
and exports.
Some modifications of the various controls were
evident in 1956.

In the monetary area, the rates on

savings accounts rose; the general policy, however, was
marked with conservatism.

The major fiscal policy change

involved a new income tax law and external policy provided
for export and import taxes and tariff modifications.
From a policy standpoint, perhaps the two factors
which contributed most to the failure to solve the problem
of International disequilibrium were lack of co-ordination
and improper timing.

The failure to co-ordinate policy

measures is evident from the facts which have been pre
sented in this chapter.

Better timing, though difficult

to accomplish, could have smoothed out the fluctuations
in the national product and income.

As an example, con

servative policy measures really should have gone into
effect early in 1952, but when they were finally applied
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in 1955, the reverse directional change was abrupt and
turned into a sharp depression.
The Federal Government in Mexico is the leading
decision-making body.

It has control of the banking

system and thus directs monetary policy to a great extent.
Furthermore, it makes decisions as to external policy
adjustments.

In numerous instances it has been observed

that the decisions made by the government created a
psychological stimulation on the part of the general
public, at one time, and a spirit of dejection at another
time.

Nevertheless, there appears to be a sincere desire

to encourage private individuals and firms to take a
larger part In helping to direct economic activity.
Judging from the rapid changes that have occurred
within a short period of time, there appeared to be forces
of a fundamental nature at work which will produce long
term adjustments.

The abrupt changes in income and prices

are indicative of the inability of the country to increase
and to diversify its production.

The development of

external economies and the spreading of firms and
industries require an extended period of time.
The key factor in decision-making was an urgent
desire for economic development.

It seems that those

responsible for policy measures were willing to accept the
harmful effects of inflation and rising prices for the
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sake of channeling large amounts of funds into long-term
development projects.

The anxiety to industrialize can be

appreciated, yet moderation is necessary in order to
prevent the evils of inflation and high prices.
International equilibrium will probably not be
achieved in Mexico for some time.

In this connection, it

would be well for those who are in a position to formulate
policy in Mexico, to keep in mind a suggestion offered by
Mr. Flores, a countryman, which reads:
It would seem that the best policy, suggested by
the experience of Mexico during recent years, is to
limit economic development to the point where balance
of payments is attained, so long as this is compatible
with the continuation of that progress. . .
To this, one should add a final note to the effect
that monetary and fiscal policy must be co-ordinated and
be made to possess the sort of flexibility that will help
realize simultaneously the success of an economic develop
ment program and the achievement of external equilibrium.

^ ^ U n i t e d Nations, Department of Economic Affairs,
Domestic Financing of Economic Development, p. 176.

APPENDIX A
BALANCE OP PAYMENTS OP MEXICO
(In millions of dollars)
1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

531.5
-597.4

620.6
-889.2

589.2
-807.6
14.0
302.3
-140.1
- 93.6
28.6

655.3
-788.7
11.7
336.8
-173.2
- 85.7
23.3

810.2
-883.7
14.2
364.8
-164.6
- 93.3
20.8

454.9
-518.3
2.4
223.6
-104.1
- 57.9
9.1

Account
irrent Account
Exports, f.o.b.
Imports, c.i.f.
Nonmonetary gold
Foreign travel
Foreign travel
Investment income
Other (net)

---

271.7
- 96.5
- 61.3
30.8

62.9

-123.9

-142.3

-107.2

- 20.5

68.4

9.7

73.4

72.5

64.3

21.7

115.9

179.0

84.5

45.5
24.4

31.0
46.2

53.3
- 20.5

40.9
- 19.6

104.6
- 6.6

111.8
27.7

60.4
9.4

28.6
25.1
20.6

34.2
- 38.9
- 26.9

55.3
- 33.8
- 51^0

31.6
- 31.2
- 65.5

58.2
- 40.3
- 95.6

113.3
- 73.8
-121.9

56.1
- 41.4
48.2

2.4

20.1

- 20.2

29.0

13.5

.1

.6

8.5

.6

- 22.4
-137.0

34.1

57.1

132.7

Capital Account
Long term
Private
Direct investment
Other private (net)
Official
Export-Import Bank,
IBRD, and other loans
Official repayments
Short term
Private
National and private
banks’ assets0- (net)
Official
Payments agreements
(net)
Use or repayment (-)
of IMP resources
Other foreign assets0 -

31.6

•

•• «

b

-

.6

- 14.8

11.4
—

52.8

- 22.5
10.4

- 60.2

45.5

22.4
- 98.4

52.8

45.6

13.1

87.2

20.3

—

tm

M

mm
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---

238 .9
- 82.2
- 58.8
30.9

619.6
-830.9
2.0
275.1
-113.3
-123.5
28.7

Balance

Balance

1956
(6 mos.

APPENDIX A (continued)
Account
Unilateral Account
Private donations
Official donations
Balance
Gold Account
Monetary gold
Balance
Errors and Omissions

1950

1951

1952

1955

1954

1955

1956
(6 mos.)

1.6
2.7

1.6
4.1

5.9
1.5

-

5.6

1.5
1.6

-

13.8

3.2
.4

13.8

5.6

3.1

4.3

5.7

-

4.4

-

2.8

-155.4

.5

63.7

- 13.8

96.4

- 79.9

- 22.6

-155.4

.5

63.7

- 13.8

96.4

- 79.9

- 22.6

25.9

73.2

62.4

29.5

-101.9

- 41.2

-117.0

Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1954, 1955, and 1956; International
Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vol. VII, January, 1957; and United Nations,
International Financial Statistics, particularly the issues of February, 1954 and
January, 1957,
aIncludes gold holdings.
^Included under "Other foreign assets."
c0ther "short-term" assets include assets of the Bank of Mexico and private
transactions such as loans and claims on United States banks and banker balances. The
account includes $37.0 million on United States Stabilization Fund Loan for 1950.
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APPENDIX B
INDEX OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN MEXICO CITY
Year

210 Commodities

1939
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
J
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
0

100.0
311.2
359.1
394.4
392.5
429.4
500.4

Consumers1
Goods

Producers1
Goods

100.0
302.9
377.6
383.2
385.9
412.9
419.6

100.0
323.8
319.2
402.9
403.3
454.6
460.2

546.1
562.7
564.2
571.1
562.1
557.0
554.8
549.3
551.7
551.2

465.5
476.9
479.7
476.6
477.8
478.6
473.4
468.1
468.8
468.1

Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1954;
National Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic Situation
of Mexico, February, 1956; and National 6ank of Foreign
Commerce, Foreign Commerce of Mexico, a monthly publication,
December, 1956.
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APPENDIX C
MONEY AND CREDIT OP MEXICO
Money In Circulation
(in millions of pesos)
Year

Total

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

5,989
6,800
7,078
7,653
8,724
10,773
10,259

Currency

Demand Deposits

2,914
3,458
3,649
3,864
4,637
5,244

3,075
3,342
3,429
3,789
4,087
5,529

a

a

Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1956; United
Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1955; and United States
Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Weekly, October
1, 1956.
information not available.
Distribution of Credit by Type of Bank
(in millions of pesos)
Year

Totala

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

6,869.1
7,639.1
9,152.8
12,823.2
13,749.2
12,483.5

Private
Institutions

National
Institutions

Bank of
Mexico

b

b

b

4,183.9
4,413.2
5,390.0
6,550.7,
b

2,929.4
3,883.8
5,921.1
6,124.3
b

505.8
855.8
1,512.1
1,074.2,
b

Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1954, 1955,
and 1956; and United States Department of dommerce, Foreign
Commerce Weekly, October 1, 1956.
aExcludes inter-bank credit.
in f o r m a t i o n not available.

APPENDIX D
BALANCE SHEET OP THE BANK OP MEXICO
(in millions of pesos)
Assets
Gold, silver, and
foreign exchange
Deposits with other
banks
Loans and discounts
Loans to Federal
government
to national banks
to private banks
Rediscounts:
30 days
90 days
180 days
360 days

1952

1953

1954

1955

2,562.5

2,337.3

2,913.2

2,553.0

31.7
531.7

25.8
1,918.2

2.4
24.1
1.8

70.4
148.4
7.7

99.7
400.7
5.4

33.9
219.3
102.2
148.0

25.2
257.3
154.4
348.5

53.4
439.3
409.0
510.7

6,320.2

2,682.0
1,717.5
--

3,063.5

2,481.1

2,277.9 1,889.3
--

6.4
692.7
22.1

3.6
492.5
22.4

109.1

138.1

123.0

112.8

11.2

16.2
621.1

772.8

6,688.5

8,693.5
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Investments
2,664.6
Federal government
long term
1,614.2
short term
-State and local
government
11.0
Bank bonds
735.3
Bank stock
23.2
Industrial securitiesmortgages
164.1
Stock of Mexican
companies
105.6
Stock of foreign
companies
11.2
Other assets
529.7
Total assets

36.2
1,011.9

1956a

APPENDIX D (continued)
Liabilities

1952

1953

1954

Notes outstanding
Metallic issues

3,479.4
388.3

3,603.4
474.7

4,376.1
491.1

Bank deposits
Treasury deposits
Individual and business deposits
Other obligations in domestic currency
Deposits and obligations in foreign currency
Other liabilities

1,182.7
119.1
73.1
68.6
204.0
512.2

1,309.6
59.9
78.1
80.0
192.8
541.4

1.244.7
46.8
86.8
69.6
406.5
1.629.7

50.0
242.8

50.0
298.6

50.0
292.2

6,320.2

6,688.5

8,693.5

Capital
Reserves
Total liabilities

1955

1956

Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1954, 1955, and 1956.
aInformation not available.
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APPENDIX E
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS OF MEXICO
(in millions of pesos)
Source of Revenue

1952

1,281.2
Income taxes
159.8
Excess profits
Taxes on lottery
36.0
and games
898.2
Export taxes
738.3
Production taxes
Mining and natural
127.1
resources
598.2
Industry
13.0
Transportation
1,123.0
Taxes on trade
632.1
Imports
490.9
Domestic trade
Taxes on non49.0
mercantile documents
Inheritance, legacy,
14.6
and gift taxes
Taxes on migration
8.7
Income from govern
ment property and
357.3
services
197.4
Services
Public or private
357.3
enterprise
751.7
Other income13
Total income

1953

%

23.6 1,072.3
65.1
3.0
.7
16.6
13.6

42.9
778.7
714.4

81.4
615.3
17.7
20.7 1,111.2
631.4
479.8

1954

%

%

1955

%

1956

24.6 1,261.7
a
• • • •
.1

24.4 1,966.1
a
♦• ♦•

28.3 1,700.C

25.4

na
900.2
710.4

na
17.4 1,454.0
817.5
13.7

na
20.6 1,050.0
na
11. *3

15.7

122.6
na
11
25.5 1,205.5
711.1
494.4

281.9
na
11
23.3 1,526.8
891.5
635.3

.1
17.9
16.4

na
TI
II

21.6

fI
730. C
na

.9

48.6

.1

na

na

II

.3
.2

15.7
6.6

*-*

11

11

ti

? t

r t

!f

6.6

349.2
198.8

8.0

11

I t

t I

t r

i I

i r

13.9

349.2
144.1

%

t t

3.3

• • •

nw

•

t i
• • •

c
*

5,425.1 100.0 4,357.1 100.0 5,179.9 100.0 7,001.3 100. C

10.9

ir
11

100.0

CD

O

APPENDIX E (continued)
Expenditures
by Function
Communication and
transportation
Agriculture,
forestry, and cattle
Industrial and com
mercial promotion
Public education and
cultural services
Public health
Social security
Army and Navy
Genej^al
administration
Public debt
Totals
Surplus
Deficit

1952

%

1953

%

1954

%

1955

%

1956

734.0

13.0

977.1

21.6 1,221.3

25.3 1,498.0

26.3 3,800.(5

420.0

7.4

510.1

11.3

653.5

13.5

649.0

11.4

---

345.0

7.1

459.0

8.0

na

583.1
234.5
177.6
583.3

12.0
4.9
3.6
12.1

732.0
296.0
258.0
563.0

13.0
5.2
4.6
9.9

377.7
651.7

8.0
13.5

427. a
799.0

7.6
14.0

na

na

660. Cf 11.7
1.9
9.0

479.7
180.0
93.2
na

10.6
4.0
2.1

16.9

280.8
954.0

6.2
21.1

_— -

106.0
507.0
na
954.0

56.7

na
11
11
11

»t

5,657.7 100.0 4,518.1 100.0 4,837.7 100.0 6,515.2 100. Oi 6,700.0 100.0
342.2
231.6

486.1
---

161.0

Source: Bank of Mexico, Annual Report, 1955 and 1956; Council for Inter-American
Cooperation, Inc., Noticlas, issues of December 20, 1955, January 17 and 24, 1956; National
Bank of Mexico, Review of the Economic Situation of Mexico, January, 1955;United States
Department of Commerce,"Business Information Service, various issues, 1952.
aIncluded in "Income taxes."

^Includes sale of national property, transfers, and so on .

cIncludes income from franchise and opportunity fees, products, and other income.
•^Includes irrigation, agriculture, and education. eIncludes health and education.
f
Expenditures of 834.2 millions of pesos not accounted for in 1955.
naInformation not available.

Components do not always add to one-hundred because of rounding.
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Less than one-tenth of one per cent.
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APPENDIX F
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF MEXICO
(In millions)5
5
' -

Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956a

Foreign Exchange
(pesos) (dollars)
398
917
528
1,739
3,390
3,315

46
106
61
139
271
265

Gold
(pesos) (dollars)
1,790
1,246
1,358
776
1,764
2,064

Total
(pesos) (dollars)

207
144
157
62
141
165

2,188
2,163
1,886
2,515
5,154
5,379

253
250
218
201
412
430

Source: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics, January, 1957.
-55-Conversions made at the following rates:
1951-1953,
8.65 pesos per dollar; 1954-1956, 12.51 pesos per dollar.
aIncludes holdings as of August, 1956.

CHAPTER III

THE CASE OF VENEZUELA:
A Survey of Recent
Monetary, Fiscal, and External Practices
Venezuela was chosen as a second underdeveloped
nation for study because it is an example of an export
economy.^

It is recognized that special problems as well

as certain benefits characterize the development of nations
so dependent upon foreign trade.

Nevertheless, many

countries in the underdeveloped areas of Latin America
depend in varying degrees upon the external sector for a
sizeable portion of their income while, at the same time,
they must rely in part upon capital imports for their
domestic growth.

This is certainly true of Venezuela.

The rise of the national product and income .of
Venezuela has not been as spectacular as that of Mexico.

O

On the other hand, the increase of these two important

1

The value of Venezuela’s commodity trade has
averaged 57.S per cent of its national product during the
period 1952 to 1955. Export income averaged 36.9 per cent
of the national product over the same period, including
the participation of foreign owned oil companies. Refer
to the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955, p. 257;
and the International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics. January, 1954, p. 233.
^The gross national product of Venezuela has risen
from 13,370 millions of bolivares in 1952 to 17,096
millions of bolivares in 1956. See the Central Bank of
Venezuela, Memoria. loc. cit.: and the Council for InterAmerican Cooperation, Inc., Noticias, November 29, 1955,
p. 3.
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factors has been at a steadier pace in Venezuela.

Further

more, inflation and the problems connected with it have
not been of such great magnitude as they were in Mexico
over the same period of time.
A special aspect of the problem of international
equilibrium is introduced when one is concerned writh an
export economy.

This special view consists, in the first

instance, of the international equilibrium situation with
out recognition of the significant external forces which
characterizes the nation as an export economy, such as the
contributions of foreign owned oil companies in the case
of Venezuela;

and secondly, the practical recognition of

all the factors which contribute to a state of inter
national equilibrium.

In other words, the position taken

here is one which attempts to explain the economic situ
ation of the country, with private firms and the govern
ment working hand-in-hand, then to incorporate the foreign
element as a factor which, although responsible for a
sizeable portion of economic activity, may at some time
in the future be withdrawn.
A separate treatment of these two aspects of the
problem of international equilibrium will present the
growth, or lack of growth, of the economy in recent years.
The following sections will be developed according to the
two-aspect approach stated above.
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Monetary and fiscal policy and their effects upon
the economic development of Venezuela will be analyzed in
subsequent sections.
Venezuela maintains a multiple exchange rate system
with few quantitative restrictions for the purpose of connt
trolling trade and payments.
Although the government
does not practice exchange control through the exclusion
of private sales and purchases of foreign exchange, it
does maintain five buying rates and two selling rates.4
Since this paper is concerned with short run policy,
this chapter will be limited to an analysis of Venezuela
during the last five years, that is, from 1952 to 1956
with emphasis upon the practical problems derived as
concepts in Chapter I of this paper.
I.

INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: A Dual

Aspect Approach

In Chapter I it was found that a condition of inter
national equilibrium requires that intended saving equal
intended investment and that imports equal exports, or that
the difference between these two factors be offset through

2

R. F. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar
World (New York: Twentieth Century #und, 1954), p. 305.
^International Monetary Fund, Seventh Annual Report
on Exchange Restrictions 1956. printed in Washington, D.
C *, p » 341.
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lending, positive or negative.

E

It was further contended

that should an international disequilibrium exist, mone
tary, fiscal, and external policy could be so applied that
together they would either prevent a tendency toward
greater disequilibrium, or better still, they would reduce
the degree of disequilibrium.6
This study will begin with the two factors of saving
and investment during the five-year period.

This will be

followed by an appraisal of exports and imports (the
current account)

and a determination of the balancing

factor of lending (the capital account).

At this point

an appraisal of the international equilibrium will be
undertaken.
A.

Saving and Investment

Table I, page 18 7, presents the estimated saving
and investment relationship in Venezuela during the last
five years excluding the contribution of the foreign owned
petroleum companies.

The saving figures account for the

total saving of the nation.

Figures revealing the savings

of the petroleum companies were not available.

Nevertheless,

the oil companies would not be expected to maintain any

6See Chapter I, pp. 15-17.
6See Chapter I, pp. 18-19.

TABLE I

SAVING AND INVESTMENT OF VENEZUELA EXCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES
(in millions of bolivares)
National As a Saving As a Private As a Public As a Invest As a Private As a Public As a
% of Sectora i of Sector^3 % of
Product % of
% of Sector % of Sector % of ment
Total
(s)
(5)
(4)
(2)
(5)
(7)
(5)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(3)
(6)
(s)
1952
13,370

100.0 3,488

26.1

l,500c 43.0

1,988 57.0

2,167

16.2

1,232

56.9

935

43.1

1953
14,127

100.0 3,193

22.6

1,373° 43.0

1,820 57.0

2,273

16.1

1,281

56.4

992

43.6

1954
15,507

100.0 3,489

22.5

1,500

43.0

1,989 57.0

2,569

16.6

1,500

58.4

1,069

41.6

16,282° 100.0 3,248

19.9

2,037

62.7

1,211 37.3

3,670

22.5

2,386

65,0

1,284

35.0

2,210° 63.0

1,298 36.7

3,853

22.5

2,505

65.0

1,348

35.0

1955

1956
.
17,096 100.0 3,508e 20.5
Source:

Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955.

aPrivate and national enterprises only.
^National government only.
cEstimated at 43 per cent of total saving for the years 1952 and 1953, and 63
per cent for 1956.
^Estimated increase at a rate of 5 per cent.
p

^Estimated increase at 8 per cent over that of 1955.
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sizeable amounts of savings within the country.

Profits

of these firms are readily withdrawn to be paid out in
part as dividends to investors located in the United States
and other foreign nations.

It may be further assumed that

the remaining portion of the profits would be invested in
plants and facilities within Venezuela.

For these reasons,

the savings of the petroleum firms are probably of small
magnitude.
Figures representing the investment expenditures
of oil companies were obtainable; therefore, they were
deducted from the total investment figures.
The area referred to as the private sector should
be viewed with reservation because the figures include the
contribution of national enterprises.

Perhaps a more accu

rate classification would be to place the national enter
prises in the same category as the public sector rather
than the private sector.

Since the figures for private

and national enterprises were not segregated, they were
placed within the category of the private sector.
The autonomous institutions have a peculiar existence
of a quasi-public nature.

An authoritative report explains

their legal characteristics in the following manner:
♦ . . These government entities have a distinct
legal existence, possessing property separate from
and independent of the Treasury.
Their income and
expenses are not considered as public revenues and
expenditures, and they are not subject to the regu
lations governing the national budget.
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All capital contributions, contributions to operat
ing expenses, and loans and grants that a ministry
makes to these agencies are listed among expenditures
of the ministry. However, the ministry receives no
statement of agency expenditures of either ministry
funds or agency earnings. On the receipts side the
ministries list only the net amounts which the agencies,
under their special regulations, must pay into the
Treasury.”
These government entities compete with as well as
supplement the activities of private firms, and this would
seem to place the latter firms in a disadvantageous com
petitive position.
The national product figures of Table I consist of
the contributions of all sectors, including the foreign
owned oil companies; therefore, the amounts are somewhat
overstated.

Nevertheless, this point does not appear too

detrimental to the purpose of comparing the domestic
relationship between saving and investment.
Figures of the private sector saving were available
for the years 1954 and 1955 only.

The saving-rate in 1954

was applied to the two earlier years, 1952 and 1953, while
the saving-rate for 1955 was extended to 1956.
The rise in the national product for the years 1955
Q
and 1956 was estimated at a rate of 5 per cent.
7
United States Department of Commerce, Office of
International Trade, Investment in Venezuela. 1953, p. 82.
8This percentage figure was taken from a recent
report. See the Council for Inter-American Cooperation,
Inc., Noticias. November 29, 1955, p. 3,
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It may be observed from the figures presented in
Table I, page 187, that total actual saving exceeded total
actual investment during the first three years of the
survey; namely, 1952 with a saving excess of 1,321 millions
of bolivares, and 1953 and 1954 each indicating a saving
surplus of 920 millions of bolivares.

The saving balance

would normally serve as a satisfactory explanation for a
decline in the national product and national income for
these years.

However, this was not the result since both

the national product and income continued to rise in each
Q
of the three years in which there was a saving excess.
Out of the total saving during the three year
period (1952-1954), the public sector accounted for
approximately 57 per cent while, over the same period of
time, the private sector accounted for about 57 per cent
of the total investment expenditures.

Furthermore, the

figures revealed that the private sector maintained its
proportionate contribution to total investment expendi
tures during the first two years, that is, 56.9 and 56.4
per cent of total investment w-hile in the third year

®The national income figures for the period under
study were as follows: 1952, 9,616; 1953, 10,257; 1954,
11,042; 1955, 11,200; and 1956, 11,760, all in millions
of bolivares. Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela,
Memoria. 1955, pp. 254 and 257. The figure for 1956 was
based upon an estimated rise of 5 per cent over 1955.
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considered, 1954, private investment expenditures rose to
account for 58.4 per cent of the total investment expendi
tures.

At the same time, the public sector held its pro

portionate saving
page

figures at 57 per cent (see Table I,

187, columns 4 and 6).

Subsequently, in 1955, the

public sector reduced its saving to 57.3 per cent of total
saving while, during the same year, private investment
rose to 65 per cent of the total investment.

The impli

cation is that once the government reduced its saving,
the private sector provided for a sizeable increase in
its expenditures.

Nevertheless, a note of caution should

be mentioned; that is, the exceptional rise in private
investment in 1955 could have been attributed to national
institutions rather than private enterprises.

The

reduction of government saving implies that the saving
was made available to national entities for investment
expansion.

However, this point cannot be established

clearly, since private and national enterprise invest
ments are not separated.
During the
ment

years when saving was larger than invest

(1952-1954), one would expect a reduction in outstand

ing credit or an increase in idle bank accounts.

Total

credit rose, however, from 1,117.8 millions of bolivares
to 1,748.7 millions of bolivares during the period (refer
to Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix A, page £79).
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Savings deposits did rise from 233.7 millions of bolivares
in 1952 to 419.0 millions of bolivares at the end of 1954,
but the increase in savings deposits was equally as large
in the following two years, 1955 and 1956, rising to 635.2
millions of bolivares at the end of 1 9 5 6 . ^
The saving and investment relationship was reversed
during the last two years.
exceeded actual saving.

Actual investment expenditures

In other words, savings deposits

rose during the whole period under study and, therefore,
negated the reasoning that a rise in savings balances
served to partially explain an excess of actual saving
over investment expenditures.

In addition, the rise in

credit would not support the fact that saving was greater
than investment.
At least one other factor could help explain the
excess of saving during the years 1952 to 1954.

High

rates of taxation would imply that savings were at a high
level.

By referring to the Receipts and Expenditures of

the National Government of Venezuela in Appendix B, page
230, one finds an insignificant change in the yield from
taxes on income.

The amounts collected rose from 635.1

millions of bolivares in 1952 to 680.6 millions of bolivares

■^Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955,
Statistical Appendix, Chart B-IX; and the Bulletin. May,
1956, p. 8.
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in 1954.

The income tax was modified somewhat in 1955,

however, during the three earlier years ”. . .

the normal

income tax rate never exceeds 4 per cent. . . .

It

was true that the greater proportion of taxes received
hy the government came from the petroleum industry.

No

doubt a large part of the public sector saving was derived
from this income source.
It is quite clear that the domestic investment of
firms and the government were not large enough to maintain
the national product and income at a given level.

The

saving balance did decline, however, from 1,321 millions
of bolivares in 1952 to 920 millions of bolivares at the
end of 1954.

The explanation as to why the national

product and income did, In fact, rise during this three
year period is not apparent from a review of the domestic
forces alone.
Table I, page 187, further reveals that actual
investment exceeded actual saving in both 1955 and 1956.
The amounts were 422 and 345 millions of bolivares,
respectively.

The rise of both saving and investment in

the private sector is of particular importance.

The

figures also indicate that the government reduced Its
absolute and relative share of saving.

11

The governments

United States Department of Commerce, Investment
in Venezuela. 1953, p. 140.
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investment expenditures continued to rise; nevertheless,
the increase was at a slower rate than that of the private
sector.

The result in percentage figures indicated a

smaller relative contribution to total investment.
The extent of indirect government assistance would
seem to indicate that the figures given tend to under
state the influence of the national government.

The

government classifies its debt according to direct and
indirect groupings.^

The indirect public debt consists

of obligations emitted by the autonomous institutions with
the guarantee of the national government.

The institutions

include, among others, the Venezuelan Development Corpo
ration, the National Institute of Sanitary Works, and the
Central Simon Bolivar, C. A., an Institution created for
the development of Caracas.

These institutions received

guaranties for expenditures from the national government
to the extent of 461.1 millions of bolivares in 1954,
671.5 millions of bolivares in 1955, and although figures
were not available, the amount in 1956 probably exceeded
1^
that of 1955.
These figures suggest that the national

12

The direct public debt of Venezuela has been
relatively small. The figures in recent years v»rere as
follows: 1955, 45.2; 1954, 55.4; and 1955, 50.7 millions
of bolivares. Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela,
Memoria. 1955, p. 211.
15Ibid
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enterprises contributed in no small way to the increase
in the private sector investment expenditures of 1,005
millions of bolivares in the last two years, 1955 and 1956.
A partial explanation for the surplus of domestic
investment expenditures over domestic saving (767 millions
of bolivares during 1955 and 1956) comes from the expansion
of loans by the national government and national enter
prises.

Furthermore, a resort to Appendix A, Money and

Credit of Venezuela, page 279, reveals that money and
credit rose by 573.2

millions of bolivares during the

last two years of this survey.

A recent statement which

is indicative of the above reasoning states:
. . . The public sector is more important than
the private sector in controlling the direction of
economic development, for the Government also invests
a large proportion of the private savings obtained
from the capital market. . .
It appears that domestic development in general is
progressing at a more rapid rate than current opinion
indicates.

Although saving and investment have not pro

vided a balance, the discrepancy is not exceedingly large.
It Is recognized that the oil industry is exceptionally
Important to the development of the nation.

Yet, domestic

investment rose some 78 per cent during the period without
the aid of the petroleum industry.

Even though total

^International Monetary Fund, International
Financial News Survey. November 2, 1956, p. 147.
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increase in saving was meager and sporadic, private sector
saving rose approximately 61 per cent, i. e., from a low
of 1 , 3 7 3 ■millions of "bolivares in 1953 to 2,210 millions
of bolivares in 1956.

In addition, the rise in saving of

this sector has been consistently moving upward since
1953.
Bringing together some of the loose ends of the
findings up to this point, it seems safe to state that
the private and public sectors saving and investment
relationships indicated that the national product and
income would have declined from 1952 to 1954.
during the year 1955 a turn of events occurred.

However,
The sav

ing excess of 920 millions of bolivares at the end of
1954 was reversed during the following year so that at
the end of 1955 investment exceeded saving by 422 millions
of bolivares.

This was accomplished without giving rise

to additional inf1 a t i o n . ^

Furthermore, the investment

balance continued in 1956.

This meant that the two sectors,

without the helping hand of the oil companies, were strong
enough to maintain and perhaps to increase the national
product and income.

Recent literature refers to numerous

evidences of the tremendous advances made by the private
sector via increased investment and diversification of

^ S e e the Index of Wholesale Prices In the Federal
District, Appendix C, p. 282.
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facilities.

A few examples will suffice:

Well-known group oa of Venezuelan businessmen are
forming a real estate development company which will
finance large city housing projects . . . and later
on will build factory buildings for rent and for sale,
office buildings, warehouses, and supermarkets through
out the nation. , . .16 Also,
. . . 107 new industrial concerns were established
last year, their total subscribed capital being 24.9
millions of dollars . . . and bought machinery and
equipment worth 15.1 millions of dollars. . . .17 And,
. . . Venezuela is now self-sufficient in corn and
rice, and all sugar requirements are expected to be
covered by domestic production this year. . . .18
One should not forget, however, that the influence
of the oil companies is perhaps greater than it appears on
the surface.

For

example, the earnings of petroleum firms

help to provide funds which private firms may utilize for
the expansion of production and trade, and the oil compa
nies contribute large sums of money which have made it
possible for the national government to realize surpluses
in its national accounts.
To take into consideration the precise influence
of the petroleum industry, a second table, Table II, page
198, has been constructed for the purpose of analyzing the

-I g

Council for Inter-American Cooperation, Inc.,
Noticias. October 18, 1955, p. 4.
l^Ibid., issue of September 27, 1955, p. 5.
^International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Hews Survey. October 14, 1955, p. 131.

TABLE II
SAVING M D INVESTMENT OF VENEZUELA INCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES
(in millions of bolivares)
National As a S aving As a Private As a Public As a Invest As a Private As a Public As a
Product % of
% of Sector % of Sector % of
% of Sector % of Sector % of ment
Total
(2)
(2)
(4)
(2)
(3)
(6)
(5)
(5)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(?)
(5 )
1952
13,370

100.0 3,488

26.1

l,500a 43.0

1,988 57.0 3,469

26.0

2,268

65.3

1,203 34.7

1953
14,127

100.0 3,193

22.6

l,373a 43.0

1,820 57.0 3,249

23.0

1,887

58.1

1,362 42.0

1954
15,507

100.0 3,489

22.5

1,500

43.0

1,989 57.0 3,706

23.9

2,437

65.8

1,268 34.2

1955
.
16,282t) 100.0 3,248

19.9

2,037

62.7

1,211 37.3 4,820

22.5

3,336° 65.0

1,484 35.0

1,2.98 36.7 5,027e

29.4

3,479° 69.2

1,548 30.8

1956

V

17,096° 100.0 3,508d 20.5
Source:

2,210a 63.0

Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955,

Estimated at 45 per cent of total saving for the years 1952 and 1953, and 63
per cent for 1956,
^Estimated increase at a rate of 5 per cent,
cEstimated a 5 per cent rise of petroleum industry investment during 1955 and 1956.
^Estimated increase at 8 per cent over that of 1955.
«
^Estimated private, national enterprises, and national government expenditures
at 5 per cent.

m
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aggregate saving and investment relationship in Venezuela.
This table is the same as Table I except that it includes
the investment expenditures of the petroleum industry and
a small amount of foreign investment.

The investment

expenditures of the oil companies have been added to those
of the private sector and, appropriately, the foreign
investment figures have been included with the national
government in the public sector.
Total actual investment has averaged about 25 per
cent of the national product for the five-year period.
This may be compared with an 18.8 per cent average shown
in Table I.

iq

These aggregate figures reveal the sig

nificance of the petroleum companies along with the general
increase of investment expenditures by the private sector.
Investment expenditures have been separated and shown
below as individual components, in millions of bolivares:^
Private investment
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
Private and national
enterprises
1,232 1,281 1,500 2,386 2,505
Petroleum companies
1.034 606
957
950
974
Total private sector
2,266 1,887 2,437 3,336 3,479
Public investment
National government
Other foreign investment
Total public sector

935

992 1,069 1,284 1,348

268 370
199
200
200
1,203 1,362 1,268 1,484 1,548

-^For comparisons refer to column 5 and the per
centages shown in Table I, page 187, and Table II.
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Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955, p. 259;
also see the explanations under Table II.

soo
This separation of the investment factors presents
some important points with respect to the growth of the
nation.

The exceedingly large investment expenditures of

the oil companies, which in 1952 amounted to nearly 50
per cent of the total private investment, is attributable
to the extension of operations which began a few years
earlier.

Large expenditures were made to construct homes

and schools for the workers, to provide electricity for
the communities, to pipe fresh water to the oil camps,
and so o n . ^

The completion of the expansion of such

facilities in 1952 brought a reduction of investment
expenditures during 1955.

Beginning in 1954,

tinued rise in petroleum exports and the

the con

need for expanded

refinery capacity stimulated a constant increase of invest
ment expenditures.

The average investment expenditures of

the oil companies from 1954 to 1956 were

51.6 per cent of

the total private sector investment.
A large rise of investment expenditures on the part
of the private and national enterprises occurred in 1954
and continued through 1955 and 1956.

The absolute increase,

in millions of bolivares, amounted to 219 during 1954 and
886 at the end of 1955.

Perhaps a large portion of the

investment was channeled through the national enterprises.

Lfnited States Department of Commerce, Investment
in Venezuela. 1955, p. 50.
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The following explanation would seem to support this view:
. . . The Government made large investments [19543,
either in the form of public works or by granting
development loans. . • •
. . . The use of the Government’s reserve fund in
the Central Bank to finance a vast new programme of
public works CwasJ provided for in the 1954/55
budget. . •
The above quotation also gives cognizance to the
fact that the national government expenditures expanded
abruptly in 1954 and continued upward in the two subse
quent years.
Reverting back to Table II, one finds that the
private sector’s contribution to total investment varied
from 58.1 per cent (1953) to 69.2 per cent (1956).
Furthermore, investment expenditures were on the incline
during the whole period except for the year 1953 as
mentioned above.
In contrast, the public sector’s relative share of
investment spending has declined (see column 7 and the
relative percentages).

However, the figures indicate

that the absolute expenditures have risen during most of
the current period.

The reason for the opposite move

ments of the relative and absolute figures was that the
private sector spending increased at a more rapid rate

^ U n i t e d Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America 1954 (New York:
United Nations Publication, 1955), p. 201.
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than that of the public sector.
Before analyzing the external accounts, a compari
son of the saving-investment relationship of Venezuela
may be presented.

This comparison is shown in Table III.

These figures reveal quite clearly some of the major
points that have been presented.

By observing the left-

hand column of the table one is able to see that total
actual investment was smaller than actual saving for the
first three years of the five-year period.

However, dur

ing the last two years (1955-1956) Investment (A) rose to
exceed saving (S).

The gradual decline in saving during

the first three years, the equality between saving and
investment during the year 1954, and the investment excess
thereafter, all serve to emphasize the rapid domestic
growth of the economy.

This observation is of special

importance since the change in the saving-investment
balances was accomplished without severe inflation.
TABLE III
EXCESS OF REALIZED SAVING (S) OR INVESTMENT (A)
(in millions of bolivares)
Excluding the Petroleum Industry
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

1,321
920
920
422
345

Source:

S
S
S
A
A

Aggregate Balances
19
56
217
1,572
1,519

S
A
A
A
A

Table I, page 187, and Table II, page 198.
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Turning to the right-hand column of Table III, one
may observe the great impact of the oil industry with
respect to the domestic growth of the country.

In only

the first year, 1952, was saving larger than investment.
Between the years 1952 and 1953 saving and investment
were equated at a national product figure approximating
13,749 millions of bolivares.
At the end of 1953 the figures indicate an invest
ment excess of about 56 millions of bolivares.

However,

as Table

II,page 198, reveals, the investment balance

for this

year did not come about because of a rise of

investment expenditures.
fell.

Those expenditures actually

Nevertheless, the balance was possible because

saving declined by a larger amount than did investment.
The investment excess continued to swell during
the next

two years (1954 and 1955),

of 1956,

the already large investment balance declined by

a small amount.

Finally, at the end

The extraordinary rise of investment

would normally be explained by inflation.

This expla

nation would not be sufficient in the case of Venezuela.
As will be explained later, the rise of the real national
product and the diversification of development, starting
with a narrow base, are important points attempting to
verify the growth of the nation nearly free of inflation.
Before analyzing the approximate state of
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international equilibrium of Venezuela, an appraisal of
the n a t i o n s external relations should he made.

This is

the purpose of the following section.
B.

Imports, Exports, and Lending^3

The survey of the domestic factors of saving and
investment just completed has shown that an equality
between saving and investment has not been realized in
Venezuela during the past five years.

Chapter I of this

paper states that if saving were greater than investment
a condition of international equilibrium may be attained,
provided that exports exceed imports by the amount of the
saving excess.

The opposite relationship may also allow

international equilibrium to be maintained, that is, with
imports exceeding exports by the exact amount of the
investment surplus.

Should either of these above require

ments fail to be realized, lending should provide the
appropriate directional flow in order to close the gap
between the accounts.^
The present task is to analyze the current and
capital accounts of Venezuela for the purpose of

P3

Imports include all the current account minus
items while exports represent the sum of all the current
account plus items. Lending constitutes the (net) capital
account balance.
^4See Chapter I, pp. 15-17.
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determining their final balances.

The dual approach will

be employed as it was in connection with the domestic
sector.

In other words, the current account will be

explained, in the first instance, with the exclusion of
the petroleum industry’s contribution to external trade.
By making this observation it will be possible to deter
mine by rough measure the domestic and external sectors’
ability to achieve and maintain economic progress.
The second part of the dual approach in the external
sector will be to present the aggregate current account
figures which will include the external contribution of
the oil industry.
Of course, the capital account Involves movements
of funds and assets and, therefore, it will be employed in
both of the above situations.
Table IV, page 206, presents the current account
of Venezuela’s balance of payments exclusive of the
petroleum industry’s contribution to the external trade
of the nation.
A general view of Table IV yields some significant
facts.

Venezuela depends to a great extent upon its

petroleum exports in order to achieve a favorable current
account.

The domestic sector contributes about 6 per cent

of the total exports.

The remaining 94 per cent is

derived from the petroleum firms.

At least this has been
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the experience of the country during the last five years.
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TABLE IV
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF VENEZUELA EXCLUDING
FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES*
(in millions of bolivares)
Itema
Exports, f.o.b.
Imports, f.o.b.
Transportation
and insurance
Investment
income
Capital
Other services
Other
Balance
Source:
D, p. 283.

1953

1952

1954

1955

I956b

373.9
288.1
365.8
411.3
228.8
-2,015.4 -2,374.8 -2,783.9 -2,919.9 -3,211.9
-

235.8 -

-1,374.2
237.9
- 173.9
- 213.4
-3,546.0

281.4 -

-1,355.7
169.2
- 216.7
- 207.8
-3,979.1

338.4 -

-1,522.3
71.7
- 236.2
- 217.4
-4,804.1

351.8 -

-1,847.9
66.7
- 346.4
- 175.4
-5,334.2

387.0

-2,032.7
73.3
- 381.0
- 192.9
-5,867.5

Balance of Payments of Venezuela, Appendix

*Minus items denote debits or a reduction of purchas
ing power.
aAll items except exports and imports represent net
figures.
•l.

Estimated at a rate of 10 per cent above the 1955
figures.
Minus balances accompany every item with the
exception of the exports and the capital (net) item for

2^As noted under Table IV, the imports and exports
figures for 1956 were estimated. The 10 per cent rise
would seem to be adequate according to a recent report
which states that petroleum exports rose 12 per cent dur
ing the first half of the year and 14 per cent during the
last six months. Refer to United States Department of
Commerce, Foreign Commerce Weekly. May 13, 1957, p. 33.
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the first two years of this s t u d y . T h i s

result infers

that the authorities must feel assured that large oil
exports will continue, otherwise some of the items would
tend to be reduced during the latter part of the period.
Yet, nearly every item has progressively risen throughout
the period considered in this survey.
The two main items in terms of size are the imports
and investment income.

Together they constitute an over

whelming portion of the total debit balance.

Imports have

risen in every year considered and, during the five-year
period, have risen to the extent of 59.4 per cent.
The investment income item showed the same upward
tendency.

A debit balance revealed by this item is con

sidered normal for countries wtiich are in a state of
underdevelopment.

Nevertheless, the figures indicate a

substantial rise for Venezuela, and may not be considered
as indicative of a prudent accomplishment unless the
exports of oil in the future are maintained on a plane at
least equal to their present level, or even higher.
During the period under study, the investment
income item has shown a persistent rising debit balance

^®The item capital (net) refers to that part of the
Donations Account which consists of goods and services and,
therefore, is charged to the Current Account. This expla
nation may be found in the Central Bank of Venezuela,
Memoria, 1955, p. 165.
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which amounted to a 47.9 per cent increase between 1952
and 1956.

The only year in which the investment income

item registered a decline was 1953, and it was then less
than 20 millions of bolivares.

No doubt foreign invest

ment in petroleum and other industries has contributed a
good deal to the larger debit balances of this item.

The

extent of the nation’s ability to diversify its invest
ment outlets rapidly will determine whether or not the
amounts shown at the present time can be repaid in the
future.
Table V, page 209, is constructed for the purpose
of showing the aggregate current account figures.

This

table constitutes the total current receipts and expendi
tures which include the petroleum industry’s contribution.
It is quite apparent from this table that the
exports of petroleum made possible the credit balances in
four out of the five years included in this survey.

Page

209 shows the yearly percentage changes of oil exports as
compared to the yearly percentage changes of total imports.
This comparison should reveal the capability of oil
exports to support the rising demand of the nation for
imports.

The absolute figures for oil exports and total

imports show that the former was approximately double the
latter during the last five years.
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TABLE V
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF VENEZUELA INCLUDING
FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES
(in millions of bolivares)
Itema

1952

Exports, f.o.b.
Imports, f.o.b.
Transportation
and insurance
Investment
income
Capital
Other services
Other
Balance
Source:
D, p. 283.

1953

1954

1955

1956^

4,864.9 5,071.9 5,603.5 6,374.4 7,191.9
-2,615.7 -2,857.9 -3,193.9 -3,372.5 -3,709.8
-

285.7 -

312.9 -

376.9 -

399.4 -

439.4

-1,374.2 -1,355.7 -1,522.3 -1,847.9 -2,032.7
237.9
169.2 71.7
73.3
66.7
- 173.9 - 216.7 - 236.2 - 346.4 - 381.0
- 273.4 - 207.8 - 217.4 - 175.4 - 192.9
439.9
290.1 14.9
166.1
362.8
Balance of Payments of Venezuela, Appendix

aAll items except exports and imports represent net
figures.
D0il exports estimated at a rate of 13 per cent.
other items at a rate of 10 per cent.

oil
total

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

6.7
11.8

3.2
15.0

9.5
11.8

14.6
5.6

13.0
10.0

A definite pattern is indicated by the above per
centages.

All

On the one hand, oil exports increased by 6.7

per cent in 1952, rose by over 3.2 per cent in 1953, and,
in 1954, ascended by 9.5 per cent.

On the other hand,

imports shot upward by 11.8 per cent in 1952, moved even
higher in 1953 which shows a 15.0 per cent rise, and, in
1954, increased by 11.8 per cent over 1953, the same per
centage rise as that of 1952.

The year 1954 seemed to be
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a breaking point, since after that year oil exports rose
rapidly in both of the following two years.
increased but at a much smaller rate in 1955.

Imports
However,

the estimated percentage rise in 1956 was somewhat larger.
In a relative sense, exports of petroleum have
risen at a more rapid rate in the latter years of this
survey than have total imports.

In other words, the

rising oil output has been large enough to support the
growing imports.

To say that this fortunate trend will

continue would be only conjecture.

Its continuation will

depend upon political as well as economic decisions on
the part of other nations, including the United States,
along with those made in Venezuela.
A few comments should be made in connection with
the debit balance on current account which appeared in
1954.

The figures in Table V show that imports and exports

have been rising up to and including the year 1954.
Because of the total commodity rise, the service items
would be expected to increase too.
shown by a glance at Table V.

This they did as is

In addition, it was found

that petroleum exports rose at a slower rate than total
imports.

The result was that the rise of imports plus

the increases in the service items exceeded the increase
of exports in 1954.

Thereafter, the relative increase of

exports was more than sufficient to offset the rise of
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imports and the service items taken together.

One should

further keep in mind the fact that exports, exclusive of
petroleum, have "been rising steadily.

The figures indicate

that these exports increased by approximately 79.8 per cent
from 1952 through 1956 (see Table IV, page 206).

The

reasons explaining why these exports have been increasing
in recent years are presented in a later portion of this
chapter (see page 262 ff.).

At this point, it will suffice

to state that export prices for coffee and cocoa were
pegged.

In addition, a portion of the export tax levied

on petroleum was used to subsidize the production of coffee,
cocoa, and perhaps other products.

World prices were

sufficiently high to encourage the production of coffee
and cocoa for export.

Finally, iron-ore deposits are being

exploited on a larger scale facilitating an increasing
quantity for export.
A survey of the current account of Venezuelan
balance of payments has presented some interesting results.
No doubt the flow of funds as represented by the capital
account will be equally revealing.

The task at hand is to

describe the capital account items.
Table VI, page 212, shows the capital account items
and their directional movements.2^

All positive items

P7
* Information was not available for 1956. Taking
into consideration the erratic movements of capital, it
was considered unwise to employ estimates for that year.
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represent inward movements of capital or negative lending
(borrowing), or return on loans made.

The minus items

indicate outward flows of capital or positive lending,
or the repayment of previous borrowings.
TABLE VI
CAPITAL ACCOUNT OF VENEZUELA
(in millions of bolivares)
Item

1952

1955

1954

1955

Long-term
279.7
305.3 265.5
159.5
Private
267.7
305.5 290.4
170.9
Official and bank
Export-import
bank loans
16.4
11.0
--Amortization
- 4.4 - 10.7 - S.4 - 5.4
Purchase of foreign
investment
--- 15.7 - 6.0
Short-term
-234.5 -151.1
78.4 -171.5
Official and bank
Liabilities
- 12.1 - 10.7 - 15.1
32.2
Foreign assets
(increase -)
-222.4 -140,4
93.5 -203.7
Balance
45.2 154.7
343.7 - 12.0
Source:
D, p. 283.
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The long-term movements of capital were inward on
balance in every year considered in this study.

This

directional movement of funds appears quite logical in the
case of an underdeveloped country.

Nevertheless, the trend

seems to be one of reduced inflows of capital as one views
the figures from 1952 through 1955.
Private long-term capital constituted the bulk of
total long-term capital movements.

The amortization of
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the Export-import Bank loans was nearly completed by the
end of 1955.

Loans from the Bank during the years 1951

through 1'953 totaled 33.4 millions of bolivares while the
amortization payments over the same period amounted to
31.9 millions of bolivares, leaving only 1.5 millions of
bolivares to be amortized.*3®
The purchase of foreign securities on the part of
Venezuela has amounted to 21.7 millions of bolivares
between 1952 and 1955.

Although precise figures were not

available, the larger portion of long-term foreign invest
ment probably consisted of United States Government
securities.
The short-term capital account showed a net out
flow of capital from Venezuela in three of the four years
surveyed.

In 1952 the outflow of short-term funds was

offset by an increase of foreign assets.

In other words,

the capital was employed in the purchase of stocks, bonds,
or other assets, including foreign currency, bank deposits,

2®The 1951 Export-import Bank loan figure was 6
millions of bolivares, and amortization amounted to 2.0
millions of bolivares. See the International Monetary
Fund, International Financial Statistics. January, 1957,
p . 233.
PQ

Figures reveal that Latin American net long-term
investments in United States Government securities totaled
189 millions of dollars during the two-year period (19541955). Refer to the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin. April, 1957,
p. 479.
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or brokerage balances amounting to 222.4 millions of
bolivares.

In addition, non-residents withdrew their net

bank deposits in Venezuelan banks to the extent of 12.1
millions of bolivares.

The total short-term outflow as

revealed by the two above accounts amounted to 234.5
millions of bolivares.
The following year, 1953, showed a similar short
term capital outflow which totaled 151.1 millions of
bolivares.

At the end of 1954 the short-term balance was

positive; that is, a net inflow of short-term capital
took place.

This inflow was possible since Venezuela^

foreign assets declined.

This meant that the government

or banks either sold some of their holdings of foreign
stocks, bonds, or other assets, or they reduced their
holdings of foreign currency, bank deposits, or brokerage
balances abroad in an amount of 93.5 millions of bolivares.
Furthermore, foreigners withdrew their bank deposits on
balance in Venezuela again in 1954 by about 15.1 millions
of bolivares.
The short-term minus balance at the end of 1955
indicated a different situation which led to an outflow
of short-term capital totaling 171.5 millions of bolivares.
Foreign assets rose by 203.7 millions of bolivares while
short-term liabilities also increased by 32.2 millions of
bolivares.
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In summarizing the short-term capital items one
finds that total liabilities changed by only 5.7 millions
of bolivares, that is, foreign bank deposits in Venezuela
declined on balance by the above amount.

On the other

hand, foreign assets held by the government and banks in
Venezuela rose some 475.0 millions of bolivares.
To conclude the capital account survey, it may be
stated that there was a positive balance in every year
except 1955.

During the first two years, 1952 and 1953,

the long-term capital inflows were larger than the short
term capital outflows.

In 1954, both long- and short-term

capital movements were inward on balance.

Finally, the

long-term capital inflow was larger than the short-term
capital outflow in 1955.
As will be shown at a later point, the current and
capital account balances must be offset by the unilateral
account or gold movements in order to provide an equi
librium in the balance of payments.
Now that the analysis of Venezuela's current and
capital accounts has been completed, it is possible to
examine the state of international equilibrium of that
country.

The procedure employed will be to analyze the

various factors with the exclusion of the petroleum
industry's contribution to the country in order to find
out wrhether or not the domestic sector was able to achieve
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a condition of international equilibrium.

After that

analysis is completed, the contribution of the oil industry
will be included for the purpose of determining the actual
state of international equilibrium.
The discussion of this phase of international equi
librium will be short.

There is justification for brevity

in this instance since the situation to be described is
not actually found within Venezuela.

However, some degree

of benefit should be forthcoming from a consideration of
the domestic sector because if that sector is contributing
to greater disequilibrium, then those persons in responsi
ble

positions should not hesitate to do all they can to

develop the nation on a broader basis.

In addition,

this

discussion will indicate the approximate importance of
the

petroleum industry to the nation as a whole.
Before

be mentioned.

getting under way, a note of caution should
It is possible that the figures to be

presented may not be entirely free of the impact of the
oil industry.^

In fact, it was mentioned earlier (pages

186 and 188) that saving figures Include those of the oil
companies.

Furthermore, some portion of the capital

For example, reinvested earnings of the Creole
Petroleum Corporation were as follows (in millions of
bolivares): 134, 1952; 160, 1953; 153, 1954; 59, 1955;
and 152, 1956. Refer to the Creole Petroleum Corporation,
Annual Report 1956. pp. 26-27.
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account may involve flows of funds created by the oil
industry.

The same reasoning holds true in connection

with the movements of gold and foreign exchange.
An examination of Table VII Indicates that actual
saving was in excess of actual Investment from 1952 through
1954.

Thereafter, the nation encountered an investment

surplus.

In the external sector imports were greatly in

excess of exports during the whole period.
TABLE VII
THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM OF VENEZUELA
EXCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES
(in millions of bolivares)*
Year

National
Product

Saving(S)Investment(A)
Balance

1952
1955
1954
1955
1956

13,370
14,127
15,507
16,282
17,096

S > A 1,521
S>A
920
S> A
920
A> S
422
A> S
545

Lending
Balance
(*-inflow)
*-

45.2
154.7
343.7
~ » 12.0
• « • •

a

Import(M)Export(E)
Balance
M>
M>
M>
M>
M>

E
E
E
E
E

3,546.0
3,971.1
4,804.1
5,334.2
5,867.5

Source:
Table I, page 187 ; Table IV, page 206; and
Table VI, page 212.
^Monetary conversions were made at the official
rate of 5.55 bolivares per dollar.
information was not available.
The lending factor was relatively small In amount
throughout the period, and it revealed a change in
directional flow in 1955.
The saving balances during the first three years
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amounted to 1,321 millions of bolivares in 1952 and 920
millions of bolivares in both 1953 and 1954.

Since these

were excesses of saving, it might be assumed that an
equality between saving and investment could be realized
should there be an outflow of capital in an amount equal
to the above saving surpluses.

The lending balances show,

however, that capital moved inward.

This directional

flow of capital had the effect of aggravating the
imbalance already created.
In order to ameliorate the domestic condition which
ordinarily accompanies a saving excess, monetary policy
would have needed to be expansive with the banking system
providing for a downward revision of quantitative controls
and a reduction of bank interest rates.

Accordingly,

fiscal policy would have called for a decrease in taxation
and a rise in government lending, among other measures.
Monetary and fiscal joolicy together would have
required a maximum expansion amounting to approximately
3,704.5 millions of bolivares.

This figure represents

the summation of the lending balances plus the saving
excesses during the three-year p e r i o d . ^

31

However, a rise

It is possible that some portion of the inflow
of capital would have been utilized directly in investment
endeavors. Monetary and fiscal policy could have been
moderated If this were the case.
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in money and credit of this magnitude would probably have
raised costs and prices a good deal, and would have forced
savings to even greater heights.
The external sector indicated an excess of imports
during the first three years of this study (1952-1354).
Table VII shows that the import balances totaled about
12,321.2 millions of bolivares for those years.

The nega

tive lending balances amounting to 543.6 millions of boli
vares were too small to cope writh the vast import surplus.
Consequently, a rapid drainage of gold and foreign
exchange would have taken place.
Internal conditions changed in 1955.

Investment

was larger than saving by approximately 422 millions of
bolivares.

This investment gap wrould have been closed

through the inflow of capital (negative lending) equal
to the above figure.

Nevertheless, lending was positive

and an outwrard flow of capital was encountered to the
extent of 12 millions of bolivares.
Monetary and fiscal policy could have helped close
the domestic gap through appropriate contractive measures
which would have included an upward revision of quanti
tative and qualitative controls, a rise of bank interest
rates, an increase in taxation, stepped-up government
borrowing, and so on.

Yet, such a reversal of policy

would not have been easy to instigate and, furthermore,
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the problem which evolved in the external sector would
have perhaps prevented these contractionist measures from
becoming effective*
Imports continued to be excessive in 1955.

The

figures in Table VII indicate the approximate amount to
be 5,354.2 millions of bolivares.

This balance would have

called for negative lending, or an inflow of capital.
Since lending was positive by 12 millions of bolivares,
the inflow that would have been needed to balance the
import-export Items amounted to 5,346.2 millions of boli
vares.

However, since the inflow of capital was not

forthcoming, gold and foreign exchange would have left
the country again at the end of 1955.
The withdrawal of foreign exchange reserves of
this magnitude, that is, approximately 15 times as large
as total exports, would probably have created extensive
borrowing and deficit financing in order to provide
additional funds to satisfy foreign commitments.
A summation of the findings may now be presented.
Negative lending (inflows) throughout the first three
years would not have provided a balance between either
saving and investment in the domestic sector or imports
and exports in the external sector.
Monetary and fiscal policy would probably have
contributed to extremely high prices because the rise of
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real Investment would have required a greater expanse of
time in an underdeveloped nation.

Externally, the loss of

gold and foreign exchange would probably have created a
demand for depreciation of the currency.
At the end of 1955 lending also failed to offset
the saving-investment balance as well as the import-export
balance.

The apparent heavy loss of gold and foreign

exchange would probably have created adverse effects upon
monetary and fiscal policy of a contractionist nature.
The following year, 1956, was similar to that of
1955 except for the fact that the internal Improvement via
a smaller investment balance was more than offset by a
larger Import balance.

Although the lending figure was

not available, It is reasonably safe to assume that it
would not have created a balance between the internal or
external accounts.

Monetary and fiscal policy problems

along with the external loss of gold and foreign exchange
would have been accentuated during the year.
It is safe to say that the national product and
income would have fallen during the period.

There would

have been a possibility that the downward movement might
have been curtailed by the end of the period.

This would

have depended upon the extent of success in applying mone
tary and fiscal policy.

Also, exchange depreciation ?/ould

have possibly been Imposed, particularly if emergency

222
funds from abroad were not forthcoming.
This short survey of the domestic sector shows
quite conclusively that there is a great need for further
diversification of production.

Should the petroleum market

dwindle or some new invention or discovery lessen the need
for petroleum, the domestic sector could not be expected to
maintain a level of income anywhere near its present plane.
The likelihood of a depression, inflation, or exchange
rate modification would be a probable outcome.
In order to establish the current state of inter
national equilibrium of Venezuela, the contribution of the
petroleum industry should be included.

Table VIII is con

structed for the purpose of showing the aggregate contri
bution of the total economy.
TABLE VIII
THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM OF VENEZUELA
INCLUDING FOREIGN OWNED OIL COMPANIES
(in millions of bolivares)
Year

National
Product

Saving(S)Investment(A)
Balance

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

13,370
14,127
15,507
16,282
17,096

S>
A>
A>
A>
A>

Lending
Balance
(«— inflow)

A
19
S
56
S
217
S 1,572
S 1,519

45.2
154.7
343.7

12.0

Import(M
Export(E
Balance
E>
E>
M>
E>
E>

M 439.9
M 290.1
E 14.9
iff 166.1
M 362.8

Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955;
and the International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics. January, 1957.
information was not available.
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A few general comments concerning Table VIII seem
to be in order before analyzing the factor changes which
occurred in the respective years.

Overall, the national

product rose approximately 27.9 per cent, in current
bolivares, that is, about 5.6 per cent per year.

Invest

ment (A) exceeded saving (S) in every year except 1958.
Furthermore, the rise of the investment balance was quite
abrupt beginning with the year 1954.

The directional

flow of the lending balance was inward for the first
three years, then, in 1955, the item showed a net out
flow of capital.

Finally, one observes that exports were

larger than Imports four out of the five years under con
sideration.
Each year contains its own unique set of factor
relationships; therefore, the analysis will proceed in a
chronological sequence.
I
At the end of 1952 realized saving wras larger than
realized investment by about 19 millions of bolivares.
Even though this was a moderate surplus, negative lending
(an inflow of capital) moved in the opposite direction
from that required to balance the saving-Investment items.
The summation of the lending balance, approximately 45
millions of bolivares, and the saving excess produced a
domestic imbalance of about 64 millions of bolivares.
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This is a small figure in terms of the national product
totaling 13,370 millions of bolivares.
The rise of money and credit in circulation amounted
to 435.9 millions of bolivares.32

Under this condition,

the price level would be expected to rise somewhat.

The

index of wholesale prices indicates a small rise in the
average level of prices amounting to 1.6 per cent for the
year.35
Exports were 440 millions of bolivares greater than
imports.

Lending, moving inward on balance, failed to

close this gap.

If the movement of capital is included

in the calculation, the gap amounts to 485 millions of
bolivares.

This difference had to be offset by unilateral

and gold movements, foreign exchange reserves, and the
unaccountable portion assigned to errors and omissions.
As for actual figures connected with such items, gold
moved out to the extent of approximately 1 million of
bolivares, donations left the country in an amount of
about 64 millions of bolivares, foreign exchange reserves
increased some 191 millions of bolivares, and the remain
ing negative balance of 613 millions of bolivares was

*20

cRefer to Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix
A, p. 279.
33

See Index of Wholesale Prices in the Federal
District, Appendix C, p. 282.
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classified as errors and omissions.
The year 1952 was, in one sense, a turning point.
Each subsequent year produced an investment surplus in
the internal sector.

A saving excess would normally

explain a fall in the national product.

However, the

national product rose about 770 millions of bolivares
during the present year.

34

This rise is justified, in

part, by reason of prior government expenditures which
provided completed projects during the year, and of the
large export surplus in the external sector.

In addition,

the national product figure would have been somewhat less
than the figure shown if it were in terms of constant
prices.
The export balance in 1952 was the largest accumu
lated in any one of the five years.

Also, the Index of

Import and Export Prices of Venezuela in Appendix C, page
232, reveals a 14.5 per cent rise in export prices between
the base year, 1950, and 1952.

Although a small amount

of gold was exported, the gold and foreign exchange
balance showed a net accumulation of 190 millions of
bolivares.
II
The following year, 1953, produced an investment

34

The national product was estimated at 12,600
millions of bolivares for 1951. The above figure repre
sents a 6.1 per cent rise between 1951 and 1952.
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surplus of some 56 millions of bolivares.

Lending was

inward on balance to the extent of 155 millions of boli
vares.

The correct directional movement of capital was

greater, however, than that required to achieve an equi
librium between saving and investment.

The influence of

lending then had the effect of supplementing the apparent
lack of saving to an amount greater than was required.
The precise figure was 99 millions of bolivares (155 - 56).
It would appear that monetary and fiscal policy
should have revealed a contractionist tendency.

Never

theless, money and credit, taken together, rose some 476
millions of bolivares.

This expansion along with the

lending balance provided funds amounting to 575 millions
of bolivares.
In the external sector exports were 290 millions
of bolivares larger than imports.

The export excess

required an outward directional flow of capital.

Yet,

lending was negative, or capital moved inward, as
mentioned above.

The export surplus plus the inflow of

capital (155 millions of bolivares) produced an Imbalance
amounting to approximately 445 millions of bolivares.
The remaining accounts in the balance of payments,
including the movement of foreign exchange, produced off
setting balances to equate the import, export, and lending
figure of 445 millions of bolivares.

To sum up the
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balancing factors, gold was exported in an amount of
300,000 bolivares and donations indicated a net outward
flow of 68.4 millions of bolivares.

Foreign exchange

reserves rose by about 143 millions of bolivares while
the errors and omissions item accounted for a debit
balance of some 519.3 millions of bolivares.
Overall, the year 1953 presented some unique
relationships.

Even though the national product rose, the

amount was less than that for the preceding year.

From a

monetary standpoint, money and credit increased; however,
the rise was less than that of the national product.
The average price level declined by slightly more
than 3 points.

Furthermore, both saving and investment

fell, the former by more than the latter.

The private

and public sectors together contributed to the smaller
saving balance while a reduction of petroleum investment
expenditures explained the decline in private sector
investment.®®
The current account yielded a large credit balance
again this year, and the net gold and foreign exchange
account rose.
Ill
The saving and investment items were not equated

35

Refer to Table II, page 198, and to the investment
figures given on page 199.
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in 1954.

Table VIII, page 222, shows that investment

exceeded saving by some 217 millions of bolivares.

In

order to close this investment gap, lending should have
been inward or negative on balance.

The flow of capital

was in the right direction, but the amount was larger
than that required to produce a saving-investment balance.
The 544 millions of bolivares of negative lending created
an excess of 127 millions of bolivares internally.
The internal condition as indicated in the above
paragraph is similar to that of the preceding year except
that in the current year the investment excess was larger
and the capital inflow was greater.
Money and credit in circulation rose by 544 millions
of bolivares, a sum larger than last year.

This figure,

added to the 127 millions of bolivares mentioned above
created additional funds representing a maximum amount
of 671.0 millions of bolivares.

The figures seem to indi

cate that monetary and fiscal policy should have been of
a contractionist nature.

Since such was not the case,

prices should have risen.

The average price did move

upward but only to the relatively small extent of 2.7
points.
The experience in the external sector was very much
different from that of last year, 1955.

This year imports

were greater than exports by a small amount, only 15
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millions of bolivares*

The import balance would lead one

to believe that lending should be negative, that is that
an inflow of capital should take place.

The movement of

capital was in the right direction in order to close the
import gap.

However, the capital movement was larger

than that required to balance the external accounts.

The

excess totaled 329 millions of bolivares (344 - 15).
The external excess was accounted for in the balance
of payments, including the foreign exchange reserve, in
the following manner: gold moved inward to the extent of
101 millions of bolivares, donations indicated an outward
flow of funds of about 72 millions of bolivares, while
foreign exchange holdings declined by 97 millions of boli
vares.

The errors and omissions item made up the remain

ing debit balance of 261 millions of bolivares.
In conclusion, the year 1954 witnessed an invest
ment excess.

Lending, vdiich moved in the direction neces

sary for closing the apparent investment gap, was too
great.

The result was a surplus of funds.

Money and

credit in circulation rose and further contributed to the
supply of spendable funds.
The small import surplus which called for an inflow
of capital resulted in a continued imbalance because the
inward movement of capital was larger than that required
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to create an Import-export balance.5®
The gold and foreign exchange account remained
nearly constant.

The receipt of gold representing 101

millions of bolivares and the loss of foreign exchange
amounting to 97 millions of bolivares created a net accumu
lation of 4 millions of bolivares.
Although money and credit in circulation rose, the
national product increased by a larger amount (1,380
millions of bolivares).

Investment expenditures of earlier

years continued to produce more real capital.

Of particu

lar importance in the present year was the expansion in
private sector investment.

The figures shown on page 199

reveal that private and national enterprises increased
their investment expenditures by more than 200 millions
of bolivares.

Furthermore, saving on the part of both

the private and public sectors showed improvement*
The price level which rose by a few points resulted
from the pressures exerted by the additional money and
credit in circulation and the time interval required to
produce goods and services.
IV
The year 1955 produced an abrupt variation in the

36

Total exports did not decline. However, the
rise of imports accompanied by greater current investment
(income) payments were largely responsible for the current
account debit balance.
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domestic sector.

Table VIII, page 222, shows that invest

ment was larger than saving by 1,572 millions of bolivares.
Negative lending (borrowing) would have been required to
close this large investment gap.

Nevertheless, rthe flow

of capital was outward by 12 millions of bolivares.

Lend

ing contributed, therefore, to the already large invest
ment surplus which now approached the figure of 1,584
millions of bolivares.
The expansive effect of investment and lending
would seem to emphasize the necessity of a contractionist
monetary and fiscal policy.

Yet, money and credit in

circulation rose by 472.6 millions of bolivares.^

Never

theless, the rise was not exceptionally large in com
parison to the investment surplus.

Furthermore, the

price level increased by less than one point.
Externally, exports were in excess of Imports by
166 millions of bolivares.

The directional movement of

lending, that is, an outflow of capital, was in the proper
direction to close the export gap.

However, positive

lending amounted to only 12 millions of bolivares.

There

was, therefore, a net accumulation in the external sector
amounting to 154 millions of bolivares (166 - 12).
Movements of foreign exchange and changes In the

37
p. 279.

See Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix A,
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remaining balance of payments accounts offset the external
accumulation mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

To sum

up these movements: donations indicated an outflow of
capital to the extent of 76 millions of bolivares.

Foreign

exchange rose by approximately 145 millions of bolivares,
while errors and omissions absorbed the remaining 223
millions of bolivares.
The year 1955 was one of marked changes which may
cause a good deal of concern in the future.

The most

noticeable changes occurred in the domestic sector, which
began with a large investment excess.
in circulation rose too.

Money and credit

The price level was not

responsive because of the constant accumulation of real
capital which was made possible by reason of prior
expenditures in both the private and public sectors.
However, the current year investment expenditures of the
national government rose quite sharply (see page 199).
In addition, the large rise of private investment expendi
tures was forthcoming primarily from the national enter
prises.^®

The expenditures of these two bodies normally

require a certain time interval before real capital is
realized.

This reasoning tends to explain why there

existed a large investment gap in the current year.

*ZQ

^°Refer to the discussion of this subject matter
on pages 200-201.
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Nevertheless, the 775 millions of bolivares increase in
the national product was larger than the rise of money and
credit in circulation.
Another point to keep in mind Is the fact that
total saving declined in 1955.

Even though private saving

rose, public sector saving fell to a greater extent than
the rise of the former (refer to Table II, page 198).
The excess of exports over imports presented a
more normal occurrence.

Although the export balance was

not exceptionally large, it did contribute to the net
accumulation within the gold-foreign exchange account.
The rise in the export price index to 132.5 from the 1950
base year was partially responsible for the credit balance
In the current account.
V
Unfortunately, the year 1956 does not present a
-zq

complete picture of events. ■

Internally, Investment was

larger than saving by some 1,519 millions of bolivares.
This figure, though somewhat smaller than that of the pre
ceding year, indicates the continuation of domestic spend
ing.

However, the expansion of money and credit in circu

lation amounting to 100.6 millions of bolivares was a good

3 9

Information which was not available includes the
capital account (lending) figures, the amount and direction
of unilateral payments (donations), and the balancing
account figure— errors and omissions.
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deal less than that of 1 9 5 5 . Also, the national product
increased by approximately 814 millions of bolivares.
The estimated rise of private and public investment
expenditures revealed the exceptionally large participation
on the part of the government and national enterprises.
Nevertheless, private firms were found to be expanding at
a rapid pace too.4-1In the external sector, exports exceeded imports by
about 362.8 millions of bolivares.

This excess is greater

than that of any prior year with the exception of 1952.
Since both saving and investment increased during
the year, it is quite evident that money and credit at the
end of the year would have been larger than that given at
the end of the first four months.

No doubt the gold and

foreign exchange holdings of Venezuela rose by the year's
end.
Having completed the survey of the state of inter
national equilibrium, a few statements by way of conclusion
may be given.
The national product of Venezuela rose in every
year included In this study.

Investment (A) exceeded

40This figure includes money and credit through the
month of April only.
41
Refer to pages 196-197 for a discussion of the
expansion of investment on the part of private enterprises.
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saving (S) in four of the five years, while exports were
greater than imports during every year except one.
Lending, as a balancing factor, failed to equate
either the internal factors of saving and investment or
the external accounts of imports and exports.
Money and credit in circulation Increased some
2,029 millions of bolivares during the period under study.
Nevertheless, the rise of the national product was of a
greater magnitude, showing an increase of 5,726 millions
of bolivares.
The above statement serves to explain, in part,
why the average price level rose only 5*9 points through
out the period.
Total saving and investment rose generally during
the five years.

Saving faltered in two years, 1955 and

1955, while investment declined only in 1953.
The large investment excesses created during the
last two years may pose a future problem for monetary and
fiscal policy.

In addition, the inflow of funds (lending)

tended to create an even greater imbalance in the domestic
and external sectors in some of the years.

The normal

inflow of capital contributed somewhat to the rise in the
national product and partially to a larger supply of funds
in circulation.
The preceding analysis has revealed many of the

236
changes that have occurred within Venezuela during the
last five years.

Although many of the problems have been

mentioned, the following section is to deal primarily
with the means employed to cope with these problems via
monetary and fiscal policy and external policy.
II. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY
The Venezuelan economy which represents a typical
export economy is a good deal more complex than is perhaps
realized.

The reason for the apparent complexity from the

standpoint of short-term stability is found in the numerous
elements which play such an important role in determining
the direction in which the economy is moving at a given
time.
Incorporated within the private and public sectors
there is the influence exerted upon the economy by the
petroleum industry.

Furthermore, the influence of the

national entities must be given recognition.

It is also

realized that a country so dependent upon the external
sector must be able to deal immediately with changes
occasioned by the desires of other nations.

This is a

fundamental problem of all nations which depend to a large
extent upon the -world markets for a sizeable portion of
their trade and income.
The dependence upon one industry for a relatively
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large portion of the country1s total export trade and
national income further subjects that country to a more
serious problem than if there were several industries to
absorb external shocks.
by Venezuela.

This is a current problem faced

In addition, the single industry dominating

the external sector of Venezuela creates internal reper
cussions.

In other words, not only is the public sector

dependent upon the petroleum industry for a large part of
its income, but the private sector also feels the shock
caused by the variations in the oil industry’s production
and exportation.
The autonomous entities mentioned at an earlier
stage (see pages 188-18S) must co-operate with fiscal
policy measures in order to assure success of their imple
mentation.48

It is not an easy task to obtain the full

co-operation of these institutions, especially since they
have separate identities and are not subject to laws bind
ing them to measures Implemented by the National Treasury.
It is contended that fiscal, policy has been applied
to a far greater extent than has monetary policy to main
tain economic stability in Venezuela.

According to one

report, fiscal policy is heavily relied upon to provide

4% o r a description of these institutions see the
United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, Public
Finance Surveys: Venezuela (New York: United Nations
Publication, 1951), pp. 22-27.
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both short-term and long rim stability.4^

It should be of

some importance, therefore, to analyze the essential roles
played by monetary and fiscal policy in this more recent
period.
A.

Monetary Policy

The Central Bank of Venezuela enjoys most of the
powers attributed to such a bank.

In Venezuela the Bank

Is the sole issuer of money, acts as a depository for the
government, and possesses the ability to control, in certain
respects, the supply of money and credit in circulation.
There is, no doubt, a closer relation between the
national government and the banking system in Venezuela
than in the United States since the government of the
former nation owns one-half of the capital stock of the

Bank^
The Central Bank has the authority to adjust discount
and rediscount rates.

It may advise the Executive Depart

ment with respect to changes in reserve requirements of the
commercial banks.

However, open market operation is not

an important method of monetary control so far as the

A IZ

°Juan Sarda, "Monetary and Fiscal Policy and the
Balance of Payments In Venezuela," Inter-American Economic
Affairs. Autumn, 1951, pp. 62-63.
^ U n i t e d States Department of Commerce, Investment
in Venezuela, p. 84.

Central Bank is concerned.
The Bank cannot make direct loans to the national
government, and it cannot acquire securities or other
obligations of the latter body except those quoted in the
45
market.
In other words, the government rather than the
Central Bank utilizes these securities in order to influence
the market.
At the end of 1955 there were 27 commercial banks
in Venezuela.

Fifteen of these were located in Caracas

while the remaining twelve were scattered throughout the
country.46
The law requires commercial banks to keep a 15 per
cent reserve behind sight deposits and an 8 per cent
reserve behind time deposits.

In addition, one-third of

the required reserves must be on deposit with the Central
Bank.

Other Important limitations include the following:4?

(1) Total obligations not supported by special funds
or guarantees may not be larger than six times
the paid-in eapital and reserves.
(2) Holdings of foreign exchange and foreign securi
ties may not be greater than 10 per cent of the
paid-in capital and reserves.

46Venezuelan Embassy, Venezuela Up-to-date.
(November, 1952), p. 4.
A £?

Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 220.
4?A more comprehensive coverage of commercial bank
activities may be found in the United States Department
of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela, pp. 84-85.
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(5) Loans cannot extend beyond two years in duration
while advances and discounts are limited to one
year, and so on.
The dependence of a nation upon monetary policy
as exercised through the Central Bank requires a certain
amount of liquidity on the part of the Bank.

The legal

reserve of the Central Bank of Venezuela cannot be less
than 50 per cent of its demand obligations.4®

The figures

below indicate that the reserves averaged 92.6 per cent
of the current obligations for the five-year period.4 ®
Current
Legal reserve
obligations requirement—
50% of current
obligations
1952
1953
1954
1955
1 9 5 6 (May)

1,423.7
1,564.8
1,625.3
1,744.9
2,011,7

711.85
782.40
812.65
872.45
1,005.85

Actual
Actual reserve
reserve of as a % of
Central
current
Bank
obligations
1,326.7
1,462.7
1,453.7
1,606.9
1,892.6

93.2
93.5
89.492.1
94.8

One other interesting comparison may be made for
the sake of revealing the degree of liquidity of the Bank.
The following figures, in millions of bolivares, show the
ratio of gold to notes in circulation:80

48Ibid.. p. 84.
4®See the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955,
Part IV, Statistical Charts, Chart A-II, and the B u l l e t i n .
May, 1956, p. 2. This information is also presented in
the Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Venezuela,
Appendix E, p.
5®Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria.
1955, Part IV, Statistical Charts, Charts A-I and A-II,
and the Bulletin. May, 1956, pp. 1-2.
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1952
1953
1954
1955
1956(May)

Notes in
circulation

Gold
reserve

Gold as a %
of notes in
circulation

1,000.3
1,041.1
1,121.3
1,154.1
1,063.9

1,140.8
1,140.8
1,233.0
1,233.6
1,233.5

114.1
109.6
110.0
106.9
115.9

The total gold reserve has not fallen below 106.9
per cent of the total note circulation for the period
covered by this survey.

The above calculations emphasize

not only the extreme liquidity of the Central Bank but
also a good deal of conservatism on the part of the
officials.

The point is, however, that the Bank has main

tained a high degree of liquidity with the aid of which
it should have been able to direct a flexible monetary
policy in such a way as to help provide for stability
within the economy.
The reliance placed upon the Central Bank in the
interest of stability in the domestic economy created by
changes in the external sector may be expressed in terms
of the variations of gold and foreign exchange as compared
to changes in the money supply and credit extended by
banks.

The following figures (in millions of bolivares)

show that during the first two years (1952-1953) gold and
foreign exchange holdings rose some 328,5 millions of
bolivares.^

On the other hand, money in circulation and

Cl
xSee Money and Credit of Venezuela, Appendix A,
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bank credit increased to a maximum figure of 919.5
millions of bolivares.

This latter figure is well over

double the amount of the external earnings.
Change in gold and
Change of money Change in
foreign exchange hold- in circulation commercial
ings— Central Bank
bank credit
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

201.8
126.7
5.9
158.9
281.9(April)

4
4
—

4
4

263.4
166.5
103.9
241.3
2.B(April)

4 189.2
4 300.4

+ 368.1
4 300.4
4 85.0(April)

In 1954 gold and foreign exchange declined by about
5.9 millions of bolivares.

Yet, money and credit rose by

nearly the same yearly amount, that is, 472.0 millions of
bolivares.
Once again, in 1955, external earnings increased
approximately 158.9 millions of bolivares.

The internal

expansion, however, amounted to more than three times the
rise of gold and foreign exchange earnings.
The incomplete data for 1956 indicate that the
281.9 millions of bolivares rise of gold and foreign
exchange was accompanied by a relatively small increase
of money and credit in circulation amounting to about
87.2 millions of bolivares.
Although the above comparisons must take into con
sideration other pertinent factors such as the change in

p. 279; and the Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of
Venezuela, Appendix E, p. 285.

4
4
4
4
4
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national income, variations in the price level, and so on,
the internal shocks caused by yearly vicissitudes in the
external sector were not smoothed out by action of the
Central Bank.
To substantiate the case, the rise of gold and
foreign exchange in the years 1952 and 1953 should have
been offset through a reduction of money and credit in
circulation.

One would further expect that the decline

of gold and foreign exchange accumulations in 1954 would
be counteracted by a small rise of money and credit in
circulation.

Nevertheless, money and credit rose by a

larger amount than that in either of the two prior years.
In .addition, the increases of gold and foreign exchange
holdings during 1955 and 1956 were accompanied not by a
decline of money and credit in circulation, as one would
think, but with a rise of the latter amounting to nearly
one and one-half times the total gold and foreign exchange
inflow.
The inflexibility with respect to the application
of monetary controls is quite evident as one reviews the
period.

The information at hand does not indicate a change

in reserve requirements over the five-year period,

fhe

rate applicable to discounts and advances was 2 per cent.52

52Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin. April, 1957, p. 489.

i
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This rate has been in effect since 1947.

However, one

type of control exercised by the Bank revealed some flexi
bility.

The Central Bank granted loans to autonomous

entities upon the presentation of collateral.

The rates

on these loans moved from 6.4 per cent in 1951 to 7 per
cent in 1955.53
There are perhaps many reasons which help to explain
the relatively inflexible nature of monetary policy as a
short-term expedient contributing to economic stability.
Some of the reasons are offered at this point.

Apparently,

the officials of the Bank were not free to alter the vari
ous controls at their disposal.

Instead, they had to

recommend to the Executive their desire to make changes.
The ultimate decision was, however, in the hands of the
Executive.
Again, since inflation had not been a pressing
problem in Venezuela, the authorities may have felt that
there was little reason to create a contractionist tendency.
Furthermore, any suppressive action might have slowed down
economic development.

In terms of objectives, the latter

held a key position.
No doubt it was felt that fiscal policy may be so
implemented that it could provide for both economic

Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 229.
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development and relative stability at the same time.
Before discussing some of the more important
aspects of fiscal policy, a few comments should be made
with respect to prices.

As stated before, the price level

of Venezuela, unlike those of many other countries, has not
risen sharply.

This is not to say, however, that prices

were not high in the major cities.

They were.

The high

price level was influenced primarily by the export
(petroleum) industry on the one hand, and the relatively
high prices paid for imports from the United States, and
the internal shortage of many commodities on the other
hand.
Wages and salaries of workers who were employed by
the oil companies compared favorably with those of workers
almost anywhere else in the world.

*54

Wage increases have

>

been quite extensive in recent years.

The last wage boost

attained in October, 1956, amounted to 10 per cent and
55
affected approximately 51,000 oil workers.
The price of most commodities tended to keep abreast
of the rising wage trend.

54

A few examples of retail food

The average direct wage for oil workers is about
seven dollars per day. Fringe benefits bring the average
total to nearly fifteen dollars per day. Refer to
Venezuelan Embassy, Venezuela Up-to-date. (November, 1956),
p. 16.
55Ibid.. p. 17.
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prices, although not current, will be sufficient:56
Meat
Tenderloin
Pork chops

pound
TI

Price
$1.30
1.20

Fruits and vegetables
Apples, imported
Tomatoes, fresh
Carrots, fresh

each
pound
11

.15
.40
.35

Dairy products
Butter, local
Eggs, fresh
Eggs, imported
Milk, pasteurized

pound
dozen
11
quart

1.20
1.05
.90
.30

Groceries
Bread
Flour
Sugar

pound loaf
pound
rt

.30
.20
.15

Canned goods
String beans, peas, carrots
Peaches, apricots, pears

Wo. 2 can
Wo. 2-2- can

.75
.90

Price indices were based largely upon prices in
Caracas, the capital, but sometimes included a few of the
other large cities.

Prices of most commodities, where

available, were no doubt much lower as one proceeded into
the interior of the country.

In some sections barter was

employed as a means of exchange.
One other aspect to consider in this section is that
of savings of the general public.57

Savings deposits in

56United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Foreign Commerce, Business Information Service: World Trade
Series (Washington: United States Printing Office)' ", June,
1954, p. 8.
57

There are no savings banks in Venezuela.

Commercial
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commercial banks have been steadily rising, as the followCO

ing figures show. °
Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956(April)

Saving deposits
(in millions of bolivares)
253.7
321.0
419.0
584.4
635.2

Though the amounts are quite small, the increase of
commercial bank savings deposits amounted to 170.9 per
cent during the five-year period.

Smaller amounts of sav

ings were deposited with other institutions such as the
Agriculture and Livestock Bank and the WorkerTs Bank.
The rise of savings deposits is encouraging.

How

ever, the figures above indicate that a relatively small
portion of the population had

fundsavailable

Savings through thepurchase

of

has been growing in recent years too.

for saving.

stocks and bonds
The securities

exchange of Caracas began operations in 1947.

The follow

ing figures reveal the growing trend of securities trans
actions.5®

and other kinds of banks provide saving facilities.
See
the United States Department of Commerce, Investment in
Venezuela, p . 86.
5(3

°Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955, Part IV,
Statistical Charts, Chart B-IX, and the Bulletin. May,
1956, p. 3.
5®The figures for 1952 were taken from the United
States Department of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela,
p. 87, and the figures for 1955 were obtained from the
Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 238.
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Month

Sept., 1952
Sept., 1955

Total
transactions
(in thousands
of holivares)
9.2
15.8

Bonds

6.6
10.2

Stocks

2.6
5.6

Security listings included those of the government,
government guaranteed bonds, and securities of numerous
enterprises.

A comparison of stock and bond transactions

is of particular importance.

Bonds were traded to a far

greater extent than were stocks.

This relation suggests

that government and government guaranteed obligations pre
dominated on the market.

Also, the smaller stock-trading

showed that private firms were not being financed to the
same extent as were the government and quasi-public enter
prises.

nonetheless, this outlet for savings was becoming

more important as time passed.

Its continued growth is

essential for the expansion of privately owned firms.
B.

Fiscal Policy

The two apparent objectives of fiscal policy are to
encourage economic development and to maintain stability
within the economy of the country.

Since the utilization

of monetary measures have not been very effective in recent
years, an inquiry into the application of fiscal measures
employed to carry out the aforementioned objectives will
be undertaken.

249
The taxation policy appears to have been applied
for the purpose of producing mixed results.

The tax law

which applied to individuals and most firms was incorporated
within a section called the Supplementary Tax.

The tax

rate applied varied from 1.5 per cent on taxable income up
to 10,000 bolivares (approximately $3,000) and ascended to
26 per cent on amounts earned in excess of 28,000,000
bolivares (about $8,500,000).®^
The progressive nature of the income tax indicated
the desire to extract only small sums from the large group
of low income earners.

The higher rates in the larger

income groupings were for the purpose of diverting large
sums previously invested in land holdings.
The normal tax contained in the Venezuelan tax
structure applied to income obtained from exploiting hydrocarbons, refining, transportation, and so on.

This levy

was a major one and pertained to the petroleum industry.
The rate was a flat 2.5 per cent assessment on the net
income derived from operations.
This tax seemed to be imposed for the purpose of
maintaining a formidable contribution to the national
budget.

It also suggested an expected penalty imposed

upon foreign owned firms.

60
Venezuelan Embassy, Venezuela Up-to-date. (July—
August), 1956, p. 12.
61Ibid.. p. 11.
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A third major form of taxation was also associated
with the oil industry.
Tax.

It was referred to as the Additional

The idea behind its implementation was that of making

sure that the government shared on an equal basis with the
petroleum firms whenever there existed a taxable excess of
the enterprises’ profits after the normal tax had been
deducted.®2
Customs duties were levied primarily for protection,
although the yield was quite high.

Of the five groups of

receipts contributing to the income of the national govern
ment, customs duties ranked third.63

Rates were low on the

importation of machines, equipment, and some foodstuffs
while the charges were extremely high on import competing
products.
Other forms of taxation included the Inheritance
tax and commodity taxes imposed upon cigarettes, liquors,
matches, and other such commodities.
The ability of the government to make large expendi
tures and yet create a balanced budget depends to a great
extent upon the revenue obtained from the petroleum industry.
The figures which follow (in millions of bolivares) empha
size the importance of the oil industry in. providing revenue

62Ibid.. p. 13
g*Z

See the Receipts and Expenditures of the National
Government of Venezuela, Appendix B, p. 280.
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for the Treasury. 64
Item
Surface tax and royalties
Income tax
Customs duties
Others
Total

1955
826.4
593.7
65.7
112.0
1,597.8

1954
904.5
507.1
60.6
25.7
1,497.9

1955
1,034.4
585.1
65.3
29.3
1,714.1

The total of the itemized taxes compared to total
fiscal income of the government yields the following
results:
Year

Total government receipts

1953
1954
1955

2,533.5
2,631.9
2,994.9

Revenue derived
from petroleum
industry
1,597.8
1,497.9
1,714.1

Revenue of
petroleum industry
as % of total
government receipts
63.1
56.9
57.2

These figures clearly reveal the dependence of the
Treasury upon a single export industry.

It is no wonder

that economic development was a major objective of the
authorities.

Even though the oil industry carried on most

of its trade with the United States, a recession or
depression, or even a change in the tariff in the latter
country could have created a serious depression in Venezuela,
A three-year period is almost too short a time
period to make fully satisfactory comparisons; however, it
may be possible to explain changes in the national budget
which were caused by variations of oil revenues.

The

budget balancing figures were taken from Appendix B, page

^Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. p. 206
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280, and are expressed in millions of bolivares.
Year
1953
1954
1955
1956

Revenue derived from
the petroleum industry
1,597.8
1,497.9
1,417.1
----

Budget receiptexpenditure balance
(4 surplus)
128.6 4
39.1 +
153.6 f
10.0 -

There is a direct correlation between the changes in
petroleum revenue and those of the receipt-expenditure
balance.

Of course, there are many items composing the

expenditures of the government, and their variations have
helped to bring about changes of the balancing figures;
nevertheless, it seems reasonable to state that changes in
petroleum revenues were one of the dominant causes of the
variations in the surplus of the national government
accounts.
The decline of petroleum revenue in 1954 amounting
to 99.9 millions of bolivares was accompanied by a receipt
over expenditure balance which was 89.5 millions of boli
vares less than in 1953.

Again in 1955, petroleum revenues

fell by 80.8 millions of bolivares.

The budget receipt

balance rose that year, however, by 114.5 millions of boli
vares.

Yet, at the end of 1956 budget figures reveal an

expenditure balance of 10.0 millions of bolivares.

It

appears reasonable, therefore, that the declining oil
revenues influenced the downward trend of the budget
balances.

£53
The changes in oil revenues and total expenditures
tended to relate the indirect importance of the petroleum
Industry to economic development.

Reduced exports of

petroleum would create the necessity of finding a new
financial source for a portion of the economic development
program.

The ever-present threat of such necessity may

he, in part, the reason why the tax structure of Venezuela
has been more varied than that of many other under
developed nations.
Government deposits in the Gentral Rank were
employed for the purpose of counteracting the increase in
currency and credit in circulation.

The deposits con

sisted of revenues derived from the petroleum industry,
along with other sources mentioned above.

The government

created a special deposit reserve which consisted of a
portion of its total deposit set aside in the Bank.

The

special deposit reserve tended to monetize a part of the
total deposit.

As money and credit in circulation changed,

the government varied the size of its special reserve fund.
The figures for the various years are presented along with
the variations of currency in circulation.66

All the

figures are expressed in millions of bolivares.

65

See the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955,
p. 300, and the Bulletin. May> 1956, p. 2.
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Year

Change of currency
in circulation

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956(April)

77*9
25.4
60.0
51.5
76.5

+
+
+
+
-

Government special
reserve deposits
in Central Bank
----19.5
108.5
108.3

The emission of hills and coins have been quite
moderate; yet, the rise has been constant during the last
five years.

Although special reserve deposit figures were

unobtainable for the years 1952 and 1953, the intent of
the government is quite clear.

The figure of 19.5 millions

of bolivares in 1954 represented one-half of the Treasury
surplus.

This meant that the government monetized, in

effect, that portion of the surplus to counteract the
emission of bills and coins.
The special reserve deposit balance at the end of
1955 was 108.5 millions of bolivares.

This increase was

considerably in excess of the rise of currency in circu
lation.

Furthermore, the decline of bills and coins in

circulation as of April, 1956, was not occasioned by a
reduction of the special reserve fund.

The latter rose

slightly.
The increase of the special reserve deposit in the
last two years (1955-1956) may be explained in terms of
the rise of credit rather than changes of currency in
circulation.
It appears, therefore, that variations of government
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deposit reserves are part of a program to provide for
stability on the one hand and to allow for economic develop
ment with moderate amounts of money and credit on the other.
This particular device could not, by itself, achieve much
success should the petroleum industry earnings decline
abruptly.
Furthermore, a large expansion of expenditures in
one or more areas would tend to drain away both the official
and special reserve deposits.
present time.

This may be occurring at the

It was found that government investment

expenditures principally for development rose sharply in
1955 and 1956 (see Table II, page 198).

Because actual

expenditures may not be encountered for a short period of
time, government deposits and the budget surpluses con
tinued to rise.

Yet, the large deposit balance in the

Central Bank at the end of 1956 may start to decline in
the following year.

This movement seems to prevail in the

case of the special reserve fund which declined from 108.8
millions of bolivares in April, 1956 to 72.6 millions of
bolivares at the end of May of the same year.

In

addition, the surplus balance in the national accounts of
the prior years turned into a deficit balance at the end
of 1956.

86

The point is that Increased government spending

Refer to the Central Bank of Venezuela, Bulletin.
May, 1956, p. 2.

256
will prevent deposits and reserves in the Central Bank
from acting as a buffer against changes of money and credit
in circulation.
The autonomous entities are of special importance in
helping to achieve the developmental goals of the nation.®?
Nevertheless, they could pose a serious threat to economic
stability.
During the period of this study, the national
product has been constantly rising.

Expansion in all

sectors, though uneven, has been upward.

Therefore, there

is little opportunity to test the probable course of action
which would have been taken by these entities if economic
conditions presented violent fluctuations.

Nevertheless,

some important comments may be made concerning the autono
mous entities.1
It would probably have been impossible for the
national government to stimulate economic development toward
its present stage unless a deficit had accrued in one or
more of the years considered in this survey.

f?7
Autonomous entities are government owned enter
prises. Their legal existence allows them to possess
property and to finance themselves by selling securities
In their own name. In addition, the Treasury has no control
over their income and expenditures. Some examples of autono
mous entitles include the Venezuelan Development Corporation,
the Agricultural and Livestock Bank, the State Railways
Administration, the National Sanitation Institute, and the
Venezuelan Navigational Company. Refer to the United States
Department of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela. 1955, p. 82.
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The autonomous enterprises engaged, however, in
development projects which tended to reduce the need for
national government expenditures in this area except for
guarantee obligations.

These obligations accounted for

the indirect debt of the government.

The following figures

indicate the rising trend of financing undertaken by the
autonomous entities.®®

The government guaranteed debt

consisting of mortgages and bonds increased in 1955 from
between 2 to 5 times the 1952 level.
Year
1952(June)
1954
1955

Government guaranteed obligations
(in millions of bolivares)
157.1
461.1
671.5

Hundreds of investors and perhaps thousands of
workers are directly connected with the numerous enter
prises.

Should a sizeable depression occur, workers wrould

probably suffer unemployment.

The government could proba

bly pay off its guarantee responsibilities if it were
forced to, but if the issues of these obligations continue
to rise at the present rate a later depression may cause
deficit financing on a broad scale.

Furthermore, should

inflation develop, the cost of

selling securities involved

in this financingwould rise.

In such event, the govern

ment would probably be left holding the inflated securities.

68

Refer to the United States Department of Commerce,
Investment in Venezuela. 1955, p. 85, and the Central Bank
of Venezuela, Memoria. 1955, p. 211.

258
The numerous and varied development projects
carried on directly through the autonomous entities would
seem to interfere, to some extent, with private enter
prises.

It is difficult to appraise the extent of this

interference accurately.

However, it would be interest

ing to see if a private firm could successfully carry on
the activities of one of the autonomous enterprises.

The

Development Corporation of Venezuela has been boldly offer
ing its holdings to private firms.

A fairly recent

announcement states that 11. . . i t will sell all holdings,
cos.

Cc o m p a n i e s ^ ,

farms owned by it if they can be

better developed by private capital or do not satisfy the
needs of economic development.

. . .

Since these autonomous entities are not accountable
to the Treasury or other ministry for their receipts and
expenditures, it would probably be difficult to make com
parisons between the operations of such enterprises and
those of privately owned firms.
The basic criteria for judging the benefit received
from autonomous enterprises is based upon long-term develop
ment and the utilization of economic resources.

At this

early stage of development almost any type of activity
would be beneficial to the nation.

However, as time

Ui7Council for Inter-American Cooperation, Inc.,
Noticias, November 15, 1955, p. 4.
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elapses, cost differences will make their importance
known.
Development through private firms constantly changes
as cost and price varies.

In this respect, private firms

would tend automatically to develop the nation based upon
comparative costs and prices.

The later consequences of

making accurate decisions now must depend upon the action
of those who are responsible for setting the policy of the
autonomous entities.
A balanced budget is essential not only for foster
ing economic development but as a stimulant to private
sector expansion.

Venezuelans budget surpluses in the

first four years of the five-year period, abundant credit,
and a high but relatively stable price level, have all
aided in creating an atmosphere conducive to economic
expansion.

There is little wonder as to why private sector

investment expenditures— national enterprises included—
have approximately doubled (see page 199) during the period
covered in this study.

Furthermore, bank savings and

security purchases on the part of the public were expanding
at a favorable rate.
In summarizing this section on monetary and fiscal
policy one must keep in mind the fact that the economy was
In a state of progression throughout the period.

This

setting has not been very conducive to an analysis which
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is intended to suggest the immediate steps necessary for
remedying certain unfavorable influences such as a
depression.
Although most of the usual controls employed by the
banking system existed within the structure of the Venezuelan
banking system, there has been much apathy with respect to
their utilization.

The absence of a powerful tool, open

market operations, appears to have reduced the effective
ness of monetary policy.

In addition, reserve requirements

and loan and discount rates were held rigid throughout the
period.

Even though currency in circulation rose moder

ately, credit expanded about 18 per cent during the last
two years of the period.
The requirement that the Central Bank officials must
seek the approval of the Executive before they are able to
implement policy changes seemed to reduce the effectiveness
of monetary policy.
The liquidity of the Central Bank is unquestioned;
therefore, it has been in a position to deal with short
term shocks created either at home or abroad.

Neverthe

less, the reliance upon stability and economic development
appeared to be a manifestation of fiscal policy.
Various taxes were Imposed in Venezuela during this
period, but the revenue secured from the petroleum firms
was the most important source of tax income.
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The new tax law which went into effect in 1956
altered only slightly the existent rates; nevertheless, it
did produce a simplification of the tax structure.
The income derived from the petroleum industry has
helped to make possible budget surpluses.

A comparison of

the changes of petroleum revenues and variations of the
national budget balances showed the extent of the reper
cussions in the public sector attributed to the single
export industry.
Government deposits and special reserve funds in
the Central Bank were used as stabilizing factors.

As

currency in circulation and credit rose the government
monetized funds by increasing its official deposits and
special reserve funds, particularly the latter.
The possibility of inflation which was evident in
the last two years of the survey was not offset through
increased deposit reserves in 1956.

Instead, the govern

ment increased its investment expenditures and thereby con
tributed to the expansion.

The decline of the special

deposit fund and the budget deficit were evidence of the
above fact.
The autonomous entities played a crucial role in
economic development.

Their existence, however, could

cause a special problem for fiscal policy.

Government

guaranteed obligations of these enterprises were expanding
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rapidly.

If the trend continues and a depression or

serious inflation sets in, the government may he required
either to make good its guarantee or absorb these securi
ties .
The autonomous enterprises rather than private enter
prises seemed to direct economic development.

This

responsibility is a grave one since the manner in which
they encourage or discourage the various industries will
determine whether or not the nation will make the best use
of its resources.
Private industry was assigned an Important part in
the development of the nation.

The surpluses accumulated'

in the national budget produced a stimulative effect upon
privately owned firms.

This effect was quite pronounced

as private investment expenditures increased over the
five-year period.
C.

External Policy

In Chapter I of this paper it states that there is
only one income level at each exchange rate that would
assure international equilibrium, given the rate of lending
and the influence of monetary and fiscal factors.

70

This

statement suggests that the market forces would bring about

70

Refer to Chapter I, p. 24 .
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the desired exchange through the operation of a freely
fluctuating exchange rate system.
It also explains in Chapter I that some of the
authorities who support the modern theory of international
trade accept the proposition that it is justifiable for a
nation to apply controls in the export sector in order to
carry out Internal adjustments of a short run n a t u r e . ^
The exchange rate system of Venezuela did not appear
to support either of the two concepts presented above.

The

multiple exchange rate system operated by that country
differed from a freely fluctuating system.

Yet, the

exchange control authorities did not rigidly control the
application of exchange to the external sector.

The

following explanation of the exchange rate system will make
this distinction more clear.
For the purpose of technical classification,
Venezuela employed a multiple exchange rate system.
Practically speaking, the exchange rates were not employed
for the purpose of controlling the balance of payments.
The official exchange rate was established at 3.35
72
bolivares to one United States dollar.
This rate

ibid., pp. 32-33, and footnote 24.
72

The technical material explaining the exchange
rate system was taken from the following sources: United
States Department of Commerce, Investment in Venezuela.
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prevailed throughout the five-year period.

All exports

were consummated, however, at a rate of 3.35 bolivares per
United States dollar except those of petroleum, coffee,
and cocoa.
Petroleum exporters converted their foreign exchange
earnings into bolivares at a rate of 3.09 bolivares per
dollar.

This rate was effective in amounts up to a limit

which was equal to the Central Bank’s sales of foreign
exchange during any one year.

A lower rate of 3.046 boli

vares per dollar was received by the oil companies for
conversions of foreign exchange into bolivares which were
in excess of the Central Bank’s sales of foreign exchange
during the year.
The exchange rate for coffee and cocoa exports was
3.33 bolivares per dollar with the provision that, should
world prices decline by a certain amount, the coffee rate
would rise to 4.80 bolivares to the dollar.
The exchange rate for cocoa was also pegged.

If the

world price fell below the fixed rate, cocoa exporters
would receive 4.25 bolivares for every dollar surrendered
to the Bank.

On the other hand, if the world price rose

above the fixed rate, cocoa exporters would receive 3.33

pp. 90-91 and 97-98; International Monetary Fund, Seventh
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions. 1956, pp. 339-341;
and the Venezuelan Embassy. Venezuela Up-to-date. (May,
1957), p. 11.
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bolivares per dollar.
The premium rate for coffee ranged from 112.00 per
bag for inferior, unwashed coffee to $18,00 per bag for
fine grade, washed coffee.

In a similar manner, the

premium rate was applied to cocoa exports if world prices
fell below $29.00 per bag.
The exchange rate system also allowed for a partial
premium payment should world prices for coffee range from
$18,00 to $50.50.

At prices above the latter figure no

premium was allowed.

In the case of cocoa, a partial

premium was allowed if world prices for this commodity
varied between $29.00 and $59.00.
no premium was given.

At higher world prices

The cocoa exporters received the

premium rate only during 1952 and 1955 while coffee
exporters did not receive any premium between 1952 and
1956.
An export tax was applied to both coffee and cocoa
whenever the world price rose above the fixed rates.

This

tax revenue along with a portion of the export tax levied
on petroleum was used to subsidize coffee and cocoa growers.
On the selling side of the market, the Central Bank
made foreign exchange available to importers and others
who had payments to make at the official rate of 5.35
bolivares to the dollar.

The only exception to this rate

was allowed in the case of purchases of foreign exchange
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by the government from the Bank.

The rate for government

purchases was 3.09 bolivares per dollar.
All purchases and sales of foreign exchange were
carried on without restriction except that the petroleum
companies were required to surrender their foreign exchange
to the Central Bank.
Purchases and sales of foreign exchange between
the Central and commercial banks were at a rate of 3.335
bolivares per dollar.

The commercial banks (free market)

purchased exchange from the public at 3.33 bolivares to
the dollar and sold exchange to individuals at 3.35 boli
vares per dollar.
This multiple exchange rate system of Venezuela
produced various results.

Most foreign exchange trans

actions were accomplished without restriction.

In addition,

the general buying and selling rates were extremely narrow
(3.33 to 3.35 bolivares to the dollar).

These features

are characteristic of a freely fluctuating exchange rate
system in which there are no restrictions and the buying
and selling rates are nearly identical.
On the other hand, the exchange rate system
resembles an exchange control system with different rates
and compulsive sales of the bulk of foreign exchange enter
ing the country.
the oil companies.

However, this situation applied only to
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The pegging of exchange rates in terms of world
prices Is a practice which one may expect to find within a
strict exchange control system for the purpose of stimu
lating certain industries.

In Venezuela that practice

was limited to only two products.

Furthermore, the high

world prices in recent years resulted in little use of
the pegging process.
The application of some fiscal policy measures was
evident in the operation of the multiple exchange rate
system.

Export taxes were applied in order to subsidize

certain favored commodities for export (coffee and cocoa).
Also, the government (through the Central Bank) realized
additional revenues from the difference between the price
of its purchases of foreign exchange from the petroleum
firms (3.09 and 3.046 bolivares per dollar)

and its sales

of foreign exchange to the commercial banks

and others

(3.335 and 3.35).
From a monetary standpoint, the Central Bank was
assured a constant source of supply of foreign exchange,
since the petroleum firms were forced to sell their
exchange to this one institution in order to satisfy
their local currency needs.

Consequently, the Bank not

only acquired foreign exchange,

but it obtained

its hold

ings at a low rate of exchange.
The official and free rates of exchange were
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maintained throughout the five-year period of this study.
It does not appear that Venezuela’s multiple exchange rate
system was employed for the purpose of controlling the
external sector.

As was mentioned earlier in this study,

the country has no balance of payments problem as such.
Of course, there would be a serious problem if the
petroleum industry were to lose its dominant position.
However, the exchange rate system seemed to be used for
the purpose of aiding internal stability.
The question may be posed: how important was the
external sector to the development of the nation over the
ensuing five-year period?

A partial answer to this

question has already been given in various sections of
this chapter.

For example, it was found that the domestic

sector could not maintain the given levels of national
production and income without the contribution of the
external sector*

Furthermore, internal sector develop

ment depended primarily upon export income.

Finally, it

was shown that the financial stability of the country was
contingent upon the activities in the external sector.
A few more points bearing upon an answer to the
question stated above may be added to those already given.
The relatively favorable international standing of Venezuela
made it possible for the country to receive outside capital.
More important still, the nation could perhaps make use of
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additional foreign investments in order to develop the
country more rapidly.
The following figures specifically indicate, in
millions of bolivares, the relative size of export income
in relation to the national product.

The export income

constituted a formidable contribution to the national
7 ,z

product.'

The overwhelming portion of export income

consisted of exports of the petroleum industry.
Year

National
product

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

13,370
14,127
15,507
16,282
1 rt n c ta
17,096

Export
income
4,865
\j (<,
5,072
5,604
5,604
6,374
6,374
rt
1 qo
7,192

Export income
as % of
national product
36.4
35.9
36.1
39.1
42.1

The above calculations help to explain why the year
1955 was less prosperous then the remaining four years.
It may be recalled that the national product rose by its
smallest amount in 1953 (757 millions of bolivares).

This

was the only year included in the survey in which both
saving and investment declined.

The larger portion of the

smaller total saving was attributed to the private sector.
Even though public sector investment rose, the fall of
private sector investment was more pronounced.

Further

more, the petroleum industry was responsible for the

73

See the International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics. January, 1957.
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reduced investment expenditures.
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The figures clearly reveal that the rise of export
income in the year 1953, 207 millions of "bolivares, was
the smallest realized during the period.

In other words,

the failure of the petroleum companies to increase domestic
investment was influenced somewhat by the smaller expansion
of export earnings.

In addition, the smaller increase of

export income contributed to the smaller rise of the
national product at the end of the year.

This finding is

evident from the percentage figure (35.9), page 269, repre
senting the relationship between the increases of export
income and the national product of 1953 and those of the
other four years.
Imports are vital to the country from the stand
point of both consumption and capital expansion.

Accord

ing to figures taken from an official source, capital
goods imports averaged about 64 per cent of total commodity
imports.

The following figures indicate the percentage

division between consumption and capital goods imported
during the four-year period (1952-1955).75

74
Refer to Table II, page 198, and the discussion
which follows.

^ S e e the Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955,
p. 145.
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Year
1952
1953
1954
1955

Capital Imports as %
of total commodity
imports
64.1
64.5
65.1
64.9

Consumption goods as %
of total commodity
imports
35.5
35.1
33.7
34.5

The small remainder in each instance consisted of
imports by the Federal Government.

The figures reveal

small differences in relative imports between the two
groups of commodities.

However, the larger portion con

stituted vital capital goods which seemed to be in keep
ing with the major objective of economic development.
The final comments in this area will pertain to
the terms of trade of Venezuela,

This would seem proper

because the terras of trade relate to many influences,
internal and external, which are brought together and
connoted by a single expression.
Although*figures were unavailable for the last
year of this survey, 1956, some interesting comments may
be presented.

The base year employed was 1950, and the

changes in the figures refer to yearly variations
beginning with 1952.
Year

^ Imports

1952
1953
1954
1955

8.2
3.4
3.0
1.4

76Ibid.. p. 152.

44-

A Exports
3.7
5.5
4.2
8.2

+
+
4f

M-J-E
(-unf avor abl e)
-2.22
.62
.71
.17
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It was found that only one year, 1952, produced
an unfavorable terms of trade*

This meant that for each

unit of goods imported 2*22 units of exports were given
up in return.

On the other hand, the three following

years were characterized by either smaller price rises of
imports than those of exports, or actual price declines.
Export prices dominated by petroleum products con
tinued to move upward because of the rising demand for
these products and the interruption of production In other
areas of the world.

Selectivity in the case of imports

through the employment of a license system and the rising
national demand for Venezuelan goods, along with the grow
ing competition in world markets, all contributed to lower
prices paid for imports.
Although favorable terms of trade prevailed in the
last three of the four years included in this survey,
volume changes should be taken Into consideration as well.
The index figures based upon the year 1950 represent
yearly changes in millions of t o n s . ^
Year
1952
1955
1954
1955

Changes of quantum
index of imports
11.7 5.9 4
11.7 4
17.7 + '

Changes of quantum
index of exports
9.2 4
4.1 14.5 4
10.4 4

^ F i g u r e s were taken from the Central Bank of
Venezuela, Memoria, p. 133. The above figures were rebased
for 1950 in order to provide for comparisons of other
material on the same basis.
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By comparing the volume changes with those of price
changes shown on page 271, one finds a close parallel with
respect to the import price-— quantum data.

For example,

the price rise of imports in 1952 amounting to 8.2 points
was occasioned with a decline in commodities imported by
11*7 points.

Conversely, the fall of import prices in

1953 by 3.4 points brought a rise of imports of 5.9 points.
Yet, the price increase of imports for the year 1954
amounting to 3.0 points was accompanied by a 11.7 point
rise of goods flowing into the country.

But in 1955 the

small price decline of 1.4 points was more than matched
by a 17.7 point rise of imports.
Price and volume changes were quite sensitive and
tended to move in opposite directions.

This movement

infers that importers acted quickly whenever prices varied.
The licensing system, which is not extensively employed,
suggested, however, that the authorities were using keen
judgment with respect to keeping the current account of
the balance of payments in a favorable condition.
The only year in which the price and quantum indices
did not move in the opposite direction was 1954.

An expla

nation as to why both prices and volume rose would seem to
be related to the greater improvement of economic activity
after the slower expansion which characterized the previous
year.

The rapid increase of investment expenditures in
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1954 as shown in Table II, page 198, required a greater
amount of imports.

The result was that even though the

price index rose 3.0 points, imports flowed into the
country in larger volume.
The price and quantum indices of exports increased
together in each year concerned except 1953.

The continued

demand for petroleum and the rise of exports of iron ore
and coffee tended to explain this favorable condition.
The reduction in the quantum index amounted to 4,1
points in 1953.

This result could be expected since there

was a sharp reduction of petroleum investment expenditures
during the year.

This point was developed more fully on

pages 269 and 270 in connection with export income contri
butions to the national product.
SUMMARY
A state of international equilibrium was not achieved
in the case of Venezuela in any one of the five years under
consideration.

The analysis of the equilibrium condition,

ignoring, as far as possible, the influence of the external
sector, revealed that the national product (income) would
have declined throughout the period.

There was, however,

a possibility that the downward movement would have been
curtailed by the end of the five years under study.
there is evident need for greater diversification in

Although
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production, the survey indicated that a good deal of
expansion has already occurred.
The inclusion of the petroleum industry in the study
showed that a state of international equilibrium was not
maintained principally because of the constant rise in the
national product and the inability to produce an equality
between saving and investment on the one hand and imports
and exports on the other hand*
The major objectives seemed to have been those of
economic development and financial stability*

The oil

industry provided the greatest source of the direction
that was necessary in carrying out the objectives.
The exceptional stability of the period would seem
to be quite unusual in a nation which is underdeveloped.
Nevertheless, considering the period as a whole the
national product rose by a greater extent than did money
and credit in circulation.

The price level was prevented,

therefore, from encountering extreme vicissitudes.
The autonomous entities appeared to take the lead
in directing economic development.

Their close connection

with the Federal Government on the one hand and the need
for rapid expansion on the other hand, provided many new
completed projects within the last five years.
The Federal Government seemed to carry on its
objectives in the capacity of a moderator.

The force of
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moderation was created, primarily, through fiscal measures.
It allowed expansion to be pursued chiefly by the autono
mous entities via guaranteeing the latter*s securities.
However, the government provided extra stimulation when
ever it was felt desirable.

A case in point was the extra-

large expenditures in 1955.
In addition, the Federal Government maintained a
surplus in its national accounts during four of the five
years of the survey.

Private enterprises were stimulated

to a certain extent by this policy.

Other measures were

instigated for the purpose of stimulating the private
sector; such as, a low rate of taxatibn and abundant credit.
Fiscal policy was employed to a greater extent than
monetary policy.

Although the Central Bank appeared to

maintain a high state of liquidity and possessed most of
the instruments of control, the banking authorities used
their resources to only a minor degree.

Perhaps the

control of the Federal Government over the Central Bank
and the relative prosperity of the period explain the
minor role assigned to monetary policy.
Variations in the official deposits and particularly
the special deposit reserve funds appeared to be a major
instrument of fiscal policy.

Other important fiscal

measures were the Indirect debt created through loans to
autonomous entities and the utilization of petroleum
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revenues.
External policy was dominated by a multiple
exchange rate system.

Nevertheless, this system incorpo

rated features characteristic of a freely fluctuating
exchange rate system.

Most all foreign exchange trans

actions were accomplished without restriction, and the
buying and selling rates were nearly identical.
The exchange rate system resembled an exchange
control system with different exchange rates.

Yet, the

various rates were not applied for the purpose of con
trolling the external sector but to supplement internal
stability.

Quantitative devices were used to some extent

in order to encourage internal development.
The system contained other features of exchange
control.

The petroleum firms were required to sell their

foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank.

Although

those earnings represented a large portion of the total
foreign exchange entering the country, there were no other
restrictions with respect to purchases and sales of
foreign exchange.
The pegging of exchange rates for coffee and cocoa
are normally practiced within a strict exchange control
system.

Nevertheless, recent high world prices resulted

in little use of the pegging process.
External policy was closely related to fiscal policy.
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Export taxes were applied in order to subsidize certain
commodities for export.

Furthermore, the Central Bank

created additional revenue for the government through the
different buying and selling rates levied on foreign
exchange.
Venezuela, a nation which is representative of an
export economy, has realized unusual economic progress
in recent years.

The petroleum industry made its

influence felt in all sectors of activity.

The reliance

of the country upon this one industry places the whole
economy in a precarious situation.

This condition has

been realized, however, and domestic development is
expanding at a steady pace.
The long run outcome with respect to the degree
of prosperity to be enjoyed by this country will depend
quite largely upon the extent and direction in which it
develops the internal sector, and also, of course, upon
the general state of world prosperity.
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APPENDIX A
MONEY AND CREDIT OP VENEZUELA
Money In Circulation
(In millions of bolivares)
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956a

Total
1,613.4
1,876.8
2,043.3
2,147.2
2,388.5
2,390.7

Currency

% of
Total

Demand
Deposits

% of
Total

818.0
895.9
921.3
981.3
1,032.8
956.3

50.8
47.7
45.1
45.7
43.3
40.0

795.4
980.9
1,122.0
1,165.9
1,355.7
1,434.4

49.2
52.3
54.9
54.3
56.7
60.0

Sources
Central Bank of Venezuela, Memorla, 1955,
and the Bulletin, May, 1956.
aData available for the first quafter of 1956 only.
Central and Commercial Bank Credit
(In millions of bolivares)
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956a

Total

Central
Bank

% of
Total

945.3
1,117,8
1,427.3
1,867.4
2,098.7
2,197.1

67.5
50.8
59.9
131.9
62.8
76.2

7.1
4.5
4.2
7.1
3.0
3.4

Commercial
Banks
877.8
1,067.0
1,367.4
1,735.5
2,035.9
2,120.9

$ of
Total
92.9
95^5
95.8
92.9
97.0
96.6

Source:
Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955,
and the Bulletin, May, 1956.
aData available for the first quarter of 1956 only.

APPENDIX B

RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OP THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA
(In millions of bolivares)
Receipts
Direct taxes on
income and wealth
Royalties (mining
and petroleum)
Custbms- revenues
Indirect taxes on
consumption
Other receipts
Total receipts

1952

%

1953

1954

%

i

1955

%

%

1956

653.1

27.1

745.0

29.4

680.6

25.9

792.3

26.4

686.0

27.0

822.7
506.2

34*2
21.0

826.6
508.4

32.6
20.1

901.1
544.8

34.2 1,035.3
587.2
20.7

34. 6
19.6

846.4
393.1

33.3
15.5

252.7
172.8

10.5
7.2

264.5
189.0

10.4
7.5

292.3
213.1

11.1
8.1

313.6
266.5

10.5
8.9

416.0
198.5

16.4
7.8

2,407.5 100.0 2,533.5 100.0 2,631.9 100.0 2,994.9 100.0 2,540.0 100.0

Expenditures
(ministry)
366.2
22.8
209.0
208.1
118.3
797.7
137.1
150.4

15.4
1.0
8.8
8.7
5.0
33.5
5.8
6.3

366.8
24.9
234.8
230.6
126.5
744.0
144.0
157.1

15.2
1.0
9.8
9.6
5.3
30.9
6.0
6.5

368.7
32.9
284.8
239.3
112.6
806.9
156.8
167.2

14.2
1.3
11.0
9.2
4.3
31.1
6.0
6,4

386.1
23.4
344.8
253.3
147.4
876.3
158.9
172.3

13.6
.8
12.1
8.9
5.2
30.8
5.6
6.1

317.5
na
11
224.4
na
11
163.2
177.0

129.0
21.0
121.6
75.1

5.4
.9
5.1
3.1

123.5
22.1
133.7
76.5

5.1
.9
5.6
3.2

126.2
26.7
157.2
78.0

4.9
1.0
6.1
3.0

140.7
28.0
145.1
78.7

4.9
1.0
5.1
2.8

na
fr
ir
it

27.4

1.1

20.2

.8

34.6

1.3

85.9

3.0

ii

12.4

■

8.8
6.4
6.9
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Interior relations
Foreign relations
Treasury
National defense
Development
Public works
Education
Health and welfare
Agriculture and
livestock
Labor
Communications
Justice
Mining and
petroleum

APPENDIX B (continued)

Interest on debt
Other expenditure

1952
.8
-

Expenditures
(ministry)

1953

%
*

%

.4
-------

1954
.7
---

Total expenditures 2^384*3 100.02,404.9 100.0 2,592.8
Surplus
Deficit

23.2

128.6

39.1

%

1955

*
100.0

.4
---

%

1955

*

.5
1,667.4

2,841.3 100.0

%
•»
65.4

2,550.0 100.0

153.6
10.0

Source: Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955; United Nations, Statistical
Yearbook, 1956.
naInformation not available.
*Less than five-tenths of one per cent.
Components do not always add to totals because of rounding.

to
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APPENDIX C
INDEX OP WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
Year

General Index
(1938 base)

1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956(May)

164.7
173.7
176.4
170.9
175.4
176.5
173.3

Source:

(1950=100)

National Product
Index
(1938 base)
(1950=100)

100.0
105.5
107.1
103.8
106.5
107.2
105.2

163.3
172.4
172.6
169.5
172.7
171.0
176.2

100.0
105.6
105.7
103.8
106.8
104.7
107.9

Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955.

INDEX OP IMPORT AND EXPORT PRICES OP VENEZUELA
Import Index
(1948 base) (1950=100)

Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956(May)

77.3
87.3
93.6
91.0
93.3
92.2
na

Source:

100.0
112.9
121.1
117.7
120.7
119.3
na

Export Index
(1948 base) (1950=
74.4
82.4
85.2
89.3
92.4
98.Q
na

100.0
110.8
114.5
120.0
124.2
132.5
na

Central Bank of Venezuela, Memoria, 1955,

naInformation not available

APPENDIX D
BALANCE OP PAYMENTS OP VENEZUELA
(in millions of bolivares)
Account
irrent Account
Exports of oil, f.o.b.
Exports, f.o.b.
Imports, oil firms, f.o.b.
Imports, f.o.b.
Transportation and
insurance, oil firms (net)
Transportation and insurance (net)
Investment income (net)
Capital, oil firms
Other (net)

1952

Balance

1954

1955

1956&

4,636.1
228.8
- 600.3
-2,015,4

4,783.8
288.1
- 483.1
-2,374.8

5,237.7
365.8
- 410.0
-2,783.9

6 ,000.5
373.9
452.6
-2 ,919.9

6,780.6
411.3
- 497.9
-3,211.9

49.9
- 235.8
-1,374.2
237.9
- 213.4

31.5
- 281.4
-1,355.7
169.2
- 207.8

38.5
- 338.4
-1,522.3
71.7
- 217.4

47.6
351.8
-1 ,847.9
—
66.7
- 175.4

52.4
- 387.0
-2,032.7
73.3
- 192.9

439.9

290.1

14.9

166.1

362.8

279.7
267.7

305.8
305.5

265.3
290.4

159.5
170.9

16.4
4.4

11.0
10.7

Balance
ipital Account13
Long term
Private
Official
Export-Import Bank loans
Amortization
Purchase of long term
investment
Short term
Liabilities
Foreign assets (increase-)

1953

—

-

234.5
12.1
222.4
45.2

9.4

-

5.4

151.1
10.7
140.4

15.7
78.4
15.1
93.5

—
-

6.0
171.5
32,2
203.7

154.7

343.7

...

-

--— - -

-

12.0

APPENDIX D (continued)
Account
Unilateral Account
Private donations
Official donations
Balance

1952

1955

1954

1955

- 64.0
.5

- 68.7
.3

- 73.0
.7

- 76.4
.7

- 63.7

- 68.4

- 72.3

- 75.7

.7

,3

-101*2

-422.1

-376*7

Gold Account**
Monetary gold
Errors and Omissions13
Source:

-155.3°

--- 78.4

International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, January,

3.957.
aEstimated oil exports at 13 per cent, all other items at a rate of 10 per cent.
^Figures for 1956 were unavailable.
0Amount given is 30.2 millions of bolivares less than that presented by the
source material because the item ”0fficial and Bank Capital” does not total the correct
figure of the items presented.

to
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APPENDIX E
BALANCE SHEET OP THE CENTRAL BANK OF1 VENEZUELA
(in millions of bolivares)
Assets
Reserves
Gold at home
Gold abroad
Deposits
Less: foreign bank
obligations
Total

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956a

904.8
236.0
.9

904.8
236.1
202.6

904.8
236.1
329.4

905.6
327.4
231.3

906.1
327.4
389.7

906.1
327.4
671.6

31.7
110.0
1,

16.8
1,326.7

7.6
1,462.7

10.6
1,453.7

16.3
1, 606.9

12.5
1,892.6

61.6

45.7

62.3

Loans and discounts
Agriculture and
livestock
Commercial and
industrial
Total

16.8
67.5

50.8

59.9

70.3
131.9

17.2
62.9

10.9
76.2

Other assets
Unpaid capital

75.9
5.0

60.2
5.0

56.2
5.0

54.4
5.0

90.5
5.0

42.9

1, 258.4

1,442.7

1,583.8

1,645.0

1, 765.3

2,011.7

870.7

1,000.3

1,041.1

1,121.3

1,154.1

1,063.9

73.4
209.8
37.5
49.3

119.7
222.6
34.9
46.2

209.4
218.2
44.8
51.3

222.3
180.2
24.2
77.3

230.8
238.6
32.8
88.6

544.5
292.6
32.7
78.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

10.0

• • ••

Total assets

50.7

• • • •

Liabilities

Capital
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Notes in circulation
Deposits
National government
Banks
Other deposits
Other obligations^

APPENDIX E (continued)
1951
Reserves
General and special
funds
Total liabilities
and capital
Source:

1952

1955

7.7

9.0

9.0

1,258.4

1,442.7

1,583.8

Central Bank of

1954

9.7

1956

10.4

....

1,645.0 1,765.3

2,011.7

Venezuela, Memoria, 1955.

1956.

1955

Also the Bulletin, May.
--------

aIncludes first 5 months only.
^Includes deposits in foreign money, other foreign bank obligations, expired
letters of credit, dividend accumulations, and so on.
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APPENDIX F
GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS OF VENEZUELA
(in millions of bolivares)
Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956a

Total

% of
Total

1,371.0
1,513.7
1,508.9
1,653.6
2,497.4

100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0

Source:

Gold
1,180.0
1,179.7
1,271.8
1,271.8
1,390.3

% of
Total

Foreign
Exchange

% of
Total

86.1
77.9
84.3
76.9
55.7

191.0
334.0
237.1
381.8
1,107.1

13.9
22.1
15.7
23.1
44.3

Central Bank of 'Venezuela , Memoria, 1955.

aFigures taken from International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics, January, 1957, and
include holdings through September, 1956 only.

CHAPTER IV

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The two preceding chapters dealing with Mexico and
Venezuela revealed the varying effects upon income and
price levels caused, in part, by monetary, fiscal, and
exchange practices.

Specifically, the Mexican experience

suggested that the authorities In charge of these policies
failed to provide proper co-ordination between them so as
to achieve a higher national income at stable price levels.
The Venezuelan experience seemed to reveal a special prefer
ence toward fiscal, and to some extent, external policy
over that of monetary policy.'*'

Yet, both nations appeared

to have greater success In the application of these policies
at the close of the five-year period.
It should be recalled tiaat these two nations were
selected for study on the basis of their dissimilar economic
structure.

This means that although both countries repre

sent underdeveloped nations, Mexico is primarily a domestic
economy; that is, industry and agriculture account for a
major portion of the national product (income).

Further

more, its external trade is free from exchange restrictions.

^ v e n though the price level appeared to be quite
stable, it was maintained at a relative high level. In
addition, the tremendous influence of petroleum exports
created a special need for adequate fiscal and external
measures.
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On the other hand, Venezuela Is typical of an export
economy.

Export income provides a large portion of the

national income of the nation.

In addition, exchange

control is employed to some extent by the application of
multiple exchange rates.
Many of the Latin American countries may be classi
fied, in a broad sense, according to the above distinguish
ing factors characteristic of Mexico and Venezuela.
Table I, page 290, presents a small number of
selected Latin American nations which are separated into
two general groups on the basis of the contribution of
their export income to total income.

There is a good deal

of uncertainty as to the amount or rate of export income
which clearly reveals that a country is a domestic economy
or an export economy.

By employing an approximate 20 per

cent rate, this figure should be large enough to definitely
place a nation within Group II, or an export economy.
Thus, Country Group I of Table I Includes three Latin
American nations that are recognized as domestic economies
according to the above criteria.
During the last five years, or a lesser number of
years for those countries in which information was lacking,
the contribution of export income to the national product
was a good deal less than the 20 per cent rate arbitrarily
employed as a dividing-point rate.

On the other hand, the

TABLE I
EXPORT INCOME IN RELATION TO NATIONAL PRODUCT (INCOME) IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
>
(in millions of domestic units)
Country Group I
Argentina (pesos)
National product*
Export income
Export income as %
of national product
Brazil (cruzeiros)
National product*
Export income
Export income as %
of national product
Mexico (pesos)
National product
Export income
Export income as %
of national product
Country Group II
Chile (pesos)
National product*
Export income
Export income as %
of national product
Peru (soles)
National product
Export income
Export income as %
of national product
Venezuela (bolivares)
National product
Export income
Export income as %
of national product

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

82,811.
4,392.

93,965.
7,189.

104,839.
6,757.

na
11

na
ft

11

11

549,300.
54,521.

11
11

5.3
292,100.
26,056.

7.7
356,500.
32,047.

8.9
58,300.
5,363.

9.0
56,300.
5,095.
5;095.

9.2

190,480.
53,929.

9.0

226,600.
44,945.

28.3
20,970.
3,827.

19.8
22,650.
3,879.

18.2

17.1
14,127.
5,072.

13,370.
4,865.
36.4

35.9

6.4
439,900.
42,968.
9.8
66,478.
8^188.
8,188.

9.9
84,000.
io',128'.
10,128.

9.2

92,400.
~5'688.'
5,688.

12.3

498,630.
80,200.

na
11

t

11

11

11
11

i i

r i

t ?

25,080.
4,952.
19.7

16,282.
6,374.

36.1

39.1

(6 mos.)

6.2

na
11
r

16.1

15,507.
5,604.

1i

17,096.
7,192.
42.1

o
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. January,
1957; the Balance of Payments Yearbook. Vol. 7, 1957; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook
1956: and the Annual Reports of Central Banks of Mexico and Venezuela, 1955 and 1956.
*National income figures.

naInformation not available.
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export income of Country Group II nations represents
approximately 20 per cent, or more, of the national
product.
The division of the countries into two groups should
not be construed to mean that each of the three nations
within a grouping have nearly exact, or even closely
related, types of domestic development or similar external
policies.

For example, Brazil is perhaps less industrial

ized than is Mexico while Argentina has nearly attained a
position of balance between agriculture and industry.
Externally, Argentina and Brazil have been utiliz
ing exchange controls in order to protect their domestic
economies.

Yet, Mexico does not employ such restrictions.2

Furthermore, Argentina and Brazil are considered as non
dollar countries since the major portion of their trade
is directed toward Europe.

Mexico, on the other hand, is

recognized as a dollar nation because the bulk of its
trade is with the United States.^
A similar differentiation may be offered in con
nection with the three remaining countries in Country
Group II, namely: Chile, Peru, and Venezuela.

Peru and

C

Tariffs compensate, in part, for the lack of mone
tary control.
^Raymond Mikesell, Foreign Exchange In The Postwar
World (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1954), pp.
305-307.
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Chile are predominately agricultural countries which
export one, or a few, basic agricultural commodities.

How

ever, Venezuela has a proportionately larger industrial
development and exports large quantities of petroleum along
with iron-ore and coffee.

In addition, Chile has a severe

restrictive exchange control policy while Peru and Venezuela
utilize a more moderate form of exchange restrictions.
The above differences among the countries are pointed
out so as not to infer a kind of fixed relationship between
one another.

In other words, each individual nation con

tains characteristics which are peculiar to it, and no
other.
Since the six Latin American nations now have been
segregated into two general groups, three of which are con
sidered as domestic economies and the other three as export
economies, one may apply various measures to determine the
effectiveness of monetary, fiscal, and external policies
of the countries within the two groups.

Perhaps it may be

possible to draw some broad conclusions with respect to
their effectiveness.
I.

MEASURES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES

It is realized that the authorities in charge of
establishing policies which are conducive to a higher
standard of living in the underdeveloped countries have a
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tremendous task before them.

It is further contended that

in their desire to raise the plane of living they are apt
to lose sight of the over-all influence that their poli
cies exert, whether beneficial or harmful, to the function
ing of the economy.
Three types of measuring devices ane offered in
order to better visualize the general effects of internal
and external policies which, if taken into account, may
modify extreme downturns or sharp upsurges in income and
prices.

The three measuring devices are: (1) the relation

ship between gold and international reserves and the money
supply, (2) a comparison between the money supply, national
product, and price level, and (3) changes in current
account balances and long-term capital movements*
A.

The Relationship Between Gold and International
Reserves and the Money Supply
By analyzing comparative changes in gold and inter

national reserves and the supply of money and credit, one
may obtain a general impression of the influence of the
external sector upon the domestic economy.^

Of perhaps

^Mr. Brovedani explained that this measuring device
is used to control money and credit in Uruguay. Refer to
Bruno Brovedani, "Latin American Medium-Term Import
Stabilization Policies and the Adequacy of Reserves,"
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers. Washington,
D. C., Vol. IV, No. 2, February, 1955, pp. 272-273.
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greater importance to the nation of the direct comparative
relationship between the changes in gold and foreign
exchange holdings and the changes in money and credit is
the fact that should the variations in money and credit
fail to reflect comparable changes in international
reserves, there is good reason to believe that the authori
ties, have lost sight of the objective of attaining equi
librium.

Furthermore, it would suggest that monetary,

fiscal, and exchange policies are either not being employed,
or are being used with little success.
Table II, pages 295 and 296, shows the changes in
gold and international reserves compared to that of the
money supply and credit extended during the five-year
period.

Of special Interest is the fact that money and

credit rose in every country for the five-year period with
only one country revealing an exception to this trend.
Money and credit of Mexico declined during the first seven
months of 1956.

Although the percentage decline in 1956

was quite small in terms of the rise of money and credit
in the four prior years, it indicates that a real effort
is being displayed in order to stabilize economic con
ditions and to make effective use of monetary and fiscal
policies.
On the other hand, Table II indicates that inter
national reserves fluctuated a great deal during the

TABLE II

CHANGES IN MONEY, CREDIT, AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES*
(in millions of units)
Country**

1952

Yearly %
Change

1953

Yearly %
Change

1954

Yearly %
Change

1955

Yearly %
Change

1956

Change

Argentina^Money
5,606
6,810
Credit
Reserves 105

12.8
15.3
-42.2

11,942
10,552
267

24.2
20.6
185.4

10,972
11,958
9

17.9
19.4
- 2.2

14,069
16,602
219

19.5
22.5
-54.5

19,405
19,247
■
106

Brazil
Money
Credit
Reserves

13,500
25,200
18

14.9
20.2
- 3.0

20,000
26,400
77

19.2
17.6
13.0

27.400
45.400
■
130

22.1
25.8
-20.0

26,400
28,700
2

17.4
13.0
- .4

21,200
33,400
100

11.9(Aub)
13.3 *»
19.0 I’

Mexico
Money
Credit
Reserves

278
770
6

4.1
11.2
2.3

575
8.1
1,514
19.8
34 - 12.5
-

1,071
3,670
13
■

14.0
40.1
- 5.5

2,049
926
211

23.5
7.2
93.8

514
- 1,265
15

5.4(Adb)

Chile
Money
Credit
Reserves

8,720
9,015
20

35.8
27.2
27.8

16,190
12,540
2

48.9
29.7
2.2

25,870
17,270
■
32

52.5
31.6
-34.4

52,710
33,360
46

70.1
46.3
75.4

Peru
Money
Credit
Reserves

320
934
4

13.3
25.7
- 5.4

366
692
4

13.4
15.2
.4

193
367
5

6.2
7.0
.5

181
756
2

5.5
13.4
.1

163
132
1

Venezuela
Money
Credit
Reserves

264
173
61

16.4
18.3
15.6

166
309
45

8.8
27.6
10.0

104
240
1

5.1
16.8
.2

242
432
55

11.3
25.9
11.0

38
377
189

-

22.5
21.3

31,680 24.8(0ct)
24,080 22.9 ii
6 ■ 5.6 ii
4.7(Jun^
2.1
.0

.(

11
11

1 6 80*0
18.0
34.2

ii
ii
to

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bulletin, $
various issues, and the International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.

TABLE II (continued)
January, 1957,
*Money comprises the monetary liabilities of the Central Banks to
including official entities and development banks, Treasury coin outside
monetary deposits of the private sector— including official entities and
banks— with the commercial and savings banks. Credit includes claims on
private sector, and official entities.

the private sector,
banks, and
development
the government,

**Money and credit are expressed in domestic units, international reserves in
dollars.
^Refers to Central Bank only.
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five-year period.

Only Venezuela revealed a consistent

trend in its international reserve holdings.
throughout the period.

They rose

Yet, the international reserves

of Peru indicated a much smaller percentage change than
did the remaining four nations.

Overall, the changes in

international reserves were as follows: Mexico, rose in
three years and fell in two years; Argentina, rose in one
year and fell in four years; Brazil, rose in two years,
fell in two years, and remained constant in one year; and
Chile, rose in three years and fell in two years.
There seems to be little, if any, correlation
between the changes of money and credit and international
reserves among the nations within Groups I and II.

Never

theless, the figures do indicate that the larger percentage
increases in money and credit were found in Argentina and
Brazil in the Group I countries and Chile of Group II.
If a fourth nation were included, it would be Mexico.

The

result is that three out of the four nations which enlarged
their money supply most were Group I countries.
With respect to changes in international reserves,
there was a lack of consistency in the size of reserve
holdings.

For the five-year period, exchange reserves rose

(on a percentage basis) in five out of the six countries.
Only Peru showed a slight decline in its holdings.

The

largest increases in gold and foreign exchange reserves
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were those of Mexico, 81.5 per cent and Argentina, 28.6
per cent in Group I countries, and Venezuela, 71 per cent
and Chile, 65.4 per cent in Group II.
The international reserve accumulations are, how
ever, misleading.

For example, Argentina realized a rise

in gold and foreign exchange In only one of the five years.
Yet, the increase in the one year, 1953, was larger than
the total decline of exchange in the remaining four years.
In other words, the nation tended to lose reserves quite
consistently even though the gain in one year was large.
Thus, the longer the time period considered, the greater
the probability of loss in reserve holdings.
Another important factor relating to changes in
gold and exchange reserves Is the amount and frequency of
exchange rate changes.

From a short run standpoint, a

rise in the country*s exchange rate (depreciation) may
bring with it a spontaneous rise in gold and foreign
exchange holdings.

Nevertheless, the new, high rate may

be offset shortly because of a volume decline.

Then too,

retaliation on the part of other nations as well as the
possibility of internal price increases may become too
serious to bear.
As one examines the external policies of the six
nations, it becomes apparent that increases in the inter
national reserves were possible, in part, because
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depreciation was quite common during this relatively short
period of time.

It may be recalled that Mexico changed

its exchange rate in 1954.

Table II shows the effect of

the depreciated rate which increased international reserves
in 1955 by some 93.8 per cent.

Every nation considered

here with the exception of Venezuela had its exchange rate
altered at least once during the five years.®
It is now possible to compare the relative changes
in the money supply and international reserves.

One way

to prevent money and credit from getting out of hand would
be to keep credit in line with changes in international
reserves.

Should credit rise by a much greater percentage

than the accumulation of International reserve holdings,
either the banking system should refuse to increase the
money supply, reduce it, or it should reduce credit.
The effectiveness of such manipulation would be
expected to vary between nations, and would directly depend
upon the relative importance of the external sector to the

"Exchange rate changes for the six nations included
In this section were as follows (rates are either basic,
preferential, or free selling rates and express domestic
units per dollar): Argentina 7.5 per dollar 1951-1955, 18
per dollar 1956; Brazil 18.38 per dollar 1951-1952, 23.261953, 31.50-1954, 37.06-1955-1956; Mexico 8.65 per dollar
1951-1953, 12.51-1954-1956; Chile 90.0 per dollar 1951,
118.6-1952, 110.0-1953, 200.0-1954, 300.0-1955, and 563.01956; Peru 15.28 per dollar 1951, 15.43-1952, 16.85-1953,
19.39-1854, and 19.0-1955-1956; and Venezuela 3.35 per
dollar 1951-1956. Refer to International Monetary Fund,
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domestic sector.

Yet, even if a nation depended to only a

small extent upon the income contribution of the external
sector, it would still be desirable to utilize the above
measuring device.

It is true that the limitations placed

upon the money supply as determined by international
reserves would be of lesser importance than purely domestic
measures.

Nevertheless, the former could be employed in

conjunction with internal measures to provide greater
stability.
All the six nations being observed in this section
rely to a great extent upon the external sector of their
economies to provide for economic stability and growth.
The relation of export income to national product (income)
as presented in Table I, page 290, is not indicative of
the full reliance that these nations place upon external
activity.

Of great importance to them besides export

income is the import of goods, particularly capital goods,
and the flows of international capital.

Thus, it seems

quite logical that all six countries would benefit from
the use of the controlling device discussed at this point.
To what extent have the Latin American countries
made use of this measure?

Table II, page 295, shows that

International Financial Statistics, January, 1957; and the
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1956.
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very little effort was expended in attempting to provide
monetary stability by regulating money and credit in
accordance with international reserve variations.
Reviewing the countries in Group I, one finds that
in Argentina credit rose by 15.3 per cent in 1952.

At the

same time, international reserves declined some 42.2 per
cent.

Yet, the money increased, too, by about 12.8 per

cent.

International reserve holdings increased approxi

mately 185.4 per cent in 1953 while total money and credit
rose some 85.8 per cent.

The exceptional rise of inter

national reserves in this latter year was more than enough
to offset the total increase of money and credit for the
same two-year period.

The last three years, 1954-1956,

showed a continual decline in gold and foreign exchange
while money and credit moved in the opposite direction.
The experience in Brazil was similar to that
occasioned by Argentina.

Credit rose about 20 per cent

in 1952, and international reserve holdings declined by
3 per cent.

Money followed the course of credit, and rose

some 15 per cent.

The expansion of credit amounted to

nearly 18 per cent in 1953.

This Increased rate was nearly

offset by a rise of international reserves by approximately
13 per cent.
cent.

The money supply rose, however, by 19 per

During the years 1954 and 1955, credit and money

rose while gold and foreign exchange declined.

But an
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abrupt change was encountered in 1956; credit was larger
than in the previous year by 'about 13 per cent while inter
national reserves rose by some 19 per cent.

Money expanded

by almost 12 per cent leaving a money and credit balance
of approximately 5 per cent over that of gold and foreign
exchange accumulation.
Mexico, the last of the three Group I nations,
experienced a more mixed-pattern relationship than either
Argentina or Brazil.

Credit increased by about 11.2 per

cent in 1952, but international reserve holdings were
larger by approximately 2.3 per cent.

Money did rise, but

the increase was only about 4.1 per cent.
change was noticeable during 1953 and 1954.
in credit amounted to some 59.9 per cent.

A consistent
The increase
On the other

hand, international reserves declined by about 18.0 per
cent.

During 1955 and the first seven months of 1956, a

reversal occurred.

The rise in credit for 1955 was but

7.2 per cent while gold and foreign exchange accumulations
amounted to nearly 93.8 per cent.
about 23.5 per cent.

Money also increased

Finally, credit and money declined

in 1956, the total amounting to 14.0 per cent.

At the

same time, international reserve holdings were larger by
some 3.4 per cent.
With respect to the above three nations, only
Mexico seemed to pay attention to the relative changes in
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credit, money, and international reserve holdings, and
then only in the latter two years.

Furthermore, only

Brazil, and to a lesser extent Mexico, revealed a downward
trend in the rise of money and credit.
Turning to the Group II countries,

the analysis

will show results similar to those of the Group I nations.
A definite trend emerges as one reviews the credit,
money, and international reserve holdings of Chile.

At

the end of 1952, the rise in credit of some 27.2 per cent
was nearly equal that of the rise of gold and foreign
exchange— 27.8 per cent.

Yet, the money supply also

increased by about 35.8 per cent.

Beginning with 1953

and continuing through 1956, with the exception of the
year 1955, Chile’s international reserve holdings declined
while credit and money continued to rise.
Peru’s experience indicates a more fixed pattern in
that the annual rise in credit has been at a decreasing
rate beginning with a 25.7 per cent increase in 1952 and
falling to a 2 per cent increase by June, 1956.

The only

year excepted was 1955 when the rise in credit was 13,4
per cent.

In addition, there was only a small change in

gold and foreign exchange reserve holdings during the
period.

A decline of about 5.8 per cent occurred during

1952 and 1953.
occasioned.

Thereafter, a 0.6 per cent rise was

The downward pattern also applies to changes
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in money.

The money supply rose by approximately 13.3 per

cent in 1952.

During the remaining four years, the

increase was smaller each year; it was 4.7 per cent for
1956.
Venezuela, the only country which realized an
increase in all three items throughout the five-year period,
reveals a more determined approach with respect to money,
credit, and international reserves.
credit rose by some 18.3 per cent.

At the end of 1952,
Although gold and

foreign holdings fell short of the rise in credit, they
were larger by nearly 15.6 per cent.

The money supply

increased too, the total amounting to approximately 16.4
per cent.

The following year witnessed a reversal since

credit rose by about 27.6 per cent while international
reserves increased by some 10.0 per cent.
supply was only 8.8 per cent larger.
noticeable during 1954.

Yet, the money

This trend is also

The last two years of the period

revealed a continuous rise in credit; however, gold and
foreign exchange accumulations were larger than the
increase in the money supply.
It would appear correct to say that only Venezuela
as one of the three Group II countries showed a serious
determination to restrict the expansion of money and
credit according to variations in its gold and foreign
exchange reserves.
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To summarize the findings at this point, it is
quite clear that of the six nations considered, only two,
Mexico and Venezuela, showed an inclination to directly
relate the changes in money and credit with variations in
international reserve holdings.
There seemed to he no clear-cut trend with respect
to the domestic economies of Group I countries and the
export economies of Group II nations.

Perhaps a part of

the explanation as to why the Group I countries attached
little importance to the measuring device described above
is that the internal problems overshadowed those of the
external sector.

On the other hand, one should consider

the fact that these countries were evidently having
problems In their external trade.

No doubt this is true

because of the numerous changes they made in their exchange
rates.

Such problems as were related to the external

sector appeared equally important to the Group II nations.
It is quite clear from the information in Table II
that only a few of the Latin American nations sought relief
from the pressing inflation by making co-ordinated use of
monetary, fiscal, and exchange policies.

The frequent

change in exchange rates, along with financial controls in
some of the countries, may have been employed to seek
relief in both the external and internal sectors of the
economy.

Surely depreciated exchange rates were used to
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increase exports or to reduce imports, or both.

In brief,

they were attempts made for the purpose of relieving the
strain on the balance of payments.

Nevertheless, their

imposition may have been a manifestation of a more recent
development; namely, the desire to protect the domestic
sector from foreign repercussions.

At any rate, monetary

and fiscal policy failure was quite evident.
The lack of success in applying the measuring device,
the subject of this section, suggests that the overwhelming
desire to develop the countries was of greater importance
than clinging to the objective of international equilibrium.
A comparison of the money supply, national product,
and price level of five of the Latin American countries
should serve to throw more light upon the relative situ
ation with respect to saving and investment as well as to
indicate the approximate influence of monetary and fiscal
policy.
B.

A Comparison Between the Money Supply,
National Product, and Price Level

A comparison between the money supply, the national
product, and the price level of the several countries
presents a basis for estimating the relationship between
saving and investment.

If the change in money supply

is not accompanied by an approximately equal change, and
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in the same direction as that of the national product,
then the price level will vary in such a way as to reflect
the difference.

According to the development pattern in

the underdeveloped countries, the money supply appears to
rise faster than the real national product.

This pro

portionately larger increase in the money supply suggests
that if an excess of investment over saving were realized,
it would be attributed, in part, to the larger money supply.
The national product must be deflated by using the price
level indicator for the purpose of showing the influence
of the larger money supply.
Since the study of Mexico and Venezuela, two of
the more advanced underdeveloped nations in Latin America,
revealed the tendency of excessive investment balances
along with exceptional increases in money and credit,
particularly in the case of Mexico, it may be safely
assumed that most all of the remaining countries in Latin
America have realized similar effects.

From the saving

side, the constant pressure of insufficient saving was
noticeable in Mexico and Venezuela, especially the former.
This saving trend would also be expected to prevail in
most of the other Latin American nations.
An attempt to approximate the saving-investment
relationship through the money supply and national product
allows for only rough estimates of the actual situation.
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Furthermore, it does not allow one to manifest sound
judgment with respect to the approximate state of inter
national equilibrium of a nation because of the failure
to take into account the external contribution via exports,
imports, capital, and unilateral movements.
Yet, the influence of the current account may be
closely estimated if a comparison between the international
reserve movements and the supply of money is known.

For

the most part, the movement of gold and foreign exchange
reveals the relationship between exports and imports.

In

a sense, they represent the money flow of the two accounts.
This second measuring device, which Is to be
employed in connection with the six countries chosen,
should help in determining the success, or lack of success,
of monetary, fiscal, and external policy application.
Table III, page 309, has been constructed to better
visualize the changes in the national product and money
supply of the five nations involved.®

In current terms,

the percentage changes In the national product of the
several nations appear exceptionally large (column 2).
many Instances the national product figures seem to rise
at a rate greater than that of the money supply.

Yet,

the yearly changes in real national product figures

Argentina was omitted because of insufficient
price data.

In

TABLE III
COMPARATIVE CHANGES IN NATIONAL PRODUCT, MONEY SUPPLY, AND PRICE
LEVELS IN SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
(in millions of domestic units)
National Yearly %
Real
Yearly
National
(real)
%
Product
Change
(see
(decrease-) Product
Change
Table I)
(decrease-)

Money
Supply*
(see
Table II)

Brazil

40,100
64,400
83,400
109,400
na

15.9
22.0
23.4
24.9
na

12,671
20,753
-20,698
37,872
na

3.9
5.8
- 5.8
11.3
na

38,700
46,400
72,800
55,100
54,600

Mexico

6,500
- 2,000
10,178
17,522
8,400

12.5
- 3.4
18.1
26.4
10.0

4,300
857
4,689
3,753
7,446

8.1
- 1.5
8.3
6.2
11.5

1,048
2,089
4,741
2,975
- 1,779

45,390
76,126
232,027
na

31.3
40.0
87.0
na

15,314
31,446
50,995
na

7.0
13.4
19.1
na

11

11

i i

11

Chile

Peru

2,260
1,680
2,430
na
11

Venezuela

960
757
1,380
775
814

12.1
8.0
10.7
na

1,278
1,468
150
na

T t

7.7
5.7
9.8
5.0
5.0

T 1

6.4
6.9
.7
na
f T

814
1,146
928
753
630

6.7
8.8
6.2
5.0
4.0

17,735
28,730
43,140
86,070
55,760(0ct)
1,254
1,058
560
937
295(June)
437
475
344
674
415

Yearly
%
Change
18.0
18.3
24.2
14.7
12.8(Aug)

Wholesale Year
Price
Index
(1953=100)
87
100
131
147
186(Sept)

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

7.7
14.2
28.2
13.8
- 7.2

102
100
109
124
128(0ct)

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

30.8
38.2
41.5
58.5
23.9

81
100
157
277
485(Aug)

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

20.8
14.5
6.7
10.5
3.0

99
100
110
119
13l(Sept)

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

17.1
15.9
9.9
17.7
9.2

103
100
103
103
104(0ct)

1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, January,
1957; United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1956; and Tables I and II, pages 290 and 295.
■^Includes money and credit.

naInformation not available.
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(column 4) are of much smaller proportion.
A glance at the price level index in Table III
reveals the tremendous pressure exerted upon the price
level caused, in part, by the exceptionally large increases
in money and credit.

There does seem to be a trend toward

reducing the amount of money and credit in some of the
countries.

For example, the rise of mdney and credit in

Mexico was reduced by nearly one-half in 1955, and together
they actually declined in 1956.

The money supply of

Venezuela increased by a much smaller proportion in 1956
than in 1955.

In addition, a similar trend occurred in

Peru.
To make some specific observations, one finds that
the percentage rise of the money supply of Brazil was
several times that of the increase in the real national
product.

Although the percentage increase in the real

national product was favorable, on the average, to the
rise of the national product in industrialized nations,
it was obvious that the money supply had to be enlarged
by nearly SO per cent each year in order to raise real
national product figures to the amounts shown in Table III.
Mexico appeared to be in a much better situation
than Brazil.

The real national product showed larger
t

yearly percentage increases with smaller proportionate
Injections of money and credit.

Nevertheless, the

311
effectiveness of greater amounts of money and credit was
quite small as compared to those of the more developed
nations.
It is evident, too, that Chile has suffered because
of especially large injections of money and credit ranging
from 25 per cent to 58 per cent a year.

On the other hand,

the real national product rose from 7 to 19 per cent during
the years for which information was available.

According

to the price index for the last two years of the period,
prices rose to 277 and 485 per cent of the 1953 base year.
These price increases, along with the exceptional rise in
the money supply, would seem to support the conclusion
that the real national income would have been a good deal
lower in 1955 and 1956 than in the three earlier years.
National product (income) information was also
lacking for Peru during 1955 and 1956.

It required, how

ever, an approximate 41 per cent increase in the money
supply in the first three years of the survey to raise
the real national product by about 13 per cent.
A more moderate rise in money and credit was evi
denced in the case of Venezuela.

Furthermore, the real

national income rose In a consistent fashion throughout
the five-year period.

The relatively small changes in

the price index is a manifestation of the greater degree
of success in the employment of money and credit than is
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true of the remaining four countries.

On the other hand,

the average price level was quite high throughout the
period from 1952 to 1956.

One reason which explains this

condition is the fact that Venezuela’s trade was closely
allied with that of the United States (refer to the price
data presented on page 246).
It may be recalled from an earlier analysis of
Venezuela that large capital expansion occurred during
1952 and 1953.

This expansion was attributed both to

the oil companies and the private sector.

The result of

the added investment is revealed in Table III by a larger
increase in real national product than that of the nominal
national product at the end of 1953.
Table III makes possible several general conclusions
with respect to the five nations under observation.
Planned saving and investment were probably at a low level.
At least one-half of the total expansion in the money
supply was accomplished by credit expansion.

The remainder

consisted, therefore, of continuous injections of new
money.

In other words, realized investment may have been

larger than realized savings in the respective nations
because of the expansion of the money supply. . The
inflationary impact would tend to support this statement.
Also, the large expansion in the money supply failed to
yield proportionate yearly returns in the real national
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output of these relatively underdeveloped nations.

The

opposite result would normally be expected in such
countries.

By this it is meant that added expenditures

should provide immediate results via increased output.
Once again, this effect suggests a partial long-term
answer to the problem of growth, that is, a probability
of mal-allocation of resources.
Evidently, little attention was directed toward the
application of monetary and fiscal policy.

Yet, and as

pointed out on page 310, the expansion of money and credit
appears to have been reduced in some of the countries by
the end of 1956.

In fact, the money supply of Mexico

actually declined in the latter year.

Furthermore, there

seemed to be no apparent trend developed by either Group
I or Group II countries that would distinguish one group
from the other with respect to these matters.
Overall, Table III presents a picture which suggests
that those in charge of guiding economic activity were
unable to create a condition within the domestic sector
which would contribute toward a state of international
equilibrium.
Since it is quite clear that monetary and fiscal
policy was rather ineffective and that the concept of
international equilibrium was not a major objective of
the domestic sector activity, the question posed is: what

314
was the contribution of external policy toward inter
national equilibrium in the countries under observation
during the five-year period?
In order to express judgment with respect to short
term capital movements and, hence, the relative condition
of the current account of the balance of payments, the
findings from the analysis of the first measuring factor—
international reserves and the money supply of the several
nations— may be helpful at this point.
It was found that international reserve holdings
rose about as often as they declined.

The total movement

of these holdings indicated a net loss for the countries
involved.

Furthermore, the acquisition of international

reserves was often possible only at the expense of depreci
ated currencies.
A partial result of this action was realized by
imposing added difficulties in the domestic sectors.

One

of the most important problems created was the extensive
rise in prices which occurred during the period.
was the lone exception in this respect.

Venezuela

To carry the

point a step further, the external problem caused by
depreciated currencies which were reflected in the domestic
sector, did not occur in Venezuela.

In other words, the

money supply of Venezuela rose by small amounts, and the
real national product constantly increased.

Thus, a
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partial explanation for this effect was the fact that the
country did not depreciate its currency.
The imposition of strict exchange controls by some
of the countries further revealed their inability to
attain a current account balance.*^
It would seem safe to state, therefore, that external
policy was employed, in part, for the purpose of insulating
the domestic sector, but apparently produced little bene
ficial results.

To the extent that external policy was

applied to accomplish a current account balance, the effect
was either a failure to accomplish the goal or, if real
ized, the domestic sector suffered a setback.

To sum it

up, the authorities responsible for external policy did
not co-ordinate such policy with a view toward accomplish
ing a condition of international equilibrium.
Before one can pass judgment in connection with
the external sector, a more accurate measurement must be
forthcoming.

This is the purpose of the third measuring

device which will now be observed.

It was possible to

estimate the approximate state of the current account
based upon the flow of gold and international reserves.

^The following countries maintained government
control of the purchase and sale of foreign exchange as
well as multiple exchange rates: Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile.
A lesser degree of exchange restrictions were
imposed by Peru and Venezuela. Mexico did not impose
exchange control.
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Yet, in order to provide a more accurate interpretation of
the effectiveness of external policy, information with
respect to both short-term and long-term capital movements
is essential.
C.

This measuring device will now be considered.
Changes in Current Account Balances
and Long-Term Capital Movements

A comparison of the current account balances vfith
long-term capital movements provides us with a rough guide
as to the directional flow of capital of the countries
involved.

A favorable current account balance (exports in

excess of imports) indicates that long-term capital should
move out of the country, on balance.

The reverse capital

flow would be occasioned if imports exceed exports, or an
unfavorable current account balance prevailed.
There is, however, a serious shortcoming in such an
analysis because capital movements are not likely to change
as suddenly or abruptly as are the variations in imports
and exports.

In other words, the longer the time period

involved as a basis for comparing these two factors, the
greater is the accuracy in terms of need for capital.
Capital, as used here, is one of the major factors
which supports saving and investment and, therefore, has
an important role to play in helping to maintain the
national product.8

The lack of saving and the tendency

Q

United Nations writers have developed an investment
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toward unfavorable current account balances are character
istic of underdeveloped nations.

Primary reliance is

placed, therefore, upon the (inward) flow of capital to
uphold a given income level.9

No doubt the inability of

some countries to find a source of constant capital flow
has, in turn, caused them to alter their exchange rates
in an effort to provide a stable national income.

Also,

their inability to attract capital has forced them to
create it internally.

The result of such activity has

contributed to inflationary pressures.

This explanation

suggests that if expanded sources of capital could be
found, the problems relating to monetary, fiscal, and
exchange policies would be alleviated to some extent.

coefficient which may be used as a partial basis for
determining the capital needs of underdeveloped countries.
See United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Economic Survey of Latin America. 1954 (New York:
United Nations Publications, 1955), pp. 3-18.
9
A new approach for providing capital to under
developed areas is suggested by Professors Max F. Millikan
and W. W. Rostow.
Among other things, it provides for:
(a) a long-term program of economic aid to be initiated
by the United States, (b) America should make about $12
billion available to underdeveloped countries over a fiveyear period, (c) governments of other advanced industri
alized countries should make available approximately #3
billion over the same time period to the underdeveloped
nations, (d) measures should be taken to expand private
investment to some $2.5 billion during the first five
years, (e) the total funds of $17.5 billion should be
loaned according to sound banking principles rather than
allocated to specific countries, and (f) loans and grants
should be made by existing national and international
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It is not the purpose of this undertaking to spe
cifically measure capital needs of the countries, but
rather to show the wrong directional movements of capital,
and, hence, the external problems associated with such
capital movements and an explanation of how the lack of
capital has influenced internal activity.
Table IV, page 319, is constructed for the purpose
of revealing the relationship between current account
changes and variations of long-term capital movements.
Unilateral transfers are omitted from the calculations
primarily because they consist of erratic types of capital
movements.

In addition, they are of minor significance

to the majority of the countries considered here.
To begin the summary of Table IV, it would seem
prudent to consider the relationship between the current
account balances and long-term capital movements for the
period as a whole.
import surpluses.

Five of the six countries realized
Only Venezuela achieved an export

surplus, on balance, for the four years reported.

This

result infers that the nations which obtained Import
surpluses should have witnessed an inflow of capital which
would have helped to offset the current account balances.

agencies. For a more detailed analysis of the program
refer to Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal:
Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1957), pp. 126-129.

TABLE IV
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES AND LONG-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS*
(in millions of dollars)
1952

1953

1954

1955

Argentina
Current account balance
Long-term capital movements(net)

-406
- 1

349
- 3

83
- 10

-215
- 14

-189
- 28

Brasil
Current account balance
Long-term capital movements(net)

-708
655

70
- 61

-230
94

- 25
264

-893
+919

Mexico
Current account balance
Long-term capital movements(net)

-142
64

-107
22

- 21
117

68
142

Chile
Current account balance
Long-term capital movements (net)

8
39

- 69
65

3
- 24

28
4

- 30
+ 84

Peru
Current account balance
Long-term capital movements(net)

- 56
47

- 71
53

- 20
19

- 42
37

-189
+156

Venezuela
Current account balance
Long-term capital movements(net)

13
84

9
91

-

4
79

50
29

1956

Total
(net)
Balances

Country**

1 0 (June)
74
"

108

-202
+419

+ 68
+283

Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
June, 1957; Balance of Payments Yearbook. 1957; and United Nations, Statistical
Yearbook 1956.
*Unilateral transfers omitted.
**Direct investments included for most countries
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One of the five nations which occasioned import surpluses
for the period— Argentina— did not achieve a capital
inflow.

In addition, Venezuela with an export surplus

acquired an inflow of capital.

This effect is contrary

to normal expectations of a nation which realized an
export surplus.
Looking at the account balances as a group, one
finds that four of the six countries, all with import
surpluses for the period considered, managed to import
long-term capital.

The other two nations witnessed wrong

directional flows In their long-term capital balances.
To review the results in the specific countries,
Argentina acquired an import surplus of $189 million.
Instead of moving into the country, long-term capital
moved outwTard to the extent of #28 million.

Furthermore,

gold and foreign exchange holdings declined during the
period by #172 m i l l i o n . T h e failure of this country to
reduce its import surplus, to attract long-term capital,
and its inability to prevent the loss of gold and foreign
exchange, all contributed to the explanation of its
external policy, i. e., strict exchange control.

At that,

exchange control brought with it a depreciation of

■^Refer to Table II, Changes in Money, Credit, and
International Reserves, p. 295.
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Argentina’s exchange rate,-^
The depreciation of the exchange rate was employed,
in part, to reduce imports and to increase exports.

The

desired effect was not realized, however, during the period
under observation.

This kind of external policy apparently

was not conducive to attracting long-term capital.
Since both short- and long-term capital declined
over the period, the major portion of an increased supply
of money and credit was accumulated internally.

Although

the internal factors as presented in Table III, and which
are necessary to substantiate the prior statement, were
unavailable for Argentina, all indications point toward
such a result.

In other words, the supply of money and

credit should have risen along with prices, and the real
national product should have declined, or,.at least,
remained quite constant.
One other point with respect to the external policy
of Argentina should be made.

It has to do with the effect

of external policy and international equilibrium.

In

Chapter I of this paper it was contended that there is
only one exchange rate and national income level which
would provide an equilibrium condition; and that the
national income may rise or fall, but there is only one

^ F o r a review of exchange rates see page 299, foot
note 5.
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exchange rate at each income level which would support an
equilibrium.

Furthermore, there may be different exchange

rates but there is only one income level at each exchange
rate that would assure equilibrium.12
As far as the national income (product) is concerned,
it has risen during the period, that is, at current prices.13
On the other hand, Argentina's exchange rate rose (depreci
ated) once over the same period of time.

The question that

arises, then, is: what significance may be attached to the
change in the exchange rate with respect to the variation
in the national income?

The answer is that such exchange

rate change apparently had very little to do with the
variation in national income.

In other words, such portion

of external policy as was related to an alteration in the
exchange rate was carried out for the purpose of allevi
ating the balance of payments rather than maintaining
national income.
cessful.

And even at that, it has not been suc

Of course, the depreciation of the exchange rate

may indirectly contribute to a rate of income which is
conducive to maintaining a condition of equilibrium.

This

12Chapter I, pp. 24-25.
IS

Refer to
that the national
able for 1955 and
trend, in current
two years.

Table I, page 290. It should be noted
(product) income figures were not avail
1956. It is assumed that their upward
prices, continued during these latter
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effect, however, has not occurred in Argentina.

It would

seem, therefore, that internal factors rather than external
policy were primarily responsible for changes in the
national income.
The experience in the external sector of Brazil
presents a different picture from that of Argentina.
Table IV reveals that Brazil encountered an import surplus
during the period.

In addition, only one year, 1953,

revealed an export surplus.

Long-term capital was attracted

to Brazil in an amount greater than the current accountrs
import surplus.

Nevertheless, the gold and foreign exchange

account showed a loss of these holdings (see Table II, page
295)•

The result was a near-equality in the balance of

payments.

Expressed in figures, they are: import surplus

of $893 million and long-term capital inflow of $919
million, less short-term capital outflow of $73 million,
or a capital movement balance of $846 million.

From this

vantage point, the external sector was nearly in balance.
Yet, this result occurred, in part, because the n a t i o n s
currency depreciated in nearly every year of the period
considered.
According to the information presented thus far,
it seems a bit strange that Brazil was able to attract a
sizeable portion of long-term capital when the current
account showed a negative figure, short-term capital was
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moving out of the country, and the exchange rate wras
subject to numerous changes.

The answer seems to be that

the major portion of the long-term capital inflow consisted
of foreign government or institutional funds, along with
some private direct investment, rather than portfolio
capital.14
Depreciation of the effective exchange rates
apparently contributed somewhat towrard relieving the
current account imbalance.

The internal result of exchange

rate changes appeared to be of minor significance except
for the probable influence registered in the higher price
levels.

More specifically, the change in the money supply

was quite constant ,and revealed no changes that were
proportionate to the variations of the exchange rate.
Although long-term capital was the major factor
which closed the balance of payments import gap, the inflow
of such capital created an internal problem.

Long-term

capital must provide a means of payment, in short, an
export surplus.

It was found, however, that the real

national product did not rise at rates considered normal
for underdeveloped areas.

Furthermore, the rise in the

real national product required huge increases in the money

^ ^ n i t e d States provided approximately $600.0 million
of long-term capital during the three year period 1953-1955.
See the International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments
Yearbook. Vol. 7, 1957.
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supply.3*^

It is conceded, however, that in the near future

greater efficiency in the application of capital is proba
ble.

The 11.5 per cent rise in the real national product

of 1955 suggests this likely outcome.
There further seems to be little direct correlation
between the changes in national income and the pattern of
external policy.

Yet, external policy contributed more,

no doubt, toward realizing an equilibrium situation in
Brazil than it did in Argentina.

The rise in Brazil’s

exchange rate did contribute to some extent toward a
nearly-realized current account balance.

A current account

balance is necessary before a state of international equi
librium may be established.

On the other hand, the

depreciated exchange rates and the long-term capital
inflows tended to transfer a part of the external responsi
bility to the domestic economy.

Thus, the responsibility

of monetary and fiscal policy became more onerous.
According to the information presented in Table IV,
page 319, Mexico has witnessed an experience in the
external sector somewhat different from that of Argentina
and Brazil.

An import surplus of |202 million accumulated

from 1952 to June, 1956.

Yet, the nation obtained an

export surplus during the last one and one-half years of

15

Refer to Table III, page 309, and to page 310 of
the present chapter.
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that period.
With respect to capital movements, Mexico was able
to acquire an inflow of long-term capital amounting to
approximately $419 million.

In addition, gold and foreign

exchange showed a positive balance of about $185 million.
To round out the external picture, only one change
was occasioned in the exchange rate.

The authorities'

raised the Mexican exchange rate (depreciated the currency)
in 1954.

One result of such action was mentioned above;

that is, an export surplus arose in 1955.
To what extent the depreciation of the exchange
rate was beneficial or harmful is difficult to say.
a part of short run policy it appeared beneficial.

As
There

is some question as to the method employed in dealing with
the deterioration of the current account balance which
lasted until 1954.

It would seem commendable, however,

that the authorities chose currency depreciation in prefer
ence to some form of exchange control.

Yet, the domestic

sector appeared to be as responsible for the inflationary
impact as was the external sector.

Table III, page 509,

shows that the money supply expanded rapidly through 1954.
Thereafter, monetary and fiscal measures were applied
with more success.

This result occurred even though export

income was contributing to the money supply.
Returning to Table IV once again, one finds that
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long-term capital flowed into Mexico in a constant stream.
This flow does not mean that the amounts of capital were
especially large in any one year.

Nevertheless, capital

accumulation for the period as a whole totaled $419
million.

In order to visualize the effectiveness of this

capital inflow, one must consult the results registered
by the real national income.

The year 1953 occasioned a

decline in both the nominal and real national income
(product).

But beginning with 1954 and continuing through

June, 1956, the real national Income rose at something
more than moderate rates.

In addition, the money supply

in 1955 increased by only one-half that of 1954, and it
declined In 1956.

Surely this explains that the

efficiency of capital was much greater near the end of
the period than in the earlier years.
But what about the contribution of external policy
toward a condition of international equilibrium?

The

depreciation of the peso did convert an import surplus
into an export surplus.

This action, In itself, may not

solve the current account problem.

There is created, how

ever, an atmosphere for the free rate to be subjected to
the forces of demand and supply.

So far, the new rate has

been maintained and an export surplus has been created.
The situation may change as the long run forces make their
weight felt.

The depreciated rate no doubt was influential
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In raising the price level hy nearly fifteen points in
1955.

Nevertheless, the increase amounted to only four

points between 1955 and October, 1956 (see Table III,
column 7, page 309).
The stock of gold and foreign exchange reserves
were larger by some $185 million.

This accumulation can

be utilized in case of a temporary current account deteri
oration.
The external sector has been favorable enough to
attract long-term capital.

The desirability of capital

inflow depends upon the relation between exports and
imports and saving and investment plus the ability of the
economy to show a larger output.

Recent Mexican experi

ence reveals that the export surplus reduces the need for
so much outside capital.

On the other hand, it was found

that, in general, the deficiency in saving required the
inflow of capital.

The tedious balancing of these factors

seemed to create a more favorable result in the latter
years of this study, particularly after depreciation
became effective.
With respect to the influence of capital inflows,
it was found that the country could better utilize
increasing amounts of capital as time passed.

The reason

for this is found in the greater efficiency that was evi
dent in the domestic sector.

Also, the inflow of capital
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seemingly reduced the need for continued expansion of
money and credit.

Finally, the export surplus which was

required to service capital imports became a reality.
For these reasons, it is quite certain that those
in charge of external policy were concerned with the state
of international equilibrium as they made their decisions
relating to the external sector.

In conclusion, one

should further state that monetary and fiscal policy were
responsible, in part, for the reorientation of the more
sound economic condition which has been accomplished in
Mexico.
Turning to Chile, Table IV, page 319, shows that
this nation has acquired an import surplus for the period
(1952-1955)

amounting to about $30 million.

Oddly enough,

there was only one year (1953) in which Chile occasioned
an import surplus.

Nevertheless, this figure was greater

than the export surpluses of the remaining years.
Capital, on balance, flowed inward.

The extent of

the inflow ($84 million) was more than enough to offset
the import surplus of the current account.

Gold and

foreign exchange holdings increased, too, by about $36
million.
On the surface it would appear that Chile was
witnessing little trouble in carrying out its external
policy.

Looking further into the matter, one finds that

sso
the opposite situation prevailed.

An important reason

which explains the prevalence of an export surplus in
every year except 1955 was the continual depreciation of
the exchange rate.

The rate change was violent.

In 1951

the exchange rate was 90 pesos per dollar; in 1956 the
rate was 565 pesos per dollar.
A short review of exchange rate variations will
begin with the year 1952.

An export surplus amounting to

about $8 million was realized.

This surplus was possible

primarily because of the depreciated rate which changed
from 90 to 118.6 pesos per dollar at the close of 1952.
At the end of 1953 an import surplus of some $69
million occurred.

Perhaps a good explanation as to why

this result took place is found in the variation of the
exchange rate.

In 1953 the effective rate was appreciated,

that is, from 118.6 to 110.0 pesos per dollar.

Evidently,

the external sector of the economy was extremely sensitive
to this new, lower (appreciated) rate.

The result was

that imports rose while exports declined, or, at least,
the two failed to move proportionately.

With the reali

zation of the sensitivity in the external sector, the
authorities allowed depreciation of the exchange rate to
continue throughout the remainder of the period.

In

other words, the only way in which an export surplus could
be accumulated was by repeated depreciation.
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As for capital inflow, figures relate that long
term capital moved into the country in three of the four
years for which information was available.

As in the case

of Brazil, a major portion of the Chilean inflow has come
from foreign governments or financial institutions rather
than from individuals.
The gold and foreign exchange reserve balance for
the period amounted to approximately $36 million (refer to
Table II, page 295).

Since an import balance occurred

over the same period of time, this balance implies that
the country was losing (selling) short-term assets in
order to cover excess imports.
It has already been pointed out that monetary and
fiscal policy was applied with little success in Chile.
External policy appears to have been just as ineffective.
But getting closer to the facts, one would, in the first
place, question the ability of a nation to enjoy benefits
from continued depreciation.

In the case of Chile, the

persistent depreciation brought with it significant rises
in the price level.

Table III, page 309, indicates a 57

per cent rise in prices in 1954 over those in 1953.

With

further depreciation in the following year, the price level
rose by over 100 per cent of 1954.
level increased.

Again in 1956 the price

It reached a height of some 485 per cent

of the base year, 1953.

Of course, some of the responsibility
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for rising prices attaches to internal causes.

Yet, the

external policy must have contributed in no small way to
this unfortunate experience.
The accumulation of long-term capital constitutes a
problem of repayment.

A nation that is able to create

export surpluses only at the expense of severe depreci
ation cannot maintain such a situation indefinitely.
And since it cannot, defaults in capital repayments may
be expected unless the problem is solved.

There seemed

to be no substantial effort directed toward a state of
international equilibrium in Chile.
Peru is the only country in this survey which
recorded an import surplus in its balance of payments in
every year of the survey.
million.

The total amounted to $189

This trend occurred even though the currency

depreciated.

In fact, the inability of the nation to sell

more abroad was responsible, in part, for the changing
value of its currency which took the following course:
15.43 soles per dollar, 1952; 16.85 - 1953; 19.39 - 1954;
and 19.00 - 1955-1956.

It is true, however, that the

exchange rate was held constant during the last two years
at a rate slightly lower (appreciated) than that of 1954.
Nevertheless, the only improvement realized appeared to
be a larger amount of long-term capital inflow.
To trace the long-term capital movements, one finds
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that capital was inward on balance during the period.

The

total inflow of $156 million was, nevertheless, less than
the current account deficit.

This condition is indicative

of a fundamental disequilibrium, and serves notice of a
long run problem with respect to the external sector of
this country.

Furthermore, gold and foreign exchange

holdings as presented in Table II, page 295, show a change
of only $1 million.
The result of Peru*s external experience over this
relatively short period of time may be explained in that
(1) the nation has been selling short-term assets, and (2)
some portion of its trade was carried on by clearing
agreements.
The external problems of the Peruvian economy
would be expected to cause some repercussions within the
nation.

To better understand the domestic disturbances,

one may refer back to Table III, page 309.

Because of the

inability to acquire foreign capital in desirable quanti
ties, the internal money supply was forced to expand.

In

doing so, the rate of money expansion wTas greater than the
productive facilities could support.
occurred.

Thus, inflation

The constant rise in the price level was attri

buted, in some degree, to the extensive depreciation of
the exchange rate.
It would seem prudent to state, then, that the rise
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in the real national product of less than one percentage
point in 1954, the last year in which national product
information was available, was a partial responsibility
of external policy.
There is little justification for stating that the
concept of international equilibrium was visualized, much
less applied, in connection with the external policy of
Peru.
With a brief discussion of the external policy of
Venezuela, this survey of the six nations will be completed.
Venezuela is the only nation of the group that obtained
an export surplus over the period considered.

The amount

of this surplus was $68 million.
The long-term capital movement which was inward, on
balance, for the period, flowed in the wrong direction and
thus did not enable the country to maintain an equilibrium
in its balance of payments.

In addition, gold and foreign

exchange accumulated to the extent of $156 million.
The experience of Venezuela is, therefore, different
than that occasioned by most of the older countries con
sidered thus far.

To use an analogy similar to that

employed in the discussion of the other countries, it would
appear that the exchange rate of Venezuela was overvalued.
But this reflection would be incorrect.

The major reason

why this nation has attained an export surplus is to be

335
found in its huge petroleum shipments.

All other items

making up its exports and imports do not reveal the
tendency toward an appreciated currency.

In other words,

the fact that Venezuela's one major export is oil should
not lead one to believe that that item determines the rate
of exchange of the country's currency.
On the other hand, the experience in Venezuela's
external sector is such that it could have created severe
internal problems.

These problems were mitigated, however,

by the wise employment of monetary and fiscal policy.
Since earlier discussions have explained the application
of domestic policy measures, it will suffice at this point
to call attention to Chapter III which indicates that the
Federal Government and, in certain respects, the Central
Bank carried out policies which prevented extreme inflation.
The results of their action is presented in Table III of
this chapter.

It shows that the increases in the money

supply were quite effective in bringing forth additional
production so that the real national product rose steadily.
And it did so without sharp increases in the price level.
The inflow of foreign capital seemed to be utilized
to further production rather than merely to add to the
blaze of inflation.

In this period of early growth it

appears that Venezuela was capable of employing large
amounts of capital quite successfully.
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There is one certain danger in connection with the
external sector of the nation*s economy.

Should the

country ever lose its heretofore dependable export market
for petroleum, its current account wrould be subject to a
sudden reversal.
The authorities in this nation, perhaps more than
those of any other included in the survey, seem to have
worked toward a more balanced economy.

In the external

sector, the exchange rate was maintained at 3.35 boli
var es per dollar throughout the whole period.

The satis

factory current account balance encouraged the inflow of
capital.

From a long run viewpoint, the nation was able

to produce an export surplus which is essential to service
the inflow of this type of capital.

All this occurred

with only moderate changes in prices and a steady rise in
real income.
To conclude this section, there appears to be no
clear-cut trend which emphasizes a definite type of
external policy of the domestic economies of Group I
nations which is distinctly different from that employed
by the external economies of Group II countries.

For

example, Argentina and Brazil, two representative nations
of Group I countries, occasioned nearly as much external
difficulty as did Chile of the Group II nations.

In fact,

Argentina and Brazil witnessed more serious problems in
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the functioning of their external sectors than was true of
Venezuela.

On the other hand, Mexico of the Group I

classification was more successful in overcoming external
difficulties than was Chile or Peru.
Once again there appears to be sound justification
for stating that each nation is confronted with a set of
problems which are peculiar to that nation.

An attempt

to set forth recommendations for the purpose of relieving
difficulties, whether of internal or external origin,
encompassing several nations or a specific area can be
expected to meet with only limited success.
The nations involved in this study employed various
means to achieve a current account balance, none of which
realized this goal.

The specific measures varied from a

nearly free market determination of the exchange rate— as
in the case of Mexico— to severe exchange controls as
applied by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile.
Depreciation was the most popular device used to
help solve the current account problem of these countries.
The effect of depreciation differed in the several nations.
From a short run viewpoint, Mexico appeared to achieve
some success after depreciation was instigated.

On the

other hand, the depreciation of the Chilean exchange rate
probably produced more harm than good.
Appreciation as an external device was little used.
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It appeared only in connection with two isolated instances.
The Chilean peso rate appreciated in 1953.

The reali

zation of an import surplus in the same year led, however,
to depreciation.

Peru was the other nation which revealed

an appreciated exchange rate.

The change occurred in 1954

and was of small magnitude.
The three measuring devices as developed in this
section yield valuable information which may he used as
a partial basis to explain the effectiveness of monetary,
fiscal, and external policies.

An analysis has shown that

the several nations enjoyed different degrees of success,
or lack of success, in applying the three policies.

In

fact, these observations indicated some of the factors which
caused difficulties in the functioning of the economies.
Not only was it possible to describe the general
effectiveness of internal and external policies, but the
three measuring devices revealed how one policy measure
influences the operation of other such measures.

In this

respect, one may determine with the aid of those measuring
devices the relative importance of monetary, fiscal, and
external policies as each of them is employed.

Finally,

the measuring devices serve as a basis for judging whether
or not a nation is directing its policies toward a con
dition of international equilibrium.
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II.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In Chapter I the concept of International equi
librium was presented.

Briefly, it explained that a nation

could maintain a given national income at a stated exchange
rate provided that saving equated investment and Imports
equated exports.

Furthermore, the above condition could

be achieved if the balance between the internal accounts
of saving and investment were different from those of the
external accounts of imports and exports, provided that
the movement of capital was equal to the difference.
It was also proposed that a condition of inter
national equilibrium is unlikely to be achieved without
the employment of flexible monetary, fiscal, and external
policies.

To substantiate the above statement, it wras

shown that underdeveloped countries are not likely to
acquire or lose capital in amounts sufficient to provide
a balance between saving and investment and Imports and
exports*

Furthermore, some of the internal difficulties

experienced by the lesser developed countries are not
directly related to capital flows.

The tremendous desire

to develop the countries may serve as one example which
creates internal problems.

Then too, external difficulties

evolve which have little direct relation to capital move
ments.

For example, it appears that some nations attempt

to control exchange rates and depreciate, or appreciate,
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their currencies in order to attain current account
balances.

The strict control of exchange rates or the

intermittent juggling of these rates reflect changes in
demand and supply of foreign exchange regardless of
capital movements.
Important factors which relate to the functioning
of underdeveloped nations may have an impact which is quite
different from the influence they would expect to have in
highly industrialized nations.

These factors create,

therefore, additional problems for study.
In connection with the relationship of these factors
to monetary policy, it was found that in Latin America
there was a lack of uniform banking systems.

One nation

was found to have a central banking system, a second nation
relied upon foreign branch banks, and a third country
emphasized commercial banking with little central direction.
Although there was a definite trend toward central banking
in this underdeveloped area, the different types of bank
ing systems created a problem of monetary control.

The

survey of Mexico and Venezuela revealed that the controls
employed by the Central Bank of Mexico were different from
those utilized by the Central Bank of Venezuela.

The

Central Bank of Mexico required that commercial banks keep
up to a 100 per cent reserve against deposits, but pro
vided an escape clause which allowed lower reserves if
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loans were channeled into predetermined sectors, or if the
banks provided a certain portion of short-, intermediate-,
and long-term loans*

This kind of control provided quanti

tative and qualitative requirements with an issue of one
decree.

On the other hand, the Central Bank of Venezuela

retained the more orthodox controls such as changes in
reserves, rediscount privileges, and so on.
It was found that savings banks were quite numerous
in Mexicoj the number of these banks increased a good deal
in recent years.

Yet, in Venezuela there were no savings

banks.
Interest rates played a rather unimportant role in
the countries studied.

In general, interest rates were

high, and were determined by the governments rather than
by the demand and supply of money.

One of the reasons

offered in explanation of the lack of Influence exerted
by interest rates in channeling funds was the failure to
establish organized exchanges, or, at least, the fact that
such exchanges were just beginning to develop.
In addition, the control over money and the banking
systems by the governments or autonomous entities tended
to prevent or restrict the implementation of the more
orthodox monetary measures.
Fiscal factors pose problems in underdeveloped
areas that are different from those of the more developed
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nations.

Not only are personal savings quite low but, for

this reason, the tax structure often differs from that
found in the relatively more developed countries.

Although

progressive individual taxation was in operation in both
Mexico and Venezuela, the rates were very moderate in the
former country while taxes derived from petroleum far
exceeded those levied on personal income in the latter
nation.
It is certain that capital accumulation is becoming
more effective in many of the Latin American countries.
Yet,

a study of two of the more advanced countries in this

area revealed that capital accumulation is a slow process.
The incentive toward capital accumulation via development
programs was surely not lacking.

The rapid rise in money,

credit, and prices was indicative of the limited ability
of most of the nations to increase real output.
Either the governments or their representatives,
the autonomous entities, rather than private enterprise,
seem to enjoy a major share in the direction of economic
activity.

Nevertheless, there appeared to be definite

indications as to the desirability of expanding private
enterprise in Mexico and Venezuela.

In the pase of Mexico,

loans were made In increasing amounts directly to indi
vidual firms.

Also, one of the larger autonomous entities

offered its assets for sale to private bidders.

With
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respect to Venezuela, private groups were spending
millions of dollars in the various fields of trade and
commerce.
External policy of the lesser developed nations is
usually practiced in a manner distinguishable from that of
the more highly developed countries.

For instance, the

exchange systems of the Latin American nations varied from
flexible exchange rates, as in the case of Mexico, to
strict exchange control systems of Argentina, Brazil, or
Chile.

In between these two extreme types of exchange

systems were those of Venezuela and Peru in which some
moderate form of exchange control was practiced.
Both internal difficulties and external problems
seem to explain why some form of exchange restriction is
utilized.

In an earlier section of this chapter it was

explained that most lesser developed countries rely quite
heavily on external trade.

This reliance is greater, per

haps, than is indicated by a comparison of the contribution
of export income to total income.

Also, nearly all of the

countries considered were unable to create an equilibrium
In their current accounts.

Yet, it was also found that

the majority of the nations were plagued with internal
problems normally associated with development plans.
The evidence presented revealed that a few of the
countries employed external controls in order to isolate

344
their domestic economies.
to do this.

Venezuela, for example, appeared

On the other hand, Chile showed a severe

current account problem.

This difficulty was largely

responsible for the implementation of a strict exchange
control system.

The pattern of exchange restrictions in

other countries indicated that they were created for the
purpose of mitigating both internal and external diffi
culties.
This analysis further suggested that at least a few
of the countries attempted to seek a rate of exchange
which expressed a closer relation between demand and supply
conditions.

The depreciation of the Mexican exchange rate

was indicative of this reasoning.

Nevertheless, depreci

ation of currencies by most of the countries seemed to
create a more serious internal problem than the difficulty
it was supposed to overcome in the external sector.
Such observations implied that the approach to the
study of underdeveloped countries must be altered some
what from that employed in the study of developed nations.
What may be key factors for studying problems of advanced
nations may be of minor significance in the study of the
lesser developed countries.
From a policy standpoint, Mexico was unable to
successfully cope with the numerous internal and external
problems until near the end of the five-year period.
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Two outstanding reasons given to explain the lack of
effective policy results were (l) a failure to co-ordinate
monetary, fiscal, and external policies and (g) improper
timing of policy measures.

Since all economic activity

was centered around economic development, policy imple
mentation was made more difficult.

Yet, those in charge

of policy making appeared to direct policy toward a more
balanced growth pattern.
Although fiscal and, to some extent, external poli
cies were more important in Venezuela than was monetary
policy, the whole period was characterized with exceptional
stability for an underdeveloped country.

Even though

economic development was an important objective, financial
stability was not' forced into the background.
The external sector was responsible in large
measure for the relative economic stability over the fiveyear period.

Export income was usually channeled into the

hands of the government and utilized as a part of fiscal
policy instead of being directed into the banking system
and thereby being controlled by monetary policy.
One of the most serious threats to economic sta
bility in Venezuela is the possible loss of its export
market.

Yet, an analysis of this country indicated that

this shortcoming was realized and that great effort was
made to diversify domestic industries.
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Neither Mexico nor Venezuela achieved a condition
of international equilibrium during the five-year period
under study.

It would seem quite logical, however, that

the lesser developed countries would not achieve such a
delicate balance among the several factors required by a
state of international equilibrium.

Nevertheless, these

two nations came closer to achieving this goal than did
any of the other four countries considered in the present
chapter.
A study of the two dissimilar economies of Mexico
and Venezuela in Chapters II and III, respectively, leads
one to suggest the necessity of incorporating measuring
devices for the purpose of revealing the effectiveness of
monetary, fiscal, and external policies.

Although several

kinds of measuring devices may be useful, those offered in
this study were (l) the relationship between gold and
international reserves and the money supply, (2) a compari
son between the money supply, national product (income),
and the price level, and (3) changes in current account
balances and long-term capital movements.
The use of the first measuring device sustained the
proposition that greater monetary stability is possible in
the open economies of the lesser developed countries if
changes in money and credit are proportional to the vari
ations of gold and foreign exchange holdings.

The
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application of this device among six representative
nations of Latin M e r i c a indicated that little effort was
expended by the authorities in most of these countries
toward maintaining a direct relation between changes in
gold and foreign exchange holdings and the money supply.
The second measuring device showed the relative
effectiveness of domestic policy, that is, monetary and
fiscal policy.

The result of this measuring device

revealed that planned saving and investment, besides being
quite small, produced a situation in which realized invest
ment was larger than realized saying.

Money and credit

were primarily responsible for this condition.

Inflation

prevailed, therefore, in most of the countries reviewed.
In addition, the evidence indicated that some of the
nations were in no position to absorb large amounts of
capital flow.

With only a few exceptions, monetary and

fiscal policy was applied with little success.
The third, and final, measuring device revealed
the portion of the external problem which was associated
with capital movements.

It also indicated the internal

influences exerted by capital flowrs.

Of the six nations

under observation, it was found that the majority realized
an import surplus.

In some cases, the capital flow was

inward; however, the amount required to cover the import
surplus was not sufficient.

It was larger than that
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required to "balance the import surplus in only one instance.
In addition, one country witnessed an export surplus and
a capital inflow.

In any event, capital movements did not

offset current account balances in exact proportions.
The flow of capital had much to do with depreciation
which, in itself, created internal difficulties.

The most

noticeable difficulty was the pressure on the ascending
price levels of most of the countries.
This last measuring device is also useful in help
ing to determine the approximate need for capital and the
ability of a country to absorb it.

At present, popular

criteria for explaining capital needs center around the
association between changes in capital and available
goods and services.

A consideration of the three measuring

devices would give a better Indication of the probable
effects on the functioning of the economy as a whole
occasioned by a change in capital movements.
There are other beneficial results to be derived
from the utilization of the three measuring devices
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.

For example, they

provide a means for checking the effectiveness of policy
implementation.

By this is meant that these devices indi

cate whether or not monetary, fiscal, and external policies
are clearly Implemented toward the purpose of achieving a
condition of international equilibrium.

This objective or
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goal is, of course, subject to change in a dynamic economy;
yet, the measuring devices act as signals calling for
changes in policy application for the purpose of producing
a more balanced growth.
This study has quite conclusively supported the
view that the intensive desire for economic development is
so strong that it tends to overshadow the principal
objective of balanced growth as expressed by the concept
of international equilibrium.

This trend is dangerous

from the standpoint of both short and long run growth.

As

observed, the short run effect of stimulated development
often produces high prices and inflation rather than
increased output.

From a long run viewpoint, there is the

problem of mal-allocation of resources.

This difficulty,

in itself, may turn possible short run gains into long run
losses, particularly if key factors are inflexible to change.
An analysis of the evidence covered by this study
reveals that there is but limited benefit to be derived
from making broad observations which may be said to apply
to groups or areas of nations.

Each country is confronted

with problems and means of solving them, and these are
often different from nation to nation.
Although this study has suggested, at various times,
the influence of long run structural factors,:it has
covered but a five-year period.

It therefore contains
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shortcomings which will become clearer as the short run
blends into a longer period of time.
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